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SUMMARY 
 
This thesis examines the impact of several types of business regulations on bank 
performance, as measured by cost efficiency, in the EU economies over the 2000-2010 
periods. First we investigate the impact of credit, labour and business regulation on the 
performance of the banking systems of the EU-10.  The regulation indices are sourced from 
the Fraser Index of Economic Freedom (Gwartney et. al, 2012). In further analysis, we 
decompose the credit regulation variable in its components (private ownership of banks, 
foreign bank competition,  private sector credit,  limitations from interest rate controls and 
regulations) in order to find which type of credit regulation is more important for 
performance.  
Second, we examine the impact of several type of business regulations derived from the 
“Doing Business” project of the World Bank on bank performance as measured by cost 
efficiency in the EU-10 economies. More specifically we  use regulation indices related to: i) 
starting a business, ii) getting credit, iii) paying taxes, iv) enforcing contracts, v) resolving 
insolvency, vi) protecting investors, and vii) employing workers. We put special emphasis on 
regulations related to “getting credit”, “paying taxes” and “starting a business” as the first 
type is directly relevant to the banking sector while the next two on the top of the EU agenda. 
In further analysis we investigate if the impact of business regulation on bank performance is 
influenced by institutional quality as measured by rule of law and corruption variables.  
iv 
 
 
Third, we assess the impact of different types of labour regulation on bank performance, as 
measured by cost efficiency, in the five countries of the eurozone periphery (Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, Portugal, Spain) over the 2000-2010 periods. We source the labour regulation variables 
from the Fraser Index of Economic Freedom (Gwartney et. al, 2012) and from the 
Employment Protection Index produced by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD). In further analysis we investigate if the impact of labour regulation on 
bank performance is influenced by the country-level law enforcement capacity.  
Finally, some conclusions are provided along with limitations of this research and an agenda 
for future work. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
v 
 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
This thesis has been a journey that I enjoyed immensely, I am grateful to many people I have 
met these years. Some of them come more in my mind as they had a tremendous effect on my 
performance and the opportunities I got. So I opt to be laconic. I am grateful to my supervisor 
Emmanuel Mamatzakis for all his support over the last years, I have learned a great deal on 
how to work through his support. I am indebted to my parents and my family for all this 
support I received from them. Courtney Fingar, editor of the Financial Times, for giving me 
initially the opportunity to pursue a career in the UK. Alexandros Karalakis for his logistical 
support and being a real friend. Finally, Theodora for being a companion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
vi 
 
 
 
 
 
“Dedicated to my  family Manolis, Ioanna and Kallia; they always believe in me 
and to Theodora; I always believe in her” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
vii 
 
 
Table of Contents 
Chapter 1: Introduction .................................................................................................................................. 1 
Chapter 2:The Impact of Regulation of Credit, Labour and Business on  Bank Performance in 
the EU-10 Economies ..................................................................................................................................... 8 
2.1 Introduction and Literature Review ................................................................................................ 8 
2.2 Variables and Methodology ............................................................................................................ 13 
2.2.1 Measuring Cost Efficiency ..................................................................................................... 13 
2.2.2 The Fraser Index of Economic Freedom and its Components ..................................... 18 
2.2.3 Bank-specific and Country-specific Control Variables .................................................. 23 
2.3 Results and Discussion ..................................................................................................................... 24 
2.3.1 Cost Efficiency Estimates ....................................................................................................... 24 
2.3.2 The Determinants of Cost Efficiency –Fixed Effects Results ...................................... 25 
2.3.2.1 Major Components of the Fraser Index of Economic Freedom .......................... 26 
2.3.2.2  Credit (CR-REG), Labour (LR-REG) and Business Regulation (BR-REG) .. 29 
2.3.2.3  Decomposing Credit Regulations ................................................................................ 31 
2.3.3  The Determinants of Cost Efficiency –  Dynamic Panel Data Results ..................... 33 
2.3.3.1 Major Components of the Fraser index of Economic Freedom- Dynamic 
Estimation .......................................................................................................................................... 34 
2.3.3.2  Credit (CR-REG), Labour (LR-REG) and Business Regulation (BR-REG)- 
Dynamic Estimation ....................................................................................................................... 37 
2.3.3.3  Decomposing Credit Regulations- Dynamic Estimation ...................................... 39 
2.3.4  Sensitivity Analysis – Panel Vector Autoregressive (VAR) estimation .................. 42 
2.3.4.1 Impulse Response Functions (IRFs) and Variance Decompositions (VDCs)  
for Foreign Bank Competition (CR-COMP), Interest Rate Controls (CR-IR),  Bank 
Market Concentration (C5) and Efficiency (EFF) ................................................................. 42 
2.3.4.2 Impulse Response Functions (IRFs) and Variance Decompositions (VDCs)  
for Private Ownership (CR-OWN),  Private Sector Credit (CR-PRS),  Bank Market 
Concentration (C5) and Efficiency (EFF) ................................................................................ 45 
2.4 Conclusion ........................................................................................................................................... 46 
Appendices to Chapter 2 ......................................................................................................................... 48 
Appendix A ............................................................................................................................................ 48 
Appendix B: Robustness Regressions ............................................................................................ 51 
Appendix C: Panel VAR Methodology ......................................................................................... 53 
Chapter 3: The Impact of Business Regulation on Bank Performance in the EU-27 ................ 56 
3.1 Introduction.......................................................................................................................................... 56 
viii 
 
 
3.2 Data and Variables ............................................................................................................................. 58 
3.2.1 Measuring Bank Performance ................................................................................................ 58 
3.2.2 Business Regulations ................................................................................................................ 61 
3.3  Related Literature and Hypothesis Development .................................................................... 63 
3.3.1 Starting a Business .................................................................................................................... 63 
3.3.2  Getting Credit ............................................................................................................................ 63 
3.3.2.1  Creditor Rights .................................................................................................................. 63 
3.3.2.2   Credit Information Sharing .......................................................................................... 64 
3.3.3  Paying Taxes .............................................................................................................................. 65 
3.3.4  Enforcing Contracts ................................................................................................................. 66 
3.3.5  Protecting Investors ................................................................................................................. 66 
3.3.6  Resolving Insolvency .............................................................................................................. 67 
3.3.7  Employing Workers ................................................................................................................. 68 
3.3.8  The Interaction of Regulations and Institutional Quality ............................................. 69 
3.4  Results and Discussion .................................................................................................................... 70 
3.4.1 Bank Performance Estimates ................................................................................................. 70 
3.4.2  The Impact of the Control Variables .................................................................................. 71 
3.4.3  The Impact of Business Regulations .................................................................................. 72 
3.4.3.1 Starting a Business ............................................................................................................ 72 
3.4.3.2 Getting Credit ..................................................................................................................... 77 
3.4.3.3 Paying Taxes ....................................................................................................................... 83 
3.4.3.4 Enforcing Contracts .......................................................................................................... 88 
3.4.3.5 Protecting investors .......................................................................................................... 93 
3.4.3.6  Resolving Insolvency ...................................................................................................... 98 
3.4.3.7 Employing Workers ....................................................................................................... 102 
3.4.4 Sensitivity Analysis: Is the Impact of Getting Credit and Protecting Investors 
regulation on Bank Performance heterogeneous in the Crisis Years? ............................... 107 
3.5  Conclusion ....................................................................................................................................... 111 
Appendix to Chapter 3 .......................................................................................................................... 113 
Chapter 4: The Impact of Labour Regulation on Bank Performance in the Eurozone Periphery 
(Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal and Spain) ........................................................................................ 114 
4.1   Introduction and Literature Review ........................................................................................ 114 
4.2  Data and Variables ........................................................................................................................ 116 
ix 
 
 
4.2.1 Measuring Bank Performance (Cost Inefficiency) ....................................................... 116 
4.2.2 Determinants of Bank Performance  (Cost inefficiency) ............................................ 119 
4.2.2.1 Labour Regulations ........................................................................................................ 119 
4.2.2.2 Control Variables ........................................................................................................... 124 
4.3  Results and Discussion ................................................................................................................. 125 
4.3.1  Cost Inefficiency Estimates ................................................................................................ 125 
4.3.2 The Determinants of Bank Performance (Cost Inefficiency) .................................... 126 
4.3.2.1 The Impact of the Control Variables ........................................................................ 126 
4.3.2.2  The Impact of Labour Regulation on Bank Performance using the Fraser 
Index ................................................................................................................................................ 127 
4.3.2.3  The Impact of Labour Regulation on Bank Performance using  the OECD 
Strictness of Employment Protection index .......................................................................... 131 
4.3.2.4  Is the impact of Labour Regulation on Bank Performance Dependent on the 
Rule of Law? .................................................................................................................................. 135 
4.3.2.5  Does the Impact of Labour Regulation on Bank Performance Differs in the 
Crisis Period? ................................................................................................................................. 139 
4.4 Conclusion ........................................................................................................................................ 143 
Appendices to Chapter 4 ...................................................................................................................... 144 
Appendix A ......................................................................................................................................... 144 
Appendix B ......................................................................................................................................... 153 
Chapter 5: Conclusions ............................................................................................................................. 156 
References ..................................................................................................................................................... 163 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
This thesis investigates the impact of financial-specific and more general economy-
wide regulations on bank performance, as measured by cost efficiency, in the 
enlarged European Union (EU-27) over the 2000-2010 periods. This introductory 
section will discuss why it is important to examine the determinants of the 
performance of the banking sector in the EU and why we are focusing on 
regulations.  
A well developed and well-functioning banking system is a central element of 
financial development which in turn is a major determinant in the process of 
economic growth and development (Levine and Zervos, 1998; Levine et al., 2000; 
Christopoulos and Tsionas 2004; Hassan et al. 2011).
1
 This is because banks, by 
acting as intermediaries, enable the execution of five important functions that 
decrease  transaction costs in the credit market. In this way, the banking sector 
becomes a driver of investment growth, which in turn leads to economic growth 
(Levine, 1997; Levine 2005). These five functions are according to Levine (2005) 
the following:  i) The production of ex ante information about potential investments 
and capital allocation, ii) The ex post monitoring of investment projects, iii) The 
facilitation of trading, diversification and management of risk, iv)  The mobilization 
and pool of savings, and v) The ease of the exchange of goods and services. Given 
these important functions that financial institutions such as banks carry out, it is 
natural to expect that when banks perform poorly the negative effects on the real 
economy can be severe as the recent financial crisis has clearly demonstrated. This is 
because  banks that are in a risky position as a result of poor performance tend to 
reduce credit availability to the rest of the economy (Bernanke 1983; Ashcraft 2005). 
This is especially true in the recent crisis (Ivashina and Scharfsteinb, 2010) and for 
firms and sectors that are more dependent on bank capital (Kroszner et al, 2007; 
                                                        
1  There is also the view that  economic growth can be a determinant of financial development. Such 
studies do not exclude that financial development is a determinant of economic growth but they rather 
find a bidirectional causality between these two (Shan et al., 2001, Hassan et al., 2011). It is also 
useful to note that the direction of causality that favors financial development as a determinant of 
economic growth becomes stronger the higher the level of economic development of a country 
(Calderon and Liu, 2003; Hassan et al. 2011). This last observation is important for the context of this 
thesis as most of the EU economies are highly developed while some of them are the catching up 
stage (the new member states that are finalizing their transition from planned to market economies). 
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Dell’Ariccia et al., 2008; Chava and Purnanandam, 2011). This reduction of the 
credit availability can lead to a reduction in investment activity and thus a decrease 
in capital investment, job growth and economic growth in general.  The studies that 
have examined the impact of banking crises on economic growth provide evidence 
that poor performance and increased risk in the banking sector of an economy has 
detrimental effects on growth  (Boyd et al., 2005; Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2006; 
Furceri and Mourougane, 2012).  Another issue, that highlights the importance of 
banks for an economy and has been demonstrated in the ongoing sovereign debt 
crisis in the EU is that the poor performance of the banking sector can lead to 
significant increases of public debt and deficit (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009; 2010). 
Part of this increased in government debt could be a result of increased government 
intervention in the banking sector in the form of bank bailouts and bank 
recapitalization measures. Such type of costly government interventions are usually 
justified by policy makers on the grounds that they are essential measures in order to 
mitigate the negative  effects of a banking crisis, as for example the reduction in the 
credit supply in the real economy. The empirical evidence on the success of such 
measures though remains inconclusive as some studies find that government 
intervention in the banking sectors moderates the negative effect of bank crisis on  
economic performance (Giannetti and Simonov, 2009; Laeven and Valencia, 2013) 
while some other studies find that such policies were not able to mitigate the effects 
of a bank crisis on the real economy (Claessens et al. 2005; Dell’Arricia et al., 2008). 
It is important to note that according to Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) it is not the 
direct costs of policies to support the banking sector that drive the increase of 
government debt and deficit in a period of banking crisis but rather a steep decrease 
in government tax revenue and other increased in government spending to counter 
the recession. In the view of Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) the higher the extent that 
the crisis of the banking sector has led an economy to a recession the higher the 
possibility that a sovereign debt crisis could occur because of decreased government 
revenue and increased government spending. Mody and Sandri (2012) on the other 
hand provide evidence that the sovereign risk of the countries in the euro area, 
especially for the ones in the EU periphery, has  increased because of greater 
expectation of public spending in support of risky banks. Furthermore Ang and 
Longstaff (2013) provide evidence from the EU and the US that crises in the 
financial markets can have an independent from the macroeconomic fundamentals 
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effect on sovereign risk. Although there is not a consensus in terms of the channel 
through which the poor performance and the riskiness of the banking sector can 
negatively affect an economy’s public debt and deficit, there is a consensus that bank 
crises can lead to a deterioration in the public finances.  
The choice of focusing this thesis on the determinants of the performance of the 
banking sector in the EU becomes then a relevant and timely issue. The banking 
sector is of great importance for the EU economies. This is because the majority of 
these countries have financial systems that are bank-based rather than market-based 
(see for example Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (2002).
2
 Secondly, several 
countries of the  EU, especially the ones in the periphery, are still in the midst of 
severe recession, that has started in the beginning of 2008 as a banking crisis and has 
spread to the real economy through less availability of credit (Hristov et al., 2012; 
Gaiotti 2013). This economic slowdown feeds back to the banking sector creating a 
situation of mutual destabilization between the banking sector and the real economy. 
Finally the progress of the crisis in the EU from the bank and the real economy level 
to the sovereign level has depleted the fiscal ammunition of governments to wither 
this double banking and real economy crisis.  
The focus of this thesis on the impact of regulation on bank performance is 
motivated by the fact that the extant bank performance literature examines a limited 
type of regulations that are related to prudential supervision and bank-specific 
regulation mainly using the Barth et al. (2001) dataset.
3
  However banks de facto and 
de jure operate within the regulatory framework of the country that they are located. 
The regulatory framework of a country covers a wide range of economy-wide 
regulations such as labour and other types business regulation that could affect the 
performance of the banking sector.
4
 Stringent labour regulation for example could 
affect directly the labour costs of banks and thus have a direct impact on their 
                                                        
2
 Over time the distinction between bank-based and market-based financial systems for the 
continental European economies subdues as they become more similar to the anglosaxon market-
based systems (Rajan and Zingales, 2003; Bruno et al. 2012). The banking sector though in the 
majority of the EU economies remains of crucial importance.  
3
 The Barth et al. (2001) dataset contains data on bank regulation that are related to official 
supervisory power, capital requirements, private monitoring and activities restrictions.  
4
 Several types of economy wide regulations are examined with respect to their impact on bank 
performance. These type of regulations include: labour regulation, business regulation, tax regulation, 
contract regulation, insolvency regulation, protecting investors regulation and bankruptcy regulation. 
These are sourced from economic freedom indices such the Fraser Index of Economic Freedom and 
the “Doing Business” project of the World Bank.  
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performance. It could also affect the performance of the non-bank firms in an 
economy and this could be channeled to the banking sector through an impact on the 
non performing loans.  The same could apply for other types of regulation such as 
tax regulation. The first contribution of this thesis then is to analyze the importance 
of several types of non financial-specific regulation on bank performance.   
 There are also some types of financial regulations that are not covered by the Barth 
et al. (2001) dataset and are not adequately examined in the banking literature in 
terms of their impact on bank performance. Such types of regulation include the 
existence and the coverage of credit bureaus and registries, the depth of credit 
information available in the credit registries and the strength of creditor rights. The 
credit information infrastructure of an economy as well as the strength of creditor 
rights  is of major importance for banks located  in this country. This is because they 
can facilitate easier and less costly loan origination  through the decrease in the 
credit market of issues such as adverse selection and moral hazard (Pagano and 
Jappelli, 1993; Kalberg and Udell, 2003; Acharya et al., 2011). We also examine 
financial regulations that are related to barriers to foreign and private bank 
competition and interest rate controls.  The second contribution of this thesis then is 
that it examines the impact of these types of financial regulation on bank 
performance. 
Furthermore, regulation by default implies an interaction of the public sector, that is 
the regulation enforcement mechanism, and the economic agents of an economy. 
This interaction can be influenced by the country-level  institutional quality. In 
countries with higher level of law observance a regulation is more likely to be 
actually enforced. On the other hand, in economies characterized by lower levels of 
rule of law a regulation is more likely to exist on paper but not enforced in practice. 
Similarly, another indicator of institutional quality, corruption, can influence the 
impact of regulation on bank performance. This is because corruption can either 
represent an additional cost in the interaction of a firm with the state bureaucracy of 
the regulation enforcement mechanism
5
 or be able to speed-up bureaucratic 
processes and enable firms to circumvent excessive regulation and thus incur 
                                                        
5
 This is the “sand the wheel” hypothesis of corruption (see, for example, Murphy et al., 1993) 
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efficiency gains
6
. The third contribution of this thesis then is that it investigates the 
extent to which institutional quality, as measured by rule of law and control of 
corruption, influences the impact of regulations on bank performance in the EU 
economies.  
Finally, it is important to select an appropriate measure of bank performance. In this 
thesis we use cost efficiency as a measure of bank performance. Frontier efficiency 
estimations measure the performance of a decision making unit (DMU), such as  
banks, in comparative terms with the best performing DMUs of an industry.  The use 
of frontier estimations of bank cost efficiency is employed in this thesis on the 
grounds that they are considered superior measures of firm performance in 
comparison with more accounting based measures of performance such as the cost to 
income ratio and other financial ratios (Berger and Humphrey, 1997; Bauer et al., 
1998).  This is because frontier estimations of bank efficiency are able to account for 
all the inputs, input prices and outputs of bank operations  (Thanassoulis et al., 1996; 
Berger and Humphrey, 1997). In this way they offer an objective numerical 
efficiency score and ranking of a banks (Berger and Humphrey, 1997) that can be 
used for academic research, regulatory and other purposes (Bauer et al., 1998). 
Additionally, we opt for cost efficiency estimation instead of profit efficiency 
because the ability of banks to control costs in general is an important objective for 
bank management as it is the efficient use of resources that determines success in the 
financial sector (Spong et al., 1995).  Furthermore, cost efficiency is preferable to 
profit efficiency because of the realistic assumption that bank managers have greater 
control over inputs and input costs rather than over outputs (Goddart et al., 2001; 
Casu and Girardone, 2006). 
This thesis is organized into five chapters. The next chapter, Chapter 2, examines  
the impact of business, labour and credit regulation on bank performance in the ten 
new EU member countries of Central and Eastern Europe. These regulation indices 
are sourced from the Fraser Index of Economic Freedom (Gwartney et. al, 2012). 
Using data from IBCA-Bankscope we derive bank cost efficiency scores using a 
parametric approach (data envelopment analysis) for the period prior to and 
immediately following the accession of these economies in the EU  (2000-2010).  
                                                        
6
 This is the “grease the wheel” hypothesis of corruption (see, for example Lui, 1985). 
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These scores are then used in fixed effects panel models, dynamic panel models and 
dynamic panel vector autoregression (VAR) models to estimate the impact of these 
types of regulation on bank-specific efficiency in these economies. In further 
analysis we decompose the credit regulation index into its components to find 
specifically which type of credit regulation matters most for bank performance . 
These components are: i) private ownership of banks, ii) foreign bank competition, 
iii) private sector credit and iv) limitations from interest rate controls and 
regulations. Finally, we provide some robustness checks with an alternative 
economic freedom index; the Heritage Foundation Index of Economic Freedom.  
In Chapter 3 we provide a comprehensive analysis of the impact of business and 
financial specific regulations on bank performance as measured by cost efficiency in 
the EU-27 over the 2004-2010 periods. In order to derive estimates of bank cost 
efficiencies we use data from IBCA-Bankscope and employ a parametric approach 
(stochastic frontier analysis). These are then regressed in both fixed effects and 
dynamic panel models over several types of business regulation. To this end we 
employ for the first time in the banking literature a unique dataset of a wide range of 
regulation indices from the “Doing Business” project of the World Bank. More 
specifically we  use regulation indices related to: i) starting a business, ii) getting 
credit, iii) paying taxes, iv) enforcing contracts, v) resolving insolvency, vi) 
protecting investors, and vii) employing workers. These general categories of 
business regulations are decomposed to account for diverse regulatory aspects. In 
further analysis we use interaction terms between the business regulation variables 
and institutional quality measures such as the rule of law and the control of 
corruption. These institutional quality measures are sourced from the World 
Governance Indicators of the World Bank. The purpose of using  in the econometric 
analysis the interaction terms between the business regulation variables and the rule 
of law and control of corruption variables is to examine if the individual effect of 
business regulation on bank performance becomes is influenced by higher levels of 
institutional quality. In further analysis we interact the  business regulation variables 
of the getting credit and protecting investors categories with a crisis dummy for the 
years 2008-2010.  In this way we explore if the individual impact of these 
regulations on bank performance subdues or becomes magnified in the years of the 
crisis. 
7 
 
 
 
Chapter 4 focuses on the impact of labour regulation on bank performance, as 
measured by cost efficiency, in the five countries of the eurozone periphery (Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain) over the 2000-2010 periods. These countries of the 
EU are currently struggling to wither a crisis that is related in three fronts: the 
banking sector, the real economy and the sovereign level. One of the measures they 
are adopting in order to improve their economic performance is the reduction of the 
strigency of labour regulation. Thus, it is timely and interesting to explore what 
impact labour regulation could have on the bank performance in these economies. 
To this end we use data from IBCA-Bankscope and employ a parametric approach 
(stochastic frontier analysis) in order to derive estimates of bank-specific cost 
inefficiencies. In a second stage analysis we regress these inefficiencies over several 
labour regulation variables along with bank-specific and country-level control 
variables. We source the labour regulation variables from the Fraser Index of 
Economic Freedom (Gwartney et. al, 2012) and from the Employment Protection 
Index produced by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD). Several types of labour regulation such as dismissal costs, minimum wage, 
hiring regulation, centralised collective bargaining regulation, hours regulation and 
conscription regulation are being employed in the models. We also examine 
dismissal cost regulation related to regular employment contracts, temporary 
employment contracts and collective dismissals. In further analysis we interact the 
labour regulation variables with the rule of law variable sourced from the World 
Governance Indicators of the World Bank. The purpose of this analysis is to 
examine whether the individual impact of labour regulations on bank performance 
subdues or becomes magnified at higher levels of law observance. Finally we 
interact the  labour regulation variables with a crisis dummy for the years 2008-2010 
to examine if the impact of labour regulation on bank performance becomes more or 
less important in the crisis years. 
Finally, in Chapter 5  we present a summary of the contributions of this thesis and  
provide some concluding remarks and public policy implications. We also discuss 
limitations of this research and an agenda for future research. 
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Chapter 2:The Impact of Regulation of Credit, Labour and 
Business on  Bank Performance in the EU-10 Economies 
 
2.1 Introduction and Literature Review 
 
The on-going financial crisis poses many challenges but also provides an 
opportunity to enhance efforts for constructive financial consolidation. In particular, 
a major concern for policy makers and market participants in the financial markets is 
related to the debate on the role of financial regulation and its impact on bank 
performance. This chapter focuses on the impact of regulation on banking sector 
performance, as this is of major importance to the well-functioning of financial 
markets. However, the importance of regulation is not limited to the banking sector.  
Particularly during a prolonged financial crisis, poor bank performance may have 
heavy negative effects for the overall economy because of the potential 
destabilisation of the financial system and the effect of restricted credit. The recent 
vulnerability of the financial markets provides a strong motivation to further study 
the importance of regulation. 
It is important to note that regulation is a very complex series of activities.  
Therefore, its nature and impact differs from highly specialised applications to 
industrial sectors to more general legal requirements directed to the economy as a 
whole. The literature that relates regulation to bank performance so far has been 
largely dominated by aspects specific to the banking/financial sector as this type of 
prudential regulation is considered by policy makers to be an important foundation 
for a sound financial system. In recent years there has been an increasing amount of 
cross-country empirical studies that link financial regulation and supervisory 
practices to bank performance (Barth et al., 2004 ; Barth et al. 2013 ; Beck et al., 
2006; Delis et al., 2011 ; Pasiouras, 2008;  Pasiouras et al., 2009)
 7
. A consensus in 
                                                        
7
 Barth et al. (2004) examines the supervisory practices and regulations in the banking sectors of 107 
economies and finds a positive and significant impact of private monitoring on bank performance but 
not a statistically significant relationship between bank performance and official supervisory power 
and capital strigency. Beck et al. (2006) in a study of 2,500 firms across 37 countries find that 
supervisory strategy that focuses on empowering private monitoring of banks by forcing them to 
disclose accurate information to the private sector tends to lower the degree to which corruption of 
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the literature on what constitutes good regulation, or how specific regulations 
influence the performance and stability of the banking sector (see e.g. Demirgüç-
Kunt et al., 2008) has not been established.  What is striking though is the absence of 
any studies that have examined the impact of non-financial regulation on bank 
performance. This is of additional importance in light of the recent financial crisis as 
many countries have enhanced their efforts to improve competitiveness and foster 
growth with structural reforms directed towards their business environment while at 
the same time supporting their financial sector to weather the crisis. Even the richest 
countries have found this to be far from easy. 
Early empirical studies of bank crisis determinants such as Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Detragiache (1998, 2002) find that better institutional quality at the country-level 
decreases the probability of a banking crisis and limits the impact of moral hazard 
due to deposit insurance. In these studies, institutional variables such as rule of law 
and quality of bureaucracy are interpreted as proxies for bank-specific supervision 
and regulation because of alternative data unavailability.  Data on bank-specific 
regulation led to studies that focus on regulation while indices of non-bank specific 
institutional and regulatory quality are used as control variables. The research 
philosophy behind such an approach is to examine not only whether bank-specific 
regulation exists as legislation but also to what extent this is being enforced in 
practice. Even in such a framework the importance of the non-financial institutional 
and regulatory framework in explaining cross-country differences in bank 
                                                                                                                                                                            
bank officials is an obstacle to firms raising external finance. Pasiouras (2008) examines the effect of 
a series of financial regulations on the performance of banks as measured by technical efficiency and 
finds that although strict capital adequacy, market discipline and powerful supervision are positively 
associated with efficiency, the effect is statistically significant only for regulation related to market 
discipline.  In another study, Pasiouras et al. (2009) investigate the impact of the three pillars of Basel 
II and restrictions on bank activities on efficiency. They find that regulation that enhances market 
discipline and the supervisory power of the authorities is positively related with bank efficiency. On 
the other hand, restrictions on bank activities increase profit efficiency but reduce cost efficiency, 
while stricter capital requirements have the opposite effect. Barth et al. (2013) examined whether 
bank regulation, supervision and monitoring improves bank efficiency, based on an unbalanced panel 
of 4,000 observations in 72 countries for 1999-2007. They find that tighter restrictions on bank 
activities have a negative impact on bank efficiency, while increased regulation has a marginally 
positive effect on efficiency. They also find that enhanced official supervisory power is positively 
associated with efficiency only in countries with independent supervisory authorities. In a more 
recent study, Delis et al. (2011) examine the relationship between the banking regulatory and 
supervision framework and banking productivity in 22 transition economies. Their results indicate 
that private monitoring and restrictions on bank activities have a positive impact on productivity 
while regulation related to the first and second pillars of Basel II (capital requirements and official 
supervisory power) do not appear to have a statistically significant impact on productivity although 
they appear to gain importance in the post financial crisis period (after 2007). 
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performance is emphasized by Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2004)
8
. On the other hand, 
studies that explicitly focus on the importance of country-level 
institutional/regulatory quality as determinants of bank efficiency are very scarce 
(Hasan et al. 2009; Lensink et al., 2008). 
Three issues emerge from the literature that examines the impact of country-level 
regulation on bank performance.  Firstly, most studies focus on prudential and 
supervisory regulation specific to the banking/financial sector. Secondly, country-
level regulatory or institutional variables have been mostly used as control variables 
when the importance of banking/financial regulation is examined. Finally, the scant 
literature that explicitly examines the impact of institutions and regulation on bank 
performance does not differentiate clearly between alternative types of 
regulatory/institutional quality, which is important in order to prioritise reform 
efforts. 
In this chapter we contribute to the literature in several ways. Firstly, we use the 
regulation components of the Fraser Index of Economic Freedom to examine the 
impact of credit (financial) regulation, on bank performance in the EU-10 
economies. The credit regulation index used in this study moves away from 
prudential and supervisory regulation issues as it relates mostly to regulation 
concerned with the ownership structure of national banking system, that is, 
government-owned, private-owned and foreign-owned banks. Previous research on 
the link between bank ownership and performance finds that privately owned banks 
perform better than their government owned counterparts (Berger et al., 2005; 
Cornet et al., 2010; Lin and Zhang, 2009; Mian, 2003; Mico et al., 2007). The 
comparatively poor performance of government-owned banks compared with those 
                                                        
8
 Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2004) in a study of 1,400 banks across 72 countries find that once they 
control for variables reflecting the non-financial regulatory framework such as the general level of 
economic freedom and the extent of protection of property rights, bank regulations become 
insignificant as determinants of net interest margins in the banking sector while the non-financial 
regulatory  indicators negatively affect net interest margins and overheads. The authors conclude that 
bank regulations cannot be viewed in isolation from the non-bank regulatory and institutional 
framework. In another study Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2008) examine whether compliance with the 
Basel Core Principles (BCPs) for Effective Banking Supervision improves bank soundness. The 
authors confirm a significant and positive relationship between bank soundness and compliance with 
principles related to information provision while their results remain robust after controlling inter alia 
for country level institutional quality as proxied by the rule of law. However, the overall index of 
BCP loses much of its statistical significance once institutional quality is controlled for. Furthermore 
most of the other components of the BCPs index are found not to be significant determinants of bank 
soundness in regressions where the rule of law index is included. 
11 
 
 
 
in private ownership can be attributed to political influence in the former group 
(Carvahlo, 2010; Cole, 2009; Dinc, 2005; Khwaja and Mian, 2005; Mico et al., 
2007; Sapienza, 2004). 
Private banks can be categorized into foreign and domestic. The theoretical 
framework used in research related to the comparative performance between these is 
based on two alternative hypotheses proposed by Berger et al. (2000).  In the first 
hypothesis, the “home advantage”, domestic banks can operate more efficiently 
than foreign banks in their own country as they are more familiar with the local 
business environment and institutional framework. In the alternative hypothesis, the 
“global advantage”, foreign banks may possess enough firm-specific advantages to 
overcome the liability of foreignness and so even outperform local competitors in 
the host economy. In terms of emerging and developing economies most of the 
evidence supports the “global advantage” hypothesis  as noted by several authors 
(Bonin et al., 2005; Classens et al., 2001; Detragiache et al., 2008; Grigorian and 
Manole, 2006; Micco et al., 2007). However, other studies find support for the 
“home advantage” hypothesis (Nikiel and Opiela, 2008; Yildirim and Phillipatos, 
2007). Finally, some studies do not find significant differences in terms of 
performance between domestic and foreign banks (Crystal et al., 2001; Mian, 2003). 
The second contribution of this chapter is the investigation of the impact of labour 
and business regulation on bank performance. With respect to labour regulation its 
relevance to the banking sector is twofold. First of all the ability of banks to control 
costs in general, and personnel expenses in particular, is an important objective for 
bank management as it is the efficient use of resources that determines success in the 
financial sector (Spong et al., 1995). Secondly, to the extent that labour regulation 
has a negative or positive impact on the performance of firms located within a 
national jurisdiction this could affect the performance of the domestic banking sector 
through spillover effects such as lower or higher loan default rates. 
The existence of labour market regulation is based on the rationale that employees 
benefit from protection from arbitrary actions by employers. However, it may 
increase the costs of firms to employ workers and adjust employment to the optimal 
level (Nickel, 1997). Most of the empirical studies that relate  labour regulation to 
economic outcomes such as output and unemployment (e.g., Blanchard and 
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Portugal, 2001; Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000; Botero et al., 2004; Heckman and 
Pagés, 2003; Lazear, 1990; Nickel and Layard, 1999) find that strict labour 
regulation has a negative impact on economic performance. While there is a growing 
consensus in the literature related to the effects of labour regulation on employment, 
relatively less is known about the impact of labour regulation on productivity. 
Furthermore, in studies that focus on productivity growth the evidence is mixed. A 
stream of recent papers finds a negative impact of labour regulation on investment 
and productivity growth (Autor et al., 2007; Bassanini et al., 2009; Besley and 
Burgess, 2004). Such productivity losses can be explained by rising employment 
costs as a result of stricter employment protection legislation (Bassanini and Ernst 
2002; Scarpetta and Tressel 2004).   On the other hand, other studies find that more 
strict labour regulation can lead to productivity gains (Deakin and Sarkar, 2008; 
Storm and Naastepad, 2009)  as firms and employees are more inclined to invest in 
enhancing firm-specific skills in the workforce (Auer, 2007; Wasmer, 2006). 
Business regulations and bureaucratic procedures that restrain business entry and 
reduce competition may also affect bank performance through spillover effects. In 
particular regulatory entry barriers can lead to decreased competition through a 
reduction in new firms entering an industry (Ciccone and Papaioannou, 2007;  
Klapper et al., 2006). This decreased competitive pressure can lead to lower 
investment (Alesina et al., 2005), reduced growth (Loayza et al., 2005) and less 
productivity (Bastos and Nasir, 2004; Bourlès et al., 2010; Nicoletti and Scarpetta, 
2003). Thus, strict business regulation can have a negative effect on the performance 
of firms and so affect the fulfilment of the obligations these firms have to the 
domestic banking sector.  In addition, increased business regulation is found to 
induce informality (Loayza et al., 2005) so making it harder for banks to assess the 
creditworthiness of a firm. Furthermore, in order to evaluate the relative importance 
of regulation of credit, labour and business in comparison with other elements of 
economic freedom we include in the initial estimations the remaining economic 
freedom variables. These are: limited size of government, legal structure and 
property rights, access to sound money and freedom to trade with foreigners. 
Finally, we focus this study on a sample of banks in the EU-10 economies that are 
involved actively in a process of financial integration.  This is a group whom a wider 
definition of regulation is likely to improve significantly their performance. Previous 
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studies related to bank performance in transition economies and the ownership 
structure in transitional banking systems have used both country-specific case 
studies and cross-country frameworks although no consensus has been reached 
(Asaftei and Kumbhakar, 2005; Bonin et al., 2005 ; Dimova, 2004 ; Fang et al., 
2011; Fries and Taci, 2005; Green et al., 2004 ; Hasan and Marton, 2003; 
Havrylchyk, 2006; Kasman and Yildirim, 2006 ;  Kosac et al., 2009; Mamatzakis et 
al., 2008; Matousek and Taci, 2004; Nikiel and Opiela, 2008; Opiela, 2001;  
Pruteanu-Podpiera, 2008; Taci and Zampieri, 1998). In this chapter the credit 
regulation components of the Fraser Index allows greater insight into this issue and 
this is the final contribution of the study. The Fraser Index labour and business 
regulation components are used for the first time in the context of bank performance 
in an application to EU-10 countries currently in transition to full market economies. 
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.2 describes the data and 
the methodology, Section 2.3 presents the econometric results and the final section 
concludes.  
               2.2 Variables and Methodology 
              2.2.1 Measuring Cost Efficiency 
 
The literature has followed two distinct approaches in modelling the efficiency of 
financial institutions.  These are based on productive and intermediary activity, and 
have been effectively distinguished by Humphrey (1985).  Similarly, the techniques 
commonly used to estimate efficiency also fall into two distinct groups, econometric 
models (Stochastic Frontier Approach, Thick Frontier Approach, and Distribution 
Free Approach) and a non-parametric, frontier approach originally developed by 
Farrell (1957), using linear programming techniques (Data Envelopment Analysis 
and Free Disposal Hull Analysis).
9
   Non-parametric frontier estimation does not 
require the imposition of any specific structure of the cost efficiency frontier. Thus, 
the efficiency measurement would not be biased because of a misspecification of the 
cost function (see Bauer et al., 1998). The probability of a misspecification of the 
cost function in the context of transition and developing economies is high because  
                                                        
9
 See Ferrier and Lovell (1990) for a comparison of parametric and non-parametric models for the 
financial sector.  
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market imperfections, as for example a high involvement of the government in the 
banking sector, could  distort the prices of inputs and therefore render complicated 
the estimation of the cost function with parametric approaches (Bhattacharyya et al., 
1997; Ataullah et al., 2004;  Claessens and Van Horen, 2012). Thus, non-parametric 
approaches such as DEA are common in efficiency studies focused on transition 
economies, where assumptions of competitive markets with cost-minimisation may 
not be appropriate (see for example Grigorian and Manole, 2006).  Given the 
process of transition of the EU-10 economies is not complete in a large portion of 
the years of this study (2000-2010), a non-parametric approach (DEA) is the method 
of choice of this chapter.  
To measure cost-efficiency using Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), it is assumed 
that all banks have access to the same technology that defines the production 
possibilities set. Each is benchmarked using linear programming against the most 
efficient (frontier) banks and scores derived that range from zero to one. The 
deterministic nature of the frontier attributes the entire difference between the most 
efficient bank, which serves as the reference point for the construction of the 
efficiency frontier, with an inefficient one exclusively on values of inputs and 
outputs, with no random error.  As in other studies on bank efficiency (see for 
example Gaganis and Pasiouras, 2009), it is assumed that banks operate at variable 
returns to scale (VRS) as under VRS  each bank  is compared only against other 
units of similar size, instead of against all banks (Avkiran, 1999),  which is 
important here as there is considerable size variation (see Table 1)
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Table 1:  Descriptive Statistics (2000-2010) 
Country P1 P2 P3 Y1 Y2 TA EA LLPL LA INFL GDPgr GDPcap DCP C5 
BULGARIA 0.0119 0.0245 1.2014 994,392 308,946 1,482,995 12.12 1.17 61.51 5.84 3.51 10,616.88 55.95 63.76 
CZECH REPUBLIC 0.0087 0.0227 0.8862 3,668,513 3,691,819 7,715,710 11.03 0.76 45.86 1.98 3.34 20,353.30 43.13 72.71 
ESTONIA 0.0179 0.0225 1.0626 2,142,949 380,466 2,717,674 14.54 2.33 59.51 4.86 3.96 15,944.76 75.18 99.32 
HUNGARY 0.013 0.0382 1.1589 3,853,288 1,310,376 5,546,250 11.41 1.56 66.19 5.75 1.97 16,421.45 52.99 75.03 
LATVIA 0.0157 0.0211 1.2268 781,240 356,612 1,216,388 10.93 5.28 48.85 7.09 3.29 13,090.75 75.64 69.34 
LITHUANIA 0.0146 0.0247 1.5757 1,589,779 386,575 2,186,101 10.54 1.41 63.01 3.1 4.23 13,977.37 42.97 87.98 
POLAND 0.0164 0.0302 0.6929 3,164,059 1,962,997 5,399,393 13.12 1.72 55.1 2.92 4.19 14,985.64 39.68 76.55 
ROMANIA 0.0229 0.0393 1.3297 1,540,218 389,876 2,516,014 14.98 2.3 54.18 16.08 4.19 9,647.33 27.4 77.47 
SLOVAKIA 0.0102 0.0193 1.0401 1,959,089 1,725,623 3,924,168 9.57 0.94 49.66 3.69 4.16 16,993.58 38.69 82.96 
SLOVENIA 0.012 0.0303 1.7559 2,195,967 995,228 3,303,470 9.13 1.14 65.42 3.95 2.82 23,654.81 56.01 75.39 
Average EU-10 0.0148 0.0273 1.0956 2,332,650 1,312,550 3,930,403 11.84 1.91 56.24 5.81 3.55 15,470.13 48.19 75.47 
Note: Figures represent sample means. P1 stands for the price of  labour, P2 stands for the price of  funds, P3 stands for the price of fixed assets, Y1 stands for net loans in thousands of US$, Y2 stands for other earning 
assets in thousands of US$, TA stands for total assets in thousands of US$, LLPL stands for the loan loss provisions to total loans ratio, EA stands for the equity to assets ratio, LA stands for the loans to assets ratio, C5 
stands for the sum of the total assets of the five  biggest banks in terms of assets in a country over the total banking assets in a country,  DCP stands for the  ratio of domestic credit to the private sector over GDP, GDPgr 
stands for rate of growth of GDP per capita at constant 2005 $, GDPcap is GDP per capita in purchasing power parity (PPP) at constant 2005 US$, INFL stands for the inflation rate.  
Source: Fitch-IBCA for the bank-specific variables, the 2012 version of the “"New Database on Financial Development and Structure" developed by Beck et al. (2000) for the C5 variable, the World Development 
Indicators of the World Bank for the DCP, GDPgr, GDPcap  and INFL variables.
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Following Charnes et al. (1978), the input oriented measure of each bank under the constant 
returns to scale (CRS) assumption requires solving the following linear programme: 
       
                                    such that                                                    
         
                                                                                                                                                                
                                                                                                                                                 (1) 
, where     is the scalar efficient score and   is a N x 1 vector of constants. If 
    the bank is efficient as it lies on the frontier, whereas if     the bank is 
inefficient and needs 1-   reduction in the input levels to reach the frontier. The 
linear programming is solved N times, once for each bank in the sample, and a value 
of   is obtained for each bank representing its technical efficiency (TE) score. The 
CRS linear programming problem is modified to account for variable returns to scale 
(VRS) as the sample banks range from large state owned institutions to smaller, 
private banks by adding the convexity constraint        to equation (1) in order 
to provide: 
       
such that            
         
       
    
                                                                                                                                                 (2) 
, where N1 is an N x 1 vector of ones. By following this approach, a convex hull of 
intersecting planes is formed that envelope the data points more tightly than the CRS 
conical hull and thus provides technical efficiency scores that are greater than or 
equal to those obtained using the CRS model.  To calculate allocative efficiency 
(AE),    is assumed to be an N x 1 vector of input prices for the i-th bank and the 
following cost minimisation problem is solved: 
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such that            
  
       
    
                                                                                                                                                 (3) 
where   
  is the cost-minimizing vector of input quantities for the i-th bank, given the 
input prices     and the output levels   .  The total cost efficiency (CE) of the i-th 
bank is calculated as: 
                                             CE=
  
   
 
  
   
                                                                               
                                                                                                                                                 (4) 
, CE is the ratio of minimum cost to observed cost, for the i-th bank. The allocative 
efficiency (AE) then is calculated as AE=CE/TE. All three measures can take values 
between 0 and 1 with higher values indicating higher efficiency. 
Inputs, input prices and outputs are chosen using the intermediation approach and 
follow Tanna et al. (2011).  This views banks as financial institutions whose primary 
purpose is to borrow funds from depositors and transform them to loans and 
securities. For the construction of the cost efficiency frontier net loans and other 
earning assets are outputs. The inputs are  financial capital (deposits and short-term 
funding),  labour ( personnel expenses) and physical  capital (fixed assets). The price 
of financial capital is defined as the interest expenses on deposits divided by total 
deposits, the price of labour is defined as the ratio between personnel expenses and 
total assets, while the price of physical capital is defined as overhead expenses 
(excluding personnel expenses) to fixed assets.  Finally a common cost efficiency 
frontier for all the new EU member countries for each year separately is calculated 
following Havrylchyk (2006) in order to examine how the fast paced liberalisation 
and deregulation affected the efficiency of the banking sector. The bank data are 
from IBCA-Bankscope for 2000-2010. The sample includes commercial banks  
following other studies in the region (see for example Grigorian and Manole, 2006; 
Kasman and Yildirim, 2006) and, after removing errors and inconsistencies, we end 
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up with a sample of 192 institutions and 1,045 bank/year observations in an 
unbalanced panel.  This represents the majority of the financial institutions in the 
new member transition economies. 
 
2.2.2 The Fraser Index of Economic Freedom and its Components 
 
 
The focus of this chapter is to examine the impact of credit, labour and business 
regulation on bank efficiency using the regulation variables of the Fraser Index of 
Economic Freedom (Gwartney et. al, 2012). Inclusion of this index is common in the 
economics literature
10
 and consists of five factors: size of government (GOV-FR); 
legal structure and security of property rights (LEG-FR); access to sound money 
(MON-FR); freedom to exchange with foreigners (TRD-FR); and regulation of 
credit, labour, and business (REG-FR). These are weighted to form a composite 
index, with 0 indicating the lowest and 10 the highest level of economic freedom. In 
this chapter, we put a special emphasis on regulation and particularly credit 
regulation and its impact on the banking industry. In the initial estimates though we 
include the rest of the economic freedom variables in order to examine their 
importance for the banking industry vis-à-vis regulation.   
The credit regulation component is decomposed to account for the following: i) 
private ownership of banks measured as percentage of deposits held in privately 
owned banks, ii) foreign competition defined as barriers to entry for foreign banks 
(rate of approval of foreign bank applications) and the share of foreign banks over 
the total banking sector assets, iii) private sector credit, measuring the extent that 
government borrowing does not crowd out private borrowing, and iv) limitations 
from interest rate controls and regulations. 
The first two subcomponents provide evidence on the extent to which the banking 
industry is dominated by private firms and whether foreign banks are permitted to 
compete in the marketplace. The final two subcomponents indicate the extent to 
which credit is supplied to the private sector and whether controls on interest rates 
interfere with the credit market.  
The composite labour (LR-REG) and business regulations (BR-REG) components 
are also added to examine their impact on bank performance. The LR-REG variable 
                                                        
10
 See for example Carlsson and Lundstrom (2002). 
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is designed to measure the extent to which labour market rigidities are present. In 
order to earn high marks in the LR-REG component, a country must allow market 
forces to determine wages and establish the conditions of hiring and firing, and 
refrain from the use of conscription. The BR-REG variable identifies the extent to 
which regulations and bureaucratic procedures restrain entry and reduce 
competition. In order to score high in this part of the index, countries must allow 
markets to determine prices and refrain from regulatory activities that hinder entry 
into the market and increase the cost of production. They also must refrain from 
using their power to extract financial payments and reward some businesses at the 
expense of others. 
The average scores of the economic freedom components across the EU-10 
economies for 2000-2010 are in Table 2. 
 
Table 2:  Economic freedom in the EU 10 economies (2000-2010) 
Country GOV-FR LEG-FR MON-FR TRD-FR REG-FR ALL-FR 
BULGARIA 6.47 4.85 8.93 7.46 7.33 7.00 
CZECH REPUBLIC 3.37 6.70 9.11 7.99 7.31 6.90 
ESTONIA 6.53 7.17 9.30 8.69 7.46 7.82 
HUNGARY 4.40 6.73 9.14 8.06 7.14 7.08 
LATVIA 5.80 6.58 8.90 7.84 6.94 7.21 
LITHUANIA 5.55 6.11 8.80 7.57 6.80 6.97 
POLAND 5.71 6.18 9.05 7.19 6.78 6.97 
ROMANIA 6.70 5.76 7.49 7.18 6.21 6.66 
SLOVAKIA 5.81 6.02 8.87 8.39 7.10 7.24 
SLOVENIA 4.86 6.88 8.89 7.57 6.48 6.93 
Average EU-10 5.43 6.26 8.80 7.69 6.90 7.01 
Note: Figures are in means and range from 0-10. Higher values denote a more liberal economic 
environment. GOV-FR: size of government expenditures, taxes, and enterprise, LEG-FR: legal 
structure and security of property rights, MON-FR: access to Sound Money, TRD-FR: freedom to 
trade Internationally, REG-FR: Regulation of credit, labour, and business, ALL-FR: The overall score 
of economic freedom in a country is measured as the average of the GOV-FR, LEG-FR, MON-FR, 
TRD-FR and REG-FR components. Source: The 2012 version of the Fraser Index of Economic 
Freedom. 
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Note that although the level of general economic freedom (ALL-FR) is 7.01 in the 
region, some components of the economic freedom are below that, for example the 
size of government (GOV-FR), the protection of legal rights (LEG-FR) and 
regulation (REG-FR) have values of 5.43, 6.26 and 6.90 respectively. It seems that 
reforms related to sound money (MON-FR) and trade liberalisation (TRD-FR) are 
more prevalent in the EU-10 economies as the regional averages for these indices 
are measured at 8.80 and 7.69 respectively. At the country level, the best performers, 
in terms of overall economic freedom (ALL-FR), are Estonia (7.82), Slovakia (7.24) 
and Latvia (7.21). Moreover, Estonia and Latvia score better than the regional 
average in all the major components of the index of economic freedom. On the other 
hand, Romania (6.66) and the Czech Republic (6.90) represent the worst performers 
in terms of the overall economic freedom (ALL-FR). In Table 3 the economic 
freedom variables over time in the EU-10 are shown. 
 
     Table 3:  Economic freedom over time in the EU 10 economies (2000-2010) 
Year GOV-FR LEG-FR MON-FR TRD-FR REG-FR ALL-FR 
2000 4.39 6.7 6.99 7.7 6.34 6.42 
2001 4.61 6.12 7.99 7.84 5.95 6.5 
2002 4.52 6.04 8.34 7.68 6.56 6.63 
2003 5.22 6.02 8.53 7.71 6.78 6.85 
2004 5.39 5.94 8.68 7.77 6.88 6.93 
2005 5.66 6.26 8.97 7.62 7.03 7.1 
2006 5.5 6.44 9.02 7.65 6.97 7.11 
2007 5.88 6.37 9.04 7.77 7.11 7.23 
2008 5.92 6.31 9.01 7.69 7.08 7.2 
2009 5.69 6.38 9.34 7.64 7.13 7.23 
2010 5.6 6.29 9.25 7.61 7.16 7.18 
Average EU-10 5.43 6.26 8.8 7.69 6.9 7.01 
Note: Figures are in means and range from 0-10. Higher values denote a more liberal economic 
environment. GOV-FR: size of government expenditures, taxes, and enterprise, LEG-FR: legal 
structure and security of property rights, MON-FR: access to Sound Money, TRD-FR: freedom to 
trade Internationally, REG-FR: Regulation of credit, labour, and business, ALL-FR: The overall score 
of economic freedom in a country is measured as the average of the GOV-FR, LEG-FR, MON-FR, 
TRD-FR and REG-FR components. Source: The 2012 version of the Fraser Index of Economic 
Freedom. 
 
The overall economic freedom (ALL-FR) for the sample has generally improved 
over the period under study, increasing from 6.42 in 2000 to 7.18 in 2010. The most 
improved component is access to sound money (MON-FR), which increased from 
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6.99 in 2000 to 9.25 in 2010. The variables reflecting government size (GOV-FR) 
and regulation (REG-FR) have also been improved over this period but less notably. 
It is noteworthy that two economic freedom components, legal rights protection 
(LEG-FR) and freedom to exchange with foreigners (TRD-FR), have slightly 
declined over the period of the study. 
In Table 4 the cross-country scores of the subcomponents of the regulation 
component (REG-FR) of the economic freedom index for 2000-2010 are shown.   
 
Table 4:  Regulation in the EU 10 economies (2000-2010) 
Country CR-REG CR-OWN CR-COMP CR-PRS CR-IR LR-REG BR-REG 
BULGARIA 9.77 9.59 8.96 9.88 9.85 6.58 5.60 
CZECH REPUBLIC 8.95 8.47 8.06 8.38 10.00 6.94 5.97 
ESTONIA 9.75 9.85 8.59 9.58 9.80 5.82 6.84 
HUNGARY 8.64 9.20 7.50 6.82 9.92 6.51 6.25 
LATVIA 9.24 9.75 7.69 8.56 9.42 5.43 6.04 
LITHUANIA 8.99 8.75 8.38 8.49 9.73 5.49 5.96 
POLAND 8.55 7.90 8.81 7.76 10.00 6.12 5.65 
ROMANIA 7.57 5.01 7.14 8.22 9.48 4.99 6.08 
SLOVAKIA 9.00 9.59 8.00 7.42 10.00 6.60 5.68 
SLOVENIA 8.77 7.28 7.49 9.03 10.00 4.51 6.06 
Average EU-10 8.78 8.27 8.01 8.26 9.82 5.92 5.96 
Note: Figures are in means and range from 0-10. Higher values denote a more liberal economic environment. CR-REG: 
composite credit regulations index, CR-OWN: that is the percentage of deposits held in privately owned banks, CR-
COMP that is foreign banks barriers to entry and foreign bank presence in the domestic market, CR-PRS that is 
government borrowing that does not crowd out private sector borrowing, CR-IR that is limitations interest rate controls, 
LR-REG: composite labour regulations index, BR-REG: composite business regulations index. Source: The 2012 version 
of the Fraser Index of Economic Freedom. 
 
It is very obvious that reforms related to credit regulation (CR-REG) are more 
established in the EU-10 economies compared with freedom in the labour market 
(LR-REG) and business regulation (BR-REG). Indeed, the regional average for 
credit regulation (CR-REG) is at the 8.78 level while the corresponding values for 
labour regulation (LR-REG) and business regulation (BR-REG) are 5.92 and 5.96 
respectively.  At the country level, the best performers, in terms of credit regulation 
(CR-REG), are Bulgaria (9.77) and Estonia (9.75) while the worst is Romania 
(7.57). In terms of labour regulation (LR-REG) the most liberalised labour markets 
are the Czech Republic (6.94) and Slovakia (6.60) while Slovenia (4.51) and 
Romania (4.99) represent the countries with the most rigid labour regulation in the 
EU-10 region. Moreover, business regulation (BR-REG) is significantly more liberal 
in Estonia (6.84) than the rest of the EU-10 economies, while Bulgaria (5.60) and 
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Poland (5.65) are the countries with the most strict business regulation (BR-REG). 
When it comes to the subcomponents of the credit regulation (CR-REG) index, we 
notice that reforms related to interest rate controls (CR-IR) are almost complete in 
the EU-10 as the regional average is 9.82 and no country scores below 9.40. On the 
other hand, the rest of the credit regulation (CR-REG) subcomponents have 
substantial room for improvement as the regional averages for private ownership of 
banks (CR-OWN), competition from foreign banks (CR-COMP) and freedom from 
government borrowing (CR-PRS)  is 8.27, 8.01 and 8.26 respectively. There is also a 
significant heterogeneity in the speed that reforms for each regulation sub-
component have been adopted in the EU-10 economies as shown in Table 5.  
 
Table 5: Regulation over time in the EU 10 economies (2000-2010) 
Year CR-REG CR-OWN CR-COMP CR-PRS CR-IR LR-REG BR-REG 
2000 7.63 4.75 6.00 8.24 9.91 4.90 6.48 
2001 8.09 6.33 5.95 8.10 9.86 4.85 4.90 
2002 8.50 7.97 7.55 7.84 9.70 5.43 5.75 
2003 8.77 8.02 7.49 8.44 9.85 5.56 6.02 
2004 8.50 7.99 7.65 7.65 9.86 5.67 6.46 
2005 9.07 8.81 8.59 8.67 9.74 5.84 6.15 
2006 9.05 8.84 8.59 8.56 9.76 5.95 5.88 
2007 9.19 8.83 8.59 8.95 9.78 6.26 5.81 
2008 9.06 8.76 8.62 8.66 9.75 6.21 5.92 
2009 8.83 8.80 8.64 7.79 9.89 6.57 5.92 
2010 8.88 8.94 . 7.70 10.00 6.48 6.05 
Average EU-10 8.78 8.27 8.01 8.26 9.82 5.92 5.96 
Note: Figures are in means and range from 0-10. Higher values denote a more liberal economic environment. 
CR-REG: composite credit regulations index, CR-OWN: that is the percentage of deposits held in privately 
owned banks, CR-COMP that is foreign banks barriers to entry and foreign bank presence in the domestic 
market , CR-PRS that is government borrowing that does not crowd out private sector borrowing, CR-IR that is 
limitations in interest rate controls, LR-REG: composite labour regulations index, BR-REG: composite 
business regulations index. Source: The 2012 version of the Fraser Index of Economic Freedom. 
 
Both credit regulation (CR-REG) and labour regulation (LR-REG) have 
significantly improved over time in the EU-10 economies. Credit Regulation (CR-
REG) has improved from 7.63 in 2000 to 8.88 in 2010 while freedom from labour 
regulation (LR-REG) has increased from 4.90 to 6.48 over the same period. On the 
other hand, business regulation has experienced a slight deterioration from 6.48 in 
2000 to 6.05 in 2010. The subcomponents of the credit regulation (CR-REG) that 
show the highest level of improvement over the  period are the private ownership of 
banks (CR-OWN) and the competition from foreign banks (CR-COMP).  The index 
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for the private ownership for banks (CR-OWN) has increased from 4.75 in 2000 to 
8.94 in 2010 while the competition from foreign banks was 8.64 in 2009 when it was 
6.00 in 2000. Freedom from government borrowing (CR-PRS)  is the only credit 
regulation subcomponent that has experienced a decrease as it has a value of 7.70 in 
2010 in comparison with 8.24 in 2000 
 
2.2.3 Bank-specific and Country-specific Control Variables 
 
A number of control variables are used in order to account for individual bank 
characteristics:  total assets (TA) measures the size of the asset portfolio of each 
bank and is expected to have a positive impact on cost efficiency as it may indicate 
higher diversification (Mester, 1993);  the ratio of loans to assets (LA), which is also 
expected to be positive as it represents well-functioning intermediation by the bank; 
the ratio of equity to total assets (EA) captures the risk preferences of the bank and is 
expected to be positive as a higher ratio suggests that managers have greater 
incentives to ensure bank performance and minimise costs; and finally the loan loss 
provisions as a  share of total loans (LLPL) is a proxy for default risk as it measures 
the quality of the credit portfolio. However, the use of such a proxy for default risk 
is related both to endogenous factors (“the bad management” hypothesis) and 
exogenous to the bank such as systemic economic or financial crises (“the bad luck” 
hypothesis). Finally according to the “skimping” hypothesis, banks that dedicate a 
lot of resources to screening the quality of their loan portfolio may experience 
decreased cost efficiency in the short-term which is compensated by higher cost 
efficiency in the medium and long-term because of low level of loan defaults.  
To control for financial sector development, domestic credit to the private sector as a 
share of GDP (DCP) is used. In addition, to account for the level of competition in 
the banking industry in each country, we use the assets of the five largest banks as a 
share of assets of all commercial banks (the C5 ratio). Finally, to control for the 
general level of economic development and capture the sophistication of the 
domestic market, real GDP per capita in purchasing power parity (PPP) is used 
while to control for the dynamism of each economy we use the annual GDP growth 
(GDPgr). 
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2.3 Results and Discussion 
2.3.1 Cost Efficiency Estimates 
 
Cost efficiency estimates are reported in Table 6.  Those efficiency scores represent 
averages over the period 2000-2010.  
Table 6: Country level  bank cost efficiency in the EU 10 economies (2000-2010) 
Country EFF 
BULGARIA 0.685 
CZECH REPUBLIC 0.860 
ESTONIA 0.790 
HUNGARY 0.900 
LATVIA 0.704 
LITHUANIA 0.710 
POLAND 0.847 
ROMANIA 0.674 
SLOVAKIA 0.765 
SLOVENIA 0.748 
Average EU-10 0.771 
Note: The table reports the mean  efficiency scores 
by country over the  2000-2010  period. The cost 
efficiencies (EFF) were estimated with the data 
envelopment analysis (DEA) methodology using 
annual frontiers and variable returns to scale (VRS). 
 
One cannot fail to notice that the average bank cost efficiency for the sample is 
relatively low at the 77%, that is, these banks need to improve by 23%, to reach the 
cost efficiency frontier.  Such efficiency scores are comparable with other studies in 
transition and emerging economies (see for example Kasman and Yildirim, 2006; 
Tecles and Tabak, 2010).  At the country level, banks in Romania and Bulgaria have 
the lowest cost efficiency levels, with scores of 0.674 and 0.685 respectively, 
whereas banks in Hungary are the best performers with efficiency scores at around 
0.9. Note also that some geographic clusters emerge in terms of bank efficiency 
scores as countries located in central-eastern  Europe (Poland, Hungary, Czech 
Republic) have the highest bank efficiency scores,  the Baltic states (Latvia, Estonia 
and Lithuania) are characterised by medium efficiency scores, while the Balkan 
states of Bulgaria and Romania have the most inefficient banking sectors. 
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Table 7: Annual bank cost efficiency in the EU 10 economies (2000-2010) 
Year EFF 
2000 0.824 
2001 0.752 
2002 0.773 
2003 0.750 
2004 0.760 
2005 0.769 
2006 0.780 
2007 0.786 
2008 0.755 
2009 0.757 
2010 0.782 
Average EU-10 0.771 
Note: The table reports the mean  efficiency scores by 
year over the  2000-2010  period. The cost efficiencies 
(EFF)  were estimated with the data envelopment 
analysis (DEA) methodology using annual frontiers 
and variable returns to scale (VRS). 
 
In terms of the time series, there is a real inconsistency in the early years (2000-
2002) while a weak positive trend can be spotted from 2003 (0.75) to 2007 (0.786), 
that is the years immediately before and just after EU accession.  In the years 2008 
and 2009, when the financial crisis was on full steam,  bank efficiency in the EU-10 
economies  deteriorated from its 2007 peak while it bounced back in 2010. 
  2.3.2 The Determinants of Cost Efficiency –Fixed Effects Results 
 
As a first step of the analysis of the cost efficiency determinants we run the 
following general model in a fixed effects framework: 
        =α0+                                       +       
                                                                                                                                                 (5) 
where         is the vector of bank specific cost efficiency scores from stage one, 
     is a vector of bank specific explanatory variables,       is a  vector of 
macroeconomic control variables, s    is a vector of financial structure variables and 
    r     a vector of economic freedom variables from the Fraser Index and e     is a 
vector of random errors. 
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2.3.2.1 Major Components of the Fraser Index of Economic Freedom 
 
The first stage of the analysis considers the impact of the overall index of economic 
freedom (ALL-FR) and its major components, government size (GOV-FR), legal 
rights protection (LEG-FR), access to sound money (MON-FR), freedom to 
exchange with foreigners (TRD-FR) and the composite regulation index (REG-FR), 
on bank cost efficiency. Seven models are estimated for the period 2000-2010. The 
models 1 to 5 include the bank-specific, macroeconomic and financial structure 
variables and each time one of the five major components of the economic freedom 
index. Model 6  includes the control variables and the regressors of all the major 
components of the economic freedom index simultaneously, while model 7 includes 
the control variables and the overall index of economic freedom (ALL-FR). These 
results are presented in Table 8.   
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Table 8:  Fixed effects results for cost efficiency and the economic freedom 
components from the Fraser Index (2000-2010) 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES EFF EFF EFF EFF EFF EFF EFF 
        
lnTA 0.0496*** 0.0497*** 0.0506*** 0.0513*** 0.0492*** 0.0472*** 0.0515*** 
 (0.0104) (0.0107) (0.0107) (0.0104) (0.0106) (0.0104) (0.0104) 
EA 0.111 0.129 0.122 0.117 0.110 0.101 0.116 
 (0.0802) (0.0796) (0.0800) (0.0793) (0.0782) (0.0793) (0.0799) 
LA 0.0313 0.0335 0.0325 0.0343 0.0392 0.0425 0.0312 
 (0.0319) (0.0322) (0.0321) (0.0314) (0.0323) (0.0322) (0.0316) 
LLPL -0.116 -0.0841 -0.0846 -0.0792 -0.107 -0.148 -0.0872 
 (0.228) (0.230) (0.228) (0.225) (0.231) (0.234) (0.224) 
lnGDPcap -0.0227 -0.0857* -0.0822* -0.0775* -0.121** -0.0647 -0.0304 
 (0.0482) (0.0455) (0.0452) (0.0449) (0.0507) (0.0509) (0.0512) 
INFL 0.000132 0.000211 0.000457 0.000327 0.000880 0.000293 -0.000133 
 (0.000760) (0.000738) (0.000740) (0.000732) (0.000756) (0.000779) (0.000811) 
GDPgr 0.00153*** 0.00157*** 0.00160*** 0.00168*** 0.00176*** 0.00169*** 0.00144*** 
 (0.000531) (0.000511) (0.000528) (0.000515) (0.000531) (0.000555) (0.000549) 
DCP -7.08e-05 0.000148 0.000226 0.000209 0.000357 -2.54e-05 -2.41e-05 
 (0.000347) (0.000362) (0.000367) (0.000358) (0.000363) (0.000339) (0.000357) 
C5 4.51e-05 0.000361 0.000210 0.000367 0.000141 0.000192 0.000157 
 (0.000419) (0.000461) (0.000455) (0.000480) (0.000447) (0.000465) (0.000437) 
GOV-FR -0.0126**     -0.0149**  
 (0.00576)     (0.00592)  
LEG-FR  0.0162**    0.0180**  
  (0.00693)    (0.00704)  
MON-FR   -0.000635   0.000702  
   (0.00269)   (0.00269)  
TRD-FR    -0.0155  -0.0115  
    (0.0143)  (0.0149)  
REG-FR     0.0174** 0.0226***  
     (0.00809) (0.00830)  
ALL-FR       -0.0212 
       (0.0130) 
Constant 0.335 0.726* 0.794** 0.841** 1.055*** 0.582 0.450 
 (0.386) (0.376) (0.371) (0.373) (0.403) (0.410) (0.395) 
        
Observations 
F-test 
1,045 
     14.45*** 
1,045 
     12.63*** 
1,045 
     11.89*** 
1,045 
     15.22*** 
1,045 
   15.78*** 
1,045 
     18.33*** 
1,045 
      12.07*** 
R-squared 0.145 0.143 0.138 0.140 0.143 0.161 0.142 
Number of 
banks 
192 192 192 192 192 192 192 
Note: The table reports the fixed effects regression results for the major components of the Fraser Index of Economic Freedom. The 
dependent variable is the cost efficiency scores calculated using a DEA methodology and assuming variable returns to scale (VRS) and a 
common annual frontier. GOV-FR stands for limitation in the government size, LEG-FR stands for legal structure and security of property 
rights, MON-FR stands for access to sound money, TRD-FR stands for freedom to exchange with foreigners, REG-FR is the composite 
index of regulation in credit, labour and business, ALL-FR stands for the overall index of economic freedom, lnTA stands for the natural 
logarithm of total assets, EA stands for the equity to assets ratio, LA stands for the loan to assets ratio, LLPL stands for the loan loss 
provisions to total loans ratio, lnGDPcap stands for the natural logarithm of GDP per capita at purchasing power parity (PPP) terms, INFL 
stands for inflation, GDPgr stands for GDP growth,  DCP stands for private sector credit to GDP, C5 stands for the five-firm concentration 
ratio of each country’s banking industry. The use of the fixed effects specification is justified after a Hausman test for each model. To avoid 
collinearity problems with the selected variables, we first analyse correlations of all the selected variables. We observe that there is not a 
high level of correlation between the variables used in the models. ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. 
Robust Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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In terms of the bank-specific control variables, the natural logarithm of total assets 
(lnTA) has a positive and  statistically significant  at the 1% level impact on bank 
efficiency, implying that larger banks with more diversified portfolios enjoy higher 
level of efficiency (Mester, 1993). This confirms evidence that large banks in the 
new member states have benefited more, in terms of average cost reduction, from 
technological progress (Kasman and Kirbas-Kasman, 2006). The rest of the bank- 
specific variables have the expected sign but their coefficients are not statistically 
different than zero. When it comes to the country level macroeconomic variables the 
level of economic development (lnGDPcap) has a negative and statistically 
significant impact at the 10% level in some of the models in Table 8 (Models 2 to 5). 
The positive and significant coefficient on the proxy for the general level of 
economic development could indicate the higher operating and financial costs for 
supplying a given level of services (Dietsch and Lozano-Vivas, 2000).  Furthermore, 
the impact of  GDP growth on efficiency is positive and statistically significant at 
the 1% level, indicating that  higher growth rate is associated with lower banking 
costs in line with Kasman and Yildirim (2006). Finally, the financial structure 
controls, private sector credit to GDP (DCP) and the concentration ratio in each 
country’s banking system (C5) do not exert a statistically significant impact on 
efficiency. 
When it comes to the economic freedom components, limitations in the size of 
government (GOV-FR) have a negative and statistically significant at the 10% level 
impact on efficiency (Model 1 of Table 8). This implies that bank cost efficiency is 
enhanced when credit is directed to the state.  In this sample, good practice in risk 
assessment is in its infancy and government borrowing is less costly with respect to 
screening and probably more secure as the probability of default is lower than debt 
to the private sector given that loans directed towards the public sector are covered 
by explicit or implicit government guarantees (Mian, 2003). Furthermore, increased 
foreign bank presence in the EU-10 economies may favour lending to the 
government instead of non-transparent private firms (Berger et al. 2001; Mian, 
2003), for which credit risk assessment based on robust information becomes more 
difficult and so more risky. Moreover , the impact of the legal structure and property 
rights (LEG-FR) has a positive and statistically significant at the 5% level impact on 
efficiency. This of no surprise as weak and poorly enforced property rights  are 
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associated with higher bank costs such as low recovery rates and higher time spent 
in repossessing collateral following a loan default (Bae and Goyal, 2009). Strong 
property rights may also have a positive impact in the non-financial sector of a 
country and improve bank efficiency through spillover effects as  in countries with 
more secure property rights firms allocate resources more efficiently and grow faster 
(Classens and Laeven, 2003; Knack and Keefer, 1995).  Finally, the composite index 
of regulation (REG-FR) is statistically significant at the 5% level and exerts a 
positive impact on efficiency (see model 5 in Table 8). Moreover its coefficient is 
larger than the ones for limitations in government size (GOV-FR) and the legal 
structure and property rights (LEG-FR) implying that liberal regulation in the credit,  
labour and business markets is the  most important channel through which economic 
freedom affects bank performance.  The rest of the economic freedom components, 
access to sound money (MON-FR) and trade freedom (TRD-FR), as well as the 
general economic freedom index (ALL-FR), do not have a statistically significant 
impact on efficiency. Finally, it is important to note that results remain robust in 
model 6 of Table 8 where the regressors of all the economic freedom components 
are included.  
2.3.2.2  Credit (CR-REG), Labour (LR-REG) and Business Regulation (BR-
REG) 
 
The next stage in the analysis considers the impact of the subcomponents of the 
regulation variable (REG-FR) of the Fraser Index of Economic Freedom on cost 
efficiency. These subcomponents include the composite credit regulation (CR-REG) 
and then two aspects of this:  labour market conditions (LR-REG) and business 
regulations (BR-REG).  
Four models are estimated for the period 2000-2010.  As in section 3.2.1 the 
regressors include the bank-specific variables, financial structure and 
macroeconomic variables as controls and the composite credit regulation (CR-REG) 
in the first model, the labour market regulation (LR-REG) in the second and 
business regulation (BR-REG) in the third.  In the fourth model all the regulation 
subcomponents are included. These results are in Table 9. 
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Table 9: Fixed effects results for credit, labour and business regulations as 
bank cost efficiency determinants in the new EU member states (2000-2010) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES EFF EFF EFF EFF 
     
lnTA 0.0510*** 0.0532*** 0.0501*** 0.0521*** 
 (0.0107) (0.0105) (0.0107) (0.0106) 
EA 0.123 0.128 0.118 0.121 
 (0.0805) (0.0777) (0.0784) (0.0780) 
LA 0.0318 0.0341 0.0351 0.0374 
 (0.0321) (0.0314) (0.0316) (0.0316) 
LLPL -0.0797 -0.0687 -0.0918 -0.0827 
 (0.230) (0.227) (0.229) (0.231) 
lnGDPcap -0.0779* -0.0786* -0.102* -0.101* 
 (0.0451) (0.0447) (0.0534) (0.0536) 
INFL 0.000398 3.62e-05 0.000779 0.000347 
 (0.000719) (0.000740) (0.000875) (0.000900) 
GDPgr 0.00163*** 0.00156*** 0.00176*** 0.00164*** 
 (0.000515) (0.000513) (0.000528) (0.000523) 
DCP 0.000183 0.000119 0.000259 0.000214 
 (0.000369) (0.000357) (0.000363) (0.000363) 
C5 0.000238 0.000379 0.000182 0.000319 
 (0.000440) (0.000450) (0.000452) (0.000449) 
CR-REG -0.00133   0.00298 
 (0.00366)   (0.00401) 
LR-REG  0.0136***  0.0146*** 
  (0.00393)  (0.00445) 
BR-REG   0.00469 0.00344 
   (0.00524) (0.00533) 
Constant 0.754** 0.630* 0.956** 0.806* 
 (0.370) (0.368) (0.442) (0.449) 
     
Observations 
F-test 
1,045 
     11.22*** 
1,045 
     14.27*** 
1,045 
     9.81*** 
1,045 
     15.93*** 
R-squared 0.138 0.148 0.139 0.149 
Number of banks 192 192 192 192 
Note: The table reports the fixed effects regression results for the regulation subcomponents of the Fraser Index of Economic Freedom. The 
dependent variable is the cost efficiency scores calculated using a DEA methodology and assuming variable returns to scale (VRS) and a 
common annual frontier. CR-REG stands for credit regulation, LR-REG stands for labour regulation, BR-REG stands for business 
regulation, lnTA stands for the natural logarithm of total assets, EA stands for the equity to assets ratio, LA stands for the loan to assets 
ratio, LLPL stands for the loan loss provisions to total loans ratio, lnGDPcap stands for the natural logarithm of GDP per capita at 
purchasing power parity (PPP) terms, INFL stands for inflation, GDPgr stands for GDP growth, DCP stands for private sector credit to 
GDP, C5 stands for the five-firm concentration ratio of each country’s banking industry. The use of the fixed effects specification is justified 
after a Hausman test for each model. To avoid collinearity problems with the selected variables, we first analyse correlations of all the 
selected variables. We observe that there is not a high level of correlation between the variables used in the models. ***, ** and * indicate 
1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. Robust Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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In the first and third models, the composite credit regulation (CR-REG) and the 
business regulation (BR-REG) are not statistically significant. However, the impact 
of labour regulation (LR-REG) in the second model is statistically significant at the 
1% level and exerts a positive impact on efficiency. These results are further 
confirmed in model 4 that includes all the regulation subcomponents, as the 
coefficient on increased labour market liberalisation (LR-REG) is statistically 
significant at the 1% level while retaining its positive sign. The other two regulation 
variables, credit regulation (CR-REG) and business regulation (BR-RG) remain 
statistically insignificant in the fourth model. The positive impact of liberal labour 
regulation on bank performance is in line with previous studies that find a negative 
effect of strict labour regulation on economic performance (Autor 2007; Bassanini et 
al. 2009) due to increased costs associated with such regulation. Furthermore, liberal 
reforms in the labour market may decrease employee complacency and associated 
absenteeism (Ichino and Riphahn, 2005; Riphahn 2004), which in turn could 
increase bank performance. Evidence has shown that liberalisation of labour 
regulation in respect with dismissal costs has resulted in productivity gains due to 
increased redundancy of unproductive workers who were previously retained due to 
high dismissal costs (Eslava et al., 2004). With respect to the bank-specific, 
macroeconomic and financial structure control variables the results remain similar to 
section 2.3.2.1.  Bank size (lnTA) and GDP growth are positively  associated with 
efficiency while the general level of economic development has a  negative impact 
on efficiency. 
2.3.2.3  Decomposing Credit Regulations 
A surprising result is that industry specific regulation, such as credit regulation (CR-
REG), does not have an impact on bank specific efficiency. A possible cause could 
be the high degree of aggregation in this regulation index. To investigate this further 
and examine the impact of credit regulation on bank efficiency, we next consider its 
main components.  These are CR-OWN, that is the percentage of deposits held in 
privately owned banks, CR-COMP, that is foreign banks presence in the domestic 
market, CR-PRS, that is government borrowing that does not crowd out private 
sector borrowing, and lastly CR-IR, that is limitation in the interest rates controls 
that lead to high spreads and/or negative real interest rates. These results are shown 
in Table 10. 
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Table 10: Fixed effects results for types of credit regulations as bank cost 
efficiency determinants in the new EU member states (2000-2010) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES EFF EFF EFF EFF EFF 
      
lnTA 0.0494*** 0.0510*** 0.0511*** 0.0519*** 0.0544*** 
 (0.0106) (0.0105) (0.0106) (0.0107) (0.0109) 
EA 0.113 0.100 0.123 0.120 0.109 
 (0.0808) (0.0784) (0.0793) (0.0790) (0.0791) 
LA 0.0345 0.0388 0.0326 0.0321 0.0368 
 (0.0323) (0.0328) (0.0317) (0.0315) (0.0319) 
LLPL -0.0973 -0.331 -0.0852 -0.0528 -0.317 
 (0.233) (0.261) (0.227) (0.226) (0.261) 
lnGDPcap -0.0915** -0.106* -0.0766* -0.0879* -0.100* 
 (0.0459) (0.0565) (0.0450) (0.0455) (0.0565) 
INFL 0.000576 0.000631 0.000532 -0.000260 -0.000374 
 (0.000738) (0.000747) (0.000744) (0.000728) (0.000802) 
GDPgr 0.00167*** 0.00155** 0.00169*** 0.00168*** 0.00156** 
 (0.000523) (0.000698) (0.000512) (0.000520) (0.000706) 
DCP 0.000295 0.000343 0.000168 0.000184 0.000172 
 (0.000359) (0.000420) (0.000373) (0.000361) (0.000417) 
C5 0.000177 0.000267 0.000268 0.000228 0.000370 
 (0.000444) (0.000461) (0.000439) (0.000444) (0.000453) 
CR-OWN 0.00172    -0.00529 
 (0.00182)    (0.00474) 
CR-COMP  0.00114   0.00502 
  (0.00244)   (0.00334) 
CR-PRS   -0.00234  -0.00185 
   (0.00176)  (0.00173) 
CR-IR    -0.0130** -0.0163** 
    (0.00618) (0.00640) 
Constant 0.878** 0.990** 0.746** 0.956** 1.085** 
 (0.376) (0.460) (0.370) (0.391) (0.472) 
      
Observations 
F-test 
1,045 
    9.34*** 
927 
     10.67*** 
1,045 
     10.11*** 
1,045 
      12.55*** 
927 
     14.49*** 
R-squared 0.139 0.141 0.139 0.141 0.148 
Number of banks 192 190 192 192 190 
Note: The table reports the fixed effects regression results for the decomposed credit regulation index of the Fraser Index of Economic Freedom. The dependent 
variable is the cost efficiency scores calculated using a DEA methodology and assuming variable returns to scale (VRS) and a common annual frontier. CR-OWN 
stands for percentage of deposits held in privately owned banks, CR-COMP stands for foreign banks barriers to entry and presence in the domestic market, CR-
PRS stands for government borrowing that does not crowd out private sector borrowing, CR-IR stands for interest rate controls, lnTA stands for the natural 
logarithm of total assets, EA stands for the equity to assets ratio, LA stands for the loan to assets ratio, LLPL stands for the loan loss provisions to total loans ratio, 
lnGDPcap stands for the natural logarithm of GDP per capita at purchasing power parity (PPP) terms, INFL stands for inflation, GDPgr stands for GDP growth, 
DCP stands for private sector credit to GDP, C5 stands for the five-firm concentration ratio of each country’s banking industry. The use of the fixed effects 
specification is justified after a Hausman test for each model. To avoid collinearity problems with the selected variables, we first analyse correlations of all the 
selected variables. We observe that there is not a high level of correlation between the variables used in the models. ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% 
significance levels respectively. Robust Standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
These results show that the ownership structure related variables, private ownership 
(CR-OWN) and foreign bank competition (CR-COMP) carry the expected positive 
sign but their impact on efficiency is statistically insignificant (see models 1 and 2 in 
table 9). On the other hand, the impact of limitations in the interest rate controls 
variable (CR-IR) has a negative and statistically significant at the 5% level impact 
on efficiency (see model 4 in Table 9). This lends support to the “competition-
fragility” hypothesis according to which increased competition in the banking 
industry induces banks to take more risks in order to increase returns (Carletti and 
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Hartmann, 2003; Demsetz et al.,1996),  increasing in that way the probability of 
bank failure (Keeley, 1990) and/or reducing performance in terms of the quality of a 
bank’s loan portfolio (Jimenez et al., 2010).  Interest rate controls can act as barrier 
for banks to take on increased risk that could negatively affect their performance 
such as investments in high-risk, high-return projects (Bhattacharya, 1982; Hellman 
et al., 2000). Finally, the variable that reflects the extent to which government 
borrowing does not crowd out private borrowing (CR-PRS), is negatively correlated 
with efficiency (see model 3 in Table 9) and although not statistically significant it 
lends some additional support to the negative and statistically significant relationship 
between efficiency and limitations in government size (GOV-FR) found in section 
2.3.2.1. This implies that cost efficiency is enhanced when credit is directed to the 
state. The results for the decomposed credit regulation variables remain robust when 
all its subcomponents are included in the model (see model 5 in Table 9). With 
respect to the bank specific, macroeconomic and financial structure control variables 
the results remain largely similar to previous sections (2.3.2.1 and 2.3.2.2).  
 
2.3.3  The Determinants of Cost Efficiency –  Dynamic Panel Data Results 
 
To further examine the impact of economic freedom and in particular the impact of 
regulation on the efficiency of the banking systems of the EU-10 economies we 
employ a dynamic panel data analysis. The use of instrumental variables in this 
analysis deals with potential endogeneity issues. In particular, the Arellano and 
Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) two-step ‘system’ GMM estimator is 
used and thus equation (3) takes the following form: 
        = a0            +                                      +        
                                                                                                                                                 (6) 
 
where         is the vector of bank-specific cost efficiency scores from stage one, 
     is a vector of bank specific explanatory variables,       is a  vector of 
macroeconomic control variables, s    is a vector of financial structure variables and 
    r     a vector of economic freedom variables from the Fraser Index and e     is a 
vector of random errors. 
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2.3.3.1 Major Components of the Fraser index of Economic Freedom- Dynamic 
Estimation 
 
Table 11 reports the results of the dynamic panel data estimation for the models that 
include the overall index of economic freedom (ALL-FR) as well as its five major 
components. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
35 
 
 
 
Table 11: Dynamic panel results for cost efficiency and the general economic 
freedom  components from the Fraser Index (2000-2010) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES EFF EFF EFF EFF EFF EFF EFF 
        
L.EFF 0.508*** 0.511*** 0.500*** 0.498*** 0.517*** 0.500*** 0.527*** 
 (0.121) (0.121) (0.123) (0.119) (0.104) (0.103) (0.119) 
lnTA 0.0472*** 0.0482*** 0.0482*** 0.0481*** 0.0474*** 0.0480*** 0.0489*** 
 (0.0122) (0.0121) (0.0124) (0.0120) (0.0109) (0.0102) (0.0121) 
EA 0.224* 0.222* 0.206 0.223* 0.198* 0.170 0.227** 
 (0.118) (0.125) (0.128) (0.120) (0.105) (0.118) (0.113) 
LA 0.0997*** 0.0894** 0.102*** 0.0970*** 0.0843** 0.0766** 0.0945*** 
 (0.0374) (0.0365) (0.0366) (0.0365) (0.0347) (0.0331) (0.0356) 
LLPL 0.204 0.184 0.237 0.191 0.166 0.185 0.249 
 (0.351) (0.334) (0.336) (0.332) (0.337) (0.347) (0.337) 
lnGDPcap -0.0139 -0.0359 -0.00777 -0.0116 -0.0574 -0.0711 -0.0523 
 (0.0679) (0.0669) (0.0662) (0.0675) (0.0696) (0.0671) (0.0718) 
INFL -0.00287*** -0.00270*** -0.00275*** -0.00279*** -0.00238*** -0.00213*** -0.00242*** 
 (0.000856) (0.000819) (0.000855) (0.000833) (0.000817) (0.000823) (0.000878) 
GDPgr 0.00115** 0.00124** 0.00112** 0.00111** 0.00112** 0.00118** 0.00125** 
 (0.000564) (0.000575) (0.000565) (0.000553) (0.000560) (0.000571) (0.000567) 
DCP -0.000905** -0.000854** -0.000936** -0.000918** -0.00114*** -0.00125*** -0.000999** 
 (0.000419) (0.000407) (0.000412) (0.000400) (0.000386) (0.000407) (0.000417) 
C5 -0.000145 -2.98e-05 -0.000227 -0.000221 -0.000539 -0.000500 -0.000157 
 (0.000501) (0.000532) (0.000504) (0.000490) (0.000539) (0.000572) (0.000499) 
GOV-FR 0.00282     -0.00483  
 (0.00799)     (0.00761)  
LEG-FR  0.0127    0.0143  
  (0.0105)    (0.0104)  
MON-FR   0.000939   0.00173  
   (0.00368)   (0.00285)  
TRD-FR    0.00211  -0.00484  
    (0.0184)  (0.0183)  
REG-FR     0.0393*** 0.0458***  
     (0.0115) (0.0121)  
ALL-FR       0.0319 
       (0.0197) 
Constant -0.145 -0.0235 -0.197 -0.166 0.0533 0.109 -0.0212 
 (0.548) (0.520) (0.529) (0.536) (0.545) (0.534) (0.547) 
        
Observations 871 871 871 871 871 871 871 
Number of banks 
N of instruments 
Wald 
AR2 p-value 
Hansen-J p-value 
177 
65 
   191.39*** 
    0.1114 
    0.146 
177 
65 
 205.41*** 
   0.1002 
   0.141 
177 
65 
 183.89*** 
0.1057 
     0.132 
177 
65 
 197.61*** 
   0.1097 
   0.140 
177 
65 
 228.01*** 
   0.3237 
   0.125 
177 
65 
 224.33*** 
   0.2998 
   0.163 
177 
65 
 189.50*** 
0.1700 
     0.154 
Note: The table reports the  dynamic panel regression results for the major components of the Fraser Index of Economic Freedom. The two-
step system GMM  (Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998) is used with Windmeijer corrected (robust) standard errors. The 
dependent variable is the cost efficiency scores calculated using a DEA methodology and assuming variable returns to scale (VRS) and a 
common annual frontier. GOV-FR stands for limitation in the government size, LEG-FR stands for legal structure and security of property 
rights, MON-FR stands for access to sound money, TRD-FR stands for freedom to exchange with foreigners, REG-FR is the composite 
index of regulation in credit, labour and business, ALL-FR stands for the overall index of economic freedom, lnTA stands for the natural 
logarithm of total assets, EA stands for the equity to assets ratio, LA stands for the loan to assets ratio, LLPL stands for the loan loss 
provisions to total loans ratio, lnGDPcap stands for the natural logarithm of GDP per capita at purchasing power parity (PPP) terms, INFL 
stands for inflation, GDPgr stands for GDP growth, DCP stands for private sector credit to GDP, C5 stands for the five-firm concentration 
ratio of each country’s banking industry. To avoid collinearity problems with the selected variables, we first analyse correlations of all the 
selected variables. We observe that there is not a high level of correlation between the variables used in the models. ***, ** and * indicate 
1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. Windmeijer corrected (robust) standard errors are in parentheses. 
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 In terms of the bank-specific variables, the natural logarithm of total assets (lnTA) 
is positively associated with efficiency and is statistically significant at the 1% level. 
This confirm the results of the fixed effects analysis that larger banks with 
diversified portfolios enjoy higher efficiency (Mester, 1993).  The ratio of loans to 
assets (LA) has also a positive and statistically significant impact on efficiency at the 
1% level in most models implying that banks with high intermediation capacity 
operate more efficiently (Carvallo and Kasman, 2005). Finally, the equity to assets 
ratio (EA) is statistically significant at the 10% level in some of the models and 
positively correlated with efficiency, lending some support in the view that the more 
capital at risk, the stronger are shareholders’ incentives to monitor management and 
assure that the bank operates efficiently (Pasiouras, 2008) . When it comes to the 
country level macroeconomic variables, GDP growth (GDPgr) is positively 
associated with efficiency confirming the fixed effects results. On the other hand, 
inflation (INFL) and the private sector credit to GDP variable (DCP) have a negative 
and statistically significant impact on efficiency at the 1% and 5% level respectively. 
Higher levels of inflation can increase overhead costs for banks (Demirgüç-Kunt et 
al., 2004), while increased financial deepening, as proxied by the DCP variable, may 
weaken risk assessment in the loan origination process and thus lead to lower levels 
of operational efficiency (Duenwald et al., 2005). Additionally, the lagged efficiency 
is positive and significant at the 1% level and its high magnitude implies the 
suitability of the dynamic panel data estimation. 
An important result in terms of the economic freedom components is the one of 
model 5 in Table 11. The coefficient of the composite index of regulation  in credit, 
labour and business (REG-FR) is statistically significant at the 1% level and has a 
positive impact on efficiency. On the other hand, none of the other economic 
freedom components (GOV-FR, LEG-FR, MON-FR, TRD-FR)  as well as the 
overall index of economic freedom (ALL-FR) has a statistically significant impact 
on efficiency. The results remain robust in model 6 of table 11 when the regressors 
of all the major components of economic freedom are included in the same 
specification. The results of the dynamic panel  analysis reveal that the most 
important channel through which economic freedom has an impact on the efficiency 
of the banking sector in the EU-10 economies is through regulation. The rest of the 
dynamic panel analysis will focus on what types regulation are important for bank 
performance. 
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2.3.3.2  Credit (CR-REG), Labour (LR-REG) and Business Regulation (BR-
REG)- Dynamic Estimation 
 
To examine further the impact of regulation on bank efficiency we decompose  
composite regulation (REG-FR) to its major subcomponents as in section 2.3.2.2: 
credit regulation (CR-FR), labour regulation (LR-FR) and business regulation (BR-
FR). The results are in Table 12. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
38 
 
 
 
Table 12:  Dynamic panel results for credit, labour and business regulations as 
bank cost efficiency determinants in the new EU member states (2000-2010) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES EFF EFF EFF EFF 
     
L.EFF 0.481*** 0.575*** 0.500*** 0.538*** 
 (0.114) (0.112) (0.114) (0.103) 
lnTA 0.0512*** 0.0447*** 0.0454*** 0.0482*** 
 (0.0116) (0.0117) (0.0120) (0.0110) 
EA 0.216* 0.212* 0.215* 0.202* 
 (0.111) (0.120) (0.116) (0.107) 
LA 0.0885** 0.0899** 0.0959*** 0.0764** 
 (0.0368) (0.0362) (0.0355) (0.0338) 
LLPL 0.116 0.238 0.163 0.179 
 (0.358) (0.309) (0.333) (0.342) 
lnGDPcap -0.0379 -0.0391 -0.0141 -0.0659 
 (0.0650) (0.0704) (0.0695) (0.0695) 
INFL -0.00274*** -0.00266*** -0.00260*** -0.00246*** 
 (0.000799) (0.000886) (0.000865) (0.000841) 
GDPgr 0.00107* 0.00121** 0.00113** 0.00109* 
 (0.000568) (0.000557) (0.000546) (0.000579) 
DCP -0.000880** -0.000683* -0.00109** -0.000873** 
 (0.000372) (0.000378) (0.000475) (0.000418) 
C5 -0.000189 -0.000187 -0.000315 -0.000343 
 (0.000479) (0.000479) (0.000548) (0.000531) 
CR-LEG 0.0109**   0.0154*** 
 (0.00532)   (0.00546) 
LR-LEG  0.0216***  0.0236*** 
  (0.00785)  (0.00778) 
BR-LEG   0.00852 0.00555 
   (0.00719) (0.00716) 
Constant -0.0278 -0.0365 -0.123 0.0422 
 (0.510) (0.564) (0.550) (0.547) 
     
Observations 871 871 871 871 
Number of banks 
N of instruments 
Wald 
AR2 p-value 
Hansen-J p-value 
177 
65 
215.23*** 
          0.1251 
           0.225 
177 
65 
222.56*** 
           0.4431 
            0.134 
177 
65 
    194.75*** 
 0.1876 
 0.151 
177 
65 
    242.54*** 
 0.4299 
0.116 
Note: The table reports the dynamic panel regression results for the regulation subcomponents of the Fraser Index of Economic Freedom.  The two-
step system GMM  (Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998) is used with Windmeijer corrected (robust) standard errors. The dependent 
variable is the cost efficiency scores calculated using a DEA methodology and assuming variable returns to scale (VRS) and a common annual 
frontier. CR-REG stands for credit regulation, LR-REG stands for labour regulation, BR-REG stands for business regulation, lnTA stands for the 
natural logarithm of total assets, EA stands for the equity to assets ratio, LA stands for the loan to assets ratio, LLPL stands for the loan loss 
provisions to total loans ratio, lnGDPcap stands for the natural logarithm of GDP per capita at purchasing power parity (PPP) terms, INFL stands for 
inflation, GDPgr stands for GDP growth, DCP stands for private sector credit to GDP, C5 stands for the five-firm concentration ratio of each 
country’s banking industry. To avoid collinearity problems with the selected variables, we first analyse correlations of all the selected variables. We 
observe that there is not a high level of correlation between the variables used in the models. ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance 
levels respectively. Windmeijer corrected (robust) standard errors are in parentheses. 
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These confirm the findings of the fixed effects models in section 2.3.2.2 with respect 
to the relationship between labour regulation (LR-REG) and bank efficiency. In 
particular, the impact of labour regulation (LR-REG) on bank efficiency (see model 
2 of Table 12) is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. Another 
channel through which liberalisation of the labour markets can affect positively bank 
performance is by increased innovation (Barbosa and Faria, 2011; Koeniger, 2005) 
especially in primary innovation such as the introduction of new products (Saint 
Paul, 2002).  Furthermore, more liberal labour regulation may have a positive impact 
in the size and sales turnover of the firms located in a country (Almeida and 
Carneiro, 2009) and reduce the levels of the unofficial economy (Botero et al., 2004) 
thus improving loan quality and making it easier for banks to evaluate the 
creditworthiness of firms. An important result of the dynamic analysis, that was not 
revealed in the fixed effects analysis, is that credit regulation (CR-REG) has a 
positive and statistically  significant at the 5% level impact on bank efficiency (see 
model 1 of table 12). This result remains robust and increases in significance from 
the 5% level to the 1% level in model 4 of table 12 when we control also for labour 
(LR-REG) and business regulation (BR-REG). Finally, the coefficient for the 
business regulation (BR-REG) is positively associated with efficiency but not 
significantly different from zero. 
2.3.3.3  Decomposing Credit Regulations- Dynamic Estimation 
 
In Table 13 the composite credit regulation (CR-REG) index is decomposed into its 
own subcomponents and their specific effects on bank efficiency estimated. 
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Table 13.  Dynamic panel results for types of credit regulations as bank cost 
efficiency determinants in the new EU member states (2000-2010) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES EFF EFF EFF EFF EFF 
      
L.EFF 0.492*** 0.432*** 0.501*** 0.493*** 0.428*** 
 (0.112) (0.0829) (0.120) (0.118) (0.0869) 
lnTA 0.0497*** 0.0591*** 0.0485*** 0.0483*** 0.0597*** 
 (0.0109) (0.0138) (0.0127) (0.0123) (0.0127) 
EA 0.204* 0.216** 0.224* 0.224* 0.219** 
 (0.111) (0.106) (0.122) (0.124) (0.103) 
LA 0.0846** 0.0750** 0.0970** 0.0978*** 0.0705** 
 (0.0354) (0.0309) (0.0377) (0.0362) (0.0331) 
LLPL -0.0220 -0.584* 0.190 0.123 -0.599* 
 (0.380) (0.344) (0.338) (0.347) (0.347) 
lnGDPcap -0.0269 -0.0981 -0.0214 -0.00225 -0.105 
 (0.0634) (0.0698) (0.0690) (0.0695) (0.0663) 
INFL -0.00298*** -0.00443*** -0.00272*** -0.00362*** -0.00424*** 
 (0.000780) (0.000963) (0.000841) (0.00102) (0.00102) 
GDPgr 0.00101* 0.00102 0.00114** 0.00104* 0.000936 
 (0.000600) (0.000640) (0.000557) (0.000564) (0.000666) 
DCP -0.000982** -0.000919** -0.000869** -0.000885** -0.000893** 
 (0.000395) (0.000430) (0.000387) (0.000398) (0.000386) 
C5 -0.000129 -0.000417 -0.000150 -0.000111 -0.000321 
 (0.000466) (0.000534) (0.000495) (0.000505) (0.000538) 
CR-OWN 0.00832***    0.00600 
 (0.00244)    (0.00828) 
CR-COMP  0.0172***   0.0148*** 
  (0.00412)   (0.00420) 
CR-PRS   0.000246  -4.61e-05 
   (0.00245)  (0.00262) 
CR-IR    -0.0126 -0.00164 
    (0.00885) (0.00727) 
Constant -0.0871 0.462 -0.0740 -0.121 0.499 
 (0.504) (0.523) (0.544) (0.557) (0.498) 
      
Observations 871 757 871 871 757 
Number of banks 
N of instruments 
Wald 
AR2 p-value 
Hansen-J p-value 
177 
65 
    245.62*** 
0.2085 
              0.245 
174 
55 
    191.94*** 
0.1775 
              0.144 
177 
65 
    203.48*** 
0.1030 
              0.180 
177 
65 
     197.51*** 
0.1105 
               0.154 
174 
65 
     201.08*** 
0.2190 
0.127 
Note: The table reports the  dynamic panel regression results for the decomposed credit regulation index of the Fraser Index of Economic Freedom.  The 
two-step system GMM  (Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998) is used with Windmeijer corrected (robust) standard errors. The dependent 
variable is the cost efficiency scores calculated using a DEA methodology and assuming variable returns to scale (VRS) and a common annual frontier. CR-
OWN stands for percentage of deposits held in privately owned banks, CR-COMP stands for foreign banks barriers to entry and presence in the domestic 
market, CR-PRS stands for government borrowing that does not crowd out private sector borrowing, CR-IR stands for interest rate controls, lnTA stands for 
the natural logarithm of total assets, EA stands for the equity to assets ratio, LA stands for the loan to assets ratio, LLPL stands for the loan loss provisions to 
total loans ratio, lnGDPcap stands for the natural logarithm of GDP per capita at purchasing power parity (PPP) terms, INFL stands for inflation, GDPgr 
stands for GDP growth, DCP stands for private sector credit to GDP, C5 stands for the five-firm concentration ratio of each country’s banking industry. To 
avoid collinearity problems with the selected variables, we first analyse correlations of all the selected variables. We observe that there is not a high level of 
correlation between the variables used in the models. ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. Windmeijer corrected (robust) 
standard errors are in parentheses. 
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The positive association of private ownership (CR-OWN) with bank efficiency 
found in the fixed effects analysis is further confirmed in the dynamic panel analysis 
but now is statistically significant at the 1% level (see model 1 in Table 13).  This 
results implies that private ownership of banks increases performance through better 
allocation of credit in the economy that results from less political interference (Dinc, 
2005; Khwaja and Mian, 2005) and more adherence to market discipline (Mian, 
2003). The competition from foreign banks (CR-COMP) is also statistically 
significant at the 1% and has a  positive coefficient (see model 2 in Table 13). The 
result for the CR-COMP variable is expected as it is a measure of openness.  
Furthermore, the interpretation of this variable has two dimensions. Firstly, the 
extent to which foreign banks are allowed to enter the domestic market may have a 
positive impact on the efficiency of domestic banks due to enhanced competition as 
any moral hazard arising from protection against external competition is removed. 
Secondly, the level of operations of foreign banks asserts a positive impact on 
efficiency because they bring technological innovation in domestic markets as well 
as advanced management and risk assessment expertise sourced from their global 
operations. This result provides evidence for the “global advantage” hypothesis 
posed by Berger et al. (2000) and supports the literature on the advantages of the 
presence of foreign banks in host country markets and the ability for foreigners to 
hold equity in domestic banks (Bonin et al., 2005;  Fries and Taci, 2005;  Grigorian 
and Manole, 2006;  Hasan and Marton, 2003). However, in model 5 of  Table 13 
when all the credit regulation variables are included in the specification, the foreign 
competition variable (CR-COMP) retains its statistical significance at the 1% level 
while the private ownership variable (CR-OWN) becomes insignificant. This implies 
that foreign ownership and not mere private ownership matters most for bank 
performance in the EU-10 economies. Finally, the dynamic panel analysis does not 
confirm the fixed effects results that  limitations on the interest rate controls (CR-IR) 
have a statistically significant impact  on bank efficiency.  
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2.3.4  Sensitivity Analysis
11
 – Panel Vector Autoregressive (VAR) estimation 
 
As part of the sensitivity analysis the flexible framework of a  panel-VAR analysis is 
used.
 12 In a panel-VAR specification all variables are entering as endogenous  and 
one of its major advantages is that it examines the underlying dynamic relationships 
compared to the static functional form of a standard fixed effects model. 
For the estimation of each panel VAR we follow the same procedure. As a first step, 
the optimal lag order j is assumed for the right-hand variables in the system of 
equations (Lutkepohl, 2006). The Arellano-Bond GMM estimator is used for the 
lags of j=1,2 and 3. The optimal lag order of one is based on the Akaike Information 
Criterion (AIC), confirmed by Arellano-Bond AR tests. To test for autocorrelation, 
more lags are added. The Sargan tests show that for lag ordered one, the null 
hypothesis cannot be rejected and thus the VAR model is of order one. The lag order 
of one preserves the degrees of freedom and information, given the low time 
frequency of the data.  
2.3.4.1 Impulse Response Functions (IRFs) and Variance Decompositions 
(VDCs)  for Foreign Bank Competition (CR-COMP), Interest Rate Controls 
(CR-IR),  Bank Market Concentration (C5) and Efficiency (EFF) 
 
The panel-VAR framework allows the examination of the impact of the components 
of credit regulation on cost efficiency in more detail and is included here as part of 
the sensitivity analysis. Credit regulation is decomposed into four components: 
ownership (CR-OWN), competition (CR-COMP), private sector credit (CR-PRS) 
and restrictions on interest rates (CR-IR). The Arellano-Bond GMM estimator for 
the lag of j=1 is used. 
The impulse response functions (IRFs) derived from the unrestricted panel-VAR in 
the case of bank cost efficiency (EFF), bank market concentration (C5), foreign bank 
competition (CR-COMP) and limitations in the interest rate control (CR-IR) 
                                                        
11
 We have also performed robustness checks in a fixed effect econometric framework using 
alternative indicators for foreign bank competition and  an alternative index of economic freedom (the 
Heritage Foundation Index of Economic Freedom) for regulation in credit, labour and business. The 
results confirm the corresponding results of the Fraser Index and are depicted in tables B1 and B2 of 
Appendix B respectively. 
12
 For a formal exposition of the panel VAR methodology see Appendix C. 
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variables are reported in Figure 1 The plots show the response of each variable in the 
panel-VAR (EFF, C5, CR-COMP and CR-IR) to its own innovation and to the 
innovations of the other variables.  The first row shows the response of efficiency 
(EFF) to an one standard deviation shock in the C5,  CR-COMP and CR-IR 
variables. 
Figure 1: Impulse response functions (IRFs) for  foreign bank competition (CR-
COMP), interest rate controls (CR-IR), bank market concentration (C5) and 
efficiency (EFF) 
 
 
 
It becomes apparent that the effect of foreign bank competition (CR-COMP) on cost 
efficiency (EFF) is positive over the whole period. The peak response of efficiency 
to CR-COMP is after the second year, and converges towards equilibrium thereafter. 
In the case of foreign bank competition (CR-COMP), the panel VAR analysis 
appears to confirm the previous dynamic panel results. Following improvements in 
levels of competitive market conditions, foreign banks bring technological 
innovations into the domestic market and enhance the performance of all banks, 
foreign and domestic, as in Asaftei and Kumbhakar (2005), Bonin et al. (2005), 
Fries and Taci (2005), Havrylchyk (2006) and Pruteanu-Podpiera (2008). 
Furthermore, the response of efficiency (EFF) to a shock in the limitation of interest 
rate controls (CR-IR) is negative in the period under study and lends support to the 
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“competition-fragility” hypothesis as discussed in section 2.3.2.3. Finally, the 
response of efficiency (EFF) to a shock in the concentration ratio of the banking 
industry (C5) is initially negative but turns positive  after the second period of the 
study. 
 
 
Table 14: Variance decompositions (VDCs) for cost efficiency (EFF),  bank 
market concentration (C5) and  the decomposed credit regulation index(CR-
REG) 
 
Variance Decompositions (VDCs) for foreign bank competition 
(CR-COMP), interest rate controls (CR-IR),  bank market 
concentration (C5) and efficiency (EFF) 
  s EFF C5 CR-COMP CR-IR 
EFF 10 0.95714 0.00065 0.01283 0.02938 
C5 10 0.00479 0.94173 0.03067 0.02281 
CR-COMP 10 0.02690 0.04893 0.66951 0.25466 
CR-IR 10 0.01727 0.10443 0.01879 0.85951 
Variance Decompositions (VDCs) for private ownership of 
banks (CR-OWN), private sector credit (CR-PRS), bank market 
concentration (C5) and efficiency (EFF) 
  s EFF C5 CR-OWN CR-PRS 
EFF 10 0.99073 0.00057 0.00248 0.00622 
C5 10 0.01433 0.89170 0.08198 0.01199 
CR-OWN 10 0.14567 0.22380 0.54872 0.08181 
CR-PRS 10 0.13074 0.26750 0.03319 0.56856 
Notes: s defines the periods ahead of VDCs.  EFF  is Efficiency, CR-OWN  is 
the percentage of deposits held in privately owned banks, CR-COMP is foreign 
banks barriers to entry and foreign bank presence in the domestic market, CR-
PRS is government borrowing that does not crowd out private sector borrowing, 
CR-IR  is limitations in interest rate controls, C5 is the five firm concentration 
ratio of each country’s banking system. 
 
Table 14 presents further evidence of the importance of credit specific regulation for 
bank efficiency as reported by the variance decompositions (VDC) estimations for 
its components. These results are consistent with the impulse response functions 
(IRFs), and provide support for the importance of regulation with respect to foreign 
bank competition (CR-COMP) in explaining the variation in cost efficiency (EFF). 
Specifically, around 1.3% of forecast error variance of cost efficiency after 10 years 
is explained by  foreign bank competition (CR-COMP) regulation disturbances. 
Limitations in the interest rate controls (CR-IR) are also confirmed to be important 
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determinants of bank efficiency (EFF) as 2.94% of the forecast error variance of  
efficiency (EFF) after 10 years is explained by shocks in the CR-IR variable. 
Finally, disturbances in the concentration ratio (C5) of the banking industry appear 
to have minimal impact in forecasting efficiency (EFF) confirming the results of the 
fixed effects and dynamic panel analysis. 
 
2.3.4.2 Impulse Response Functions (IRFs) and Variance Decompositions 
(VDCs)  for Private Ownership (CR-OWN),  Private Sector Credit (CR-PRS),  
Bank Market Concentration (C5) and Efficiency (EFF) 
 
The impulse response functions (IRF) derived from the unrestricted panel-VAR in 
the case of bank cost efficiency (EFF) and regulation related to private sector credit 
(PRS), private ownership of banks (CR-OWN) and the concentration ratio of the 
banking industry (C5) are  presented in Figure 2. The first row shows the response of 
efficiency (EFF) to  an one standard deviation shock in C5, CR-OWN and CR-PRS. 
Figure 2: Impulse response function (IRFs) for  private ownership of banks 
(CR-OWN),  private sector credit (CR-PRS), bank market concentration (C5) 
and efficiency (EFF) 
 
 
Impulse-responses for 1 lag VAR of eff c5 crown crprs
Errors are 5% on each side generated by Monte-Carlo with 500 reps
response of eff to eff shock
s
 (p 5) eff  eff
 (p 95) eff
0 6
-0.0028
0.0492
response of eff to c5 shock
s
 (p 5) c5  c5
 (p 95) c5
0 6
-0.0096
0.0116
response of eff to crown shock
s
 (p 5) crown  crown
 (p 95) crown
0 6
-0.0032
0.0059
response of eff to crprs shock
s
 (p 5) crprs  crprs
 (p 95) crprs
0 6
-0.0095
0.0048
response of c5 to eff shock
s
 (p 5) eff  eff
 (p 95) eff
0 6
-0.4326
1.2343
response of c5 to c5 shock
s
 (p 5) c5  c5
 (p 95) c5
0 6
-0.1095
3.6217
response of c5 to crown shock
s
 (p 5) crown  crown
 (p 95) crown
0 6
-0.9900
0.0000
response of c5 to crprs shock
s
 (p 5) crprs  crprs
 (p 95) crprs
0 6
-0.3661
0.9048
response of crown to eff shock
s
 (p 5) eff  eff
 (p 95) eff
0 6
0.0000
0.3543
response of crown to c5 shock
s
 (p 5) c5  c5
 (p 95) c5
0 6
0.0000
0.3896
response of crown to crown shock
s
 (p 5) crown  crown
 (p 95) crown
0 6
-0.0108
0.6620
response of crown to crprs shock
s
 (p 5) crprs  crprs
 (p 95) crprs
0 6
0.0000
0.2353
response of crprs to eff shock
s
 (p 5) eff  eff
 (p 95) eff
0 6
-0.1114
0.5383
response of crprs to c5 shock
s
 (p 5) c5  c5
 (p 95) c5
0 6
-0.0725
0.6871
response of crprs to crown shock
s
 (p 5) crown  crown
 (p 95) crown
0 6
-0.1035
0.3052
response of crprs to crprs shock
s
 (p 5) crprs  crprs
 (p 95) crprs
0 6
-0.0433
1.3455
46 
 
 
 
The response of efficiency (EFF) to a shock of the private ownership (CR-OWN) is 
positive in all the years under study, while it peaks on the first period confirming the 
results of the dynamic panel analysis in section 3.3.3 related to the positive impact of 
private ownership on bank efficiency. On the other hand, the response of efficiency 
to a shock of the private sector credit (CR-PRS) variable is negative throughout the 
study, implying that credit direct towards the government is less costly for the 
banking sector. These results are further confirmed by the variance decomposition 
(VDC) estimations in Table 14. In a 10 year time frame around 0.25% of the 
forecast error variance of efficiency (EFF) can be explained by disturbances in the 
private ownership variable while around 0.62% from disturbances in the private 
sector credit (CR-PRS) variable. Finally, disturbances in the concentration ratio (C5) 
of the banking industry appear to have minimal impact in forecasting efficiency 
(EFF) as found in section 2.3.4.1 
2.4 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter we investigated the relationship between bank efficiency and credit, 
labour and business regulation in the banking industry of the new EU member states.  
These countries from Central and Eastern Europe have had little more than a decade 
to manage the transition from central planning to a market economy.  Established 
non-parametric methods (data envelopment analysis) are used for efficiency scores 
estimation and these scores are used in both fixed effects and dynamic panel data 
models to investigate the impact of credit, labour and business regulation of bank 
efficiency.   
Using the Fraser Index of Economic Freedom we find that, among the five major 
components (government size, legal structure and property rights protection, access 
to sound money, trade freedom and regulation), the composite regulation index that 
includes regulation in credit, labour and business has the strongest influence on the 
banking sector and it has a consistently positive and statistically significant impact 
on bank efficiency regardless of the specification of the estimating equation.  
Furthermore, by decomposing the regulation index into its three components (credit, 
business and labour regulation) we find that strict labour regulation is associated 
with lower bank efficiency lending support to the view that more liberal labour 
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markets are associated with increased economic performance. Furthermore, 
decomposing credit regulation provides a rich of results. In particular, aspects of 
foreign ownership and competition as well as private ownership are significantly 
associated with increased bank efficiency. The dynamic panel-VAR results using 
impulse response functions and variance decomposition support the validity of these 
results further. 
The results of this chapter are timely as several EU member states appear to have 
fragile financial systems.  Regulation of the banking sectors in the transition 
countries is relatively new and this study shows that it enhances bank operating 
performance.  Overall, credit regulation in the transition countries is recent and this 
study shows it enhances bank operating performance. Labour regulation also asserts 
a negative impact on inefficiency.  These results are valuable for both academics and 
policy makers in their attempts to understand what could drive bank efficiency.
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Appendices to Chapter 2 
Appendix A 
 
Table A1: The overall components of the Fraser Index of Economic Freedom  
 
Variable Category Nature Description 
GOV-FR 
Size of Government: 
Expenditures, Taxes, 
and Enterprise Composite 
This variable takes values between 0 and 10 with higher values indicating greater economic freedom 
and is the average of four components: A) General government consumption spending  as a percentage 
of total consumption, B) Transfers and subsidies as a percentage of GDP, C) Government enterprises 
and investment, D) Top marginal tax rate (Di: Top marginal income tax rate, Dii:  Top marginal 
income and payroll tax rate).  The four components of this index indicate the extent to which  
countries rely on the political process to allocate resources  and goods and services. Taken together, 
the four components of  measure the degree to which a country relies on personal choice and markets 
rather than government budgets and  political decision-making. Therefore, countries with low levels of 
government spending as a share of the total, a smaller government enterprise sector, and lower 
marginal tax rates earn the highest ratings in this area. 
LEG-FR 
Legal Structure and 
Security of Property 
Rights Composite 
This variable takes values between 0 and 10 with higher values indicating greater economic freedom 
and is the average of seven components: A) Judicial independence, B) Impartial courts, C)  Protection 
of property rights, D)  Military interference in rule of law and the political process, E)  Integrity of the 
legal system, F) Legal enforcement of contract, G) Regulatory restrictions on the sale of real property.   
Protection of persons and their rightfully acquired property is a central element of economic freedom 
and a civil society.  The key ingredients of a legal system consistent with economic freedom are rule 
of law, security of property rights, an independent judiciary, and an impartial court system. 
Components indicating how well  the protective function of government is performed were assembled 
from three primary sources: the International Country Risk Guide, the Global Competitiveness Report, 
and the World Bank’s Doing Business project. 
MON-FR 
Access to Sound 
Money Composite 
This variable takes values between 0 and 10 with higher values indicating greater economic freedom 
and is the average of four components: A)  Money growth, B)  Standard deviation of inflation, C)  
Inflation: Most recent year, D) Freedom to own foreign currency bank accounts. In order to earn  a 
high rating in this area, a country must follow policies  and adopt institutions that lead to low (and 
stable) rates  of inflation and avoid regulations that limit the ability to use alternative currencies. 
TRD-FR 
Freedom to Trade 
Internationally Composite 
 
 
 
 
This variable takes values between 0 and 10 with higher values indicating greater economic freedom 
and is the average of five components: A) Taxes on international trade (Ai: Revenues from trade taxes 
as % of the trade sector, Aii: Mean tariff rate, Aiii) Standard Deviation of tariff rates), B) Regulatory 
trade barriers (Bi: Non-tariff trade barriers, Bii: ii Compliance cost of importing & exporting), C) Size 
of trade sector relative to expected, D) Black-market exchange rates, E) International capital market 
controls (Ei: Foreign ownership/investment restrictions, Eii: Capital controls). The components in this 
area are designed to measure a wide variety of restraints that affect international exchange: tariffs, 
quotas, hidden administrative restraints,  and exchange rate and capital controls. In order to get a high 
rating in this area, a country must have low tariffs, a trade sector larger than expected, easy clearance 
and efficient administration of customs, a freely convertible currency, and few controls on the 
movement of capital. 
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REG-FR 
Regulation of Credit, 
Labour, and Business Composite 
This variable takes values between 0 and 10 with higher values indicating greater economic freedom . 
When regulations restrict entry into markets and interfere with the freedom to engage in voluntary 
exchange, they reduce economic freedom. The fifth area of the index focuses on regulatory restraints 
that limit the freedom of  exchange in credit, labor, and product market. This index is the average of  
three components: A) Credit market regulations (Ai: Private ownership of banks, Aii: Foreign bank 
competition, Aiii: Private sector credit, Aiv: Interest rate controls/negative real interest rates), B) 
Labour market regulations (Bi: Hiring regulations and minimum wage, Bii:  Hiring and firing 
regulations, Biii: Centralised collective bargaining, Biv: Hours regulations, Bv: Mandated cost of 
worker dismissal, Bvi: Conscription), C) Business regulations (Ci: Price controls, Cii: Administrative 
requirements, Ciii: Bureaucracy costs, Civ: Starting a business, Cv: Extra 
payments/bribes/favouritism, Cvi: Licensing restrictions, Cvii: Cost of tax compliance) 
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Table A2: The regulation components of the Fraser Index of Economic 
Freedom   
 
Variable Category Nature Description 
CR-OWN 
Credit 
Regulations Component 
Data on the percentage of bank deposits held in privately owned banks were used to 
construct rating intervals. Countries with larger shares of privately held deposits received 
higher ratings. When privately held deposits totalled between 95% and 100%, countries 
were given a rating of 10. When private deposits constituted between 75% and 95% of the 
total, a rating of 8 was assigned. When private deposits were between 40% and 75% of the  
total, the rating was 5. When private deposits totalled between 10% and 40%, countries 
received a rating of 2. A zero rating was assigned when private deposits were 10% or less 
of the total.  
CR-COMP 
Credit 
Regulations Component 
If a country approved all or most foreign bank applications and if foreign banks had a 
large share of the banking  sector assets, then the country received a higher rating.  
CR-PRS 
Credit 
Regulations Component 
This sub-component measures the extent to which government borrowing crowds out 
private borrowing. When data are available, this sub-component is calculated as the 
government fiscal deficit as a share of gross saving. Since the deficit is expressed as a 
negative value, higher numerical values result in higher ratings. The formula used to 
derive the country ratings for this sub-component was (−Vmax − Vi) / (Vmax + Vmin) 
multiplied by 10. Vi is the deficit to gross investment ratio, and the values for Vmax and 
Vmin are set at 0 and −100.0%, respectively. The formula allocates higher ratings as the 
deficit gets smaller (i.e., closer to zero) relative to gross saving. If the deficit data are not 
available, the component is instead based on the share of private credit to total credit 
extended in the banking sector. Higher values are indicative of greater economic freedom. 
Thus, the formula used to derive the country ratings for this sub-component was (Vi − 
Vmin) / (Vmax − Vmin) multiplied by 10. Vi is the share of the country’s total domestic 
credit allocated to the private sector and the values for Vmax and Vmin are set at 99.9% 
and 10.0%, respectively. The 1990 data were used to derive the maximum and minimum 
values for this component. The formula allocates higher ratings as the share of credit 
extended to the private sector increases.  
CR-IR 
Credit 
Regulations Component 
Data on credit-market controls and regulations were used to construct rating intervals. 
Countries with interest rates determined by the market, stable monetary policy, and 
positive real deposit and lending rates received higher ratings. When interest rates were 
determined primarily by market forces and the real rates were positive, countries were 
given a rating of 10. When interest rates were primarily determined by the market but the 
real rates were sometimes slightly negative (less than 5%) or the differential between the 
deposit and lending rates was large (8% or more), countries received a rating of 8. When 
the real deposit or lending rate was persistently negative by a  single-digit amount or the 
differential between them was regulated by the government, countries were rated at 6. 
When the deposit and lending rates were fixed by the government and the real rates were 
often negative by single digit amounts, countries were assigned a rating of 4. When the 
real deposit or lending rate was persistently negative by a double-digit amount, countries 
received a rating of 2. A zero rating was assigned when the deposit and lending rates were 
fixed by the government and real rates were persistently negative by double-digit amounts 
or hyperinflation had virtually eliminated the credit market.  
CR-REG 
Credit 
Regulations Composite Composite index of the above 
LR-REG 
Labour 
Regulation Composite 
A measure of the extent to which labour market rigidities are present. In order to earn high 
marks in the LR component, a  country must allow market forces to determine wages and 
establish the conditions of hiring and firing, and refrain from the use of conscription. 
BR-REG 
Business 
Regulations Composite 
The variable aims to identify  the extent to which regulations and bureaucratic procedures 
restrain entry and reduce competition. In order to score high in this part of the index, 
countries must allow markets to determine prices and refrain from regulatory activities that 
retard entry into business and increase the cost of producing products. They also must 
refrain from using their power to extract financial payments and reward some businesses at 
the expense of others. 
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Appendix B: Robustness Regressions 
 
Table B1: Robustness check - efficiency and foreign bank competition 
 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES EFF EFF 
   
lnTA 0.0494*** 0.0431*** 
 (0.0107) (0.0164) 
EA 0.101 0.237*** 
 (0.0782) (0.0851) 
LA 0.0340 0.0511 
 (0.0317) (0.0355) 
LLPL -0.260 -0.134 
 (0.244) (0.250) 
lnGDPcap -0.187*** 0.0200 
 (0.0605) (0.0628) 
INFL 0.000630 -0.00141 
 (0.000758) (0.000877) 
GDPgr 0.00246*** 0.00108 
 (0.000706) (0.000781) 
DCP 0.000202 -0.000777* 
 (0.000392) (0.000436) 
C5 -0.000463 -9.22e-05 
 (0.000422) (0.000519) 
FDI-Banks 0.00262***  
 (0.000667)  
FDI-assets  4.76e-05 
  (0.000484) 
Constant 1.695*** -0.0237 
 (0.507) (0.480) 
   
Observations 
F-test 
927 
     18.27*** 
707 
      12.32*** 
R-squared 0.171 0.118 
Number of banks 190 174 
Note: The table reports the fixed effects regression results for alternative measures of foreign bank competition in the domestic market 
using data from Claessens and van Horen (2013).  The dependent variable is the cost efficiency scores calculated using a DEA 
methodology and assuming variable returns to scale (VRS) and a common annual frontier. FDI-Banks stands for the percentage of the 
number of foreign owned banks to the number of the total banks in an economy, FDI-assets stands for the percentage of the total banking 
assets that are held by foreign banks in an economy.  lnTA stands for the natural logarithm of total assets, EA stands for the equity to 
assets ratio, LA stands for the loan to assets ratio, LLPL stands for the loan loss provisions to total loans ratio, lnGDPcap stands for the 
natural logarithm of GDP per capita at purchasing power parity (PPP) terms, INFL stands for inflation, GDPgr stands for GDP growth, 
DCP stands for private sector credit to GDP, C5 stands for the five-firm concentration ratio of each country’s banking industry. The use of 
the fixed effects specification is justified after a Hausman test for each model. To avoid collinearity problems with the selected variables, 
we first analyse correlations of all the selected variables. We observe that there is not a high level of correlation between the variables used 
in the models. ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. Robust Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Table B2: Robustness check- efficiency and regulation in credit, labour and 
business using an alternative economic freedom index (The Heritage 
Foundation Index of Economic Freedom) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES EFF EFF EFF EFF 
     
lnTA 0.0523*** 0.0402*** 0.0518*** 0.0428*** 
 (0.0107) (0.0151) (0.0108) (0.0155) 
EA 0.132* 0.170 0.123 0.184 
 (0.0793) (0.119) (0.0799) (0.119) 
LA 0.0288 0.0355 0.0362 0.0327 
 (0.0315) (0.0400) (0.0328) (0.0395) 
LLPL -0.0415 0.0586 -0.0793 0.0895 
 (0.228) (0.184) (0.227) (0.193) 
lnGDPcap -0.0955** 0.0617 -0.0903** 0.0646 
 (0.0465) (0.0581) (0.0450) (0.0548) 
INFL 0.000690 -0.00246*** 0.000328 -0.00261*** 
 (0.000729) (0.000809) (0.000722) (0.000773) 
GDPgr 0.00163*** 0.000884 0.00169*** 0.000819 
 (0.000517) (0.000560) (0.000519) (0.000546) 
DCP 0.000288 -0.00123*** 0.000329 -0.00125*** 
 (0.000378) (0.000452) (0.000368) (0.000442) 
C5 0.000150 -0.000551 0.000524 -0.00126 
 (0.000434) (0.000855) (0.000472) (0.000807) 
FIN-HER 0.000565   0.000968** 
 (0.000404)   (0.000447) 
LAB-HER  0.00304***  0.00285** 
  (0.00115)  (0.00110) 
BUS-HER   -0.000527 0.000430 
   (0.000498) (0.000446) 
Constant 0.854** -0.492 0.855** -0.585 
 (0.376) (0.463) (0.363) (0.459) 
     
Observations 
F-test 
1,045 
    15.50*** 
725 
      13.19*** 
1,045 
     14.78*** 
725 
      18.67*** 
R-squared 0.141 0.123 0.140 0.138 
Number of banks 192 175 192 175 
Note: The table reports the fixed effects regression results for alternative measures of economic freedom related to credit, labour and business 
using data from the  Heritage Foundation Index of Economic Freedom. The dependent variable is the cost efficiency scores calculated using a 
DEA methodology and assuming variable returns to scale (VRS) and a common annual frontier. FIN-HER stands for financial freedom, LAB-
HER stands for labour freedom, BUS-HER stands for business freedom, lnTA stands for the natural logarithm of total assets, EA stands for the 
equity to assets ratio, LA stands for the loan to assets ratio, LLPL stands for the loan loss provisions to total loans ratio, lnGDPcap stands for 
the natural logarithm of GDP per capita at purchasing power parity (PPP) terms, INFL stands for inflation, GDPgr stands for GDP growth, 
DCP stands for private sector credit to GDP, C5 stands for the five-firm concentration ratio of each country’s banking industry. The use of the 
fixed effects specification is justified after a Hausman test for each model. To avoid collinearity problems with the selected variables, we first 
analyse correlations of all the selected variables. We observe that there is not a high level of correlation between the variables used in the 
models. ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. Robust Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Appendix C: Panel VAR Methodology 
 
We examine the underlying causality links between cost efficiency (EFF), the five 
firm concentration in a country’s banking industry (C5), and bank regulation 
variables using a first order 4x4 panel-VAR model: 
tiitiit e ,1  XX  ,  i =1,…, N, t=1,…,T.                                                                               
                                                                                                                                 (1) 
, where Xit is a vector of four random variables, that is, the bank specific cost 
efficiency (EFFit), the concentratio ratio (C5it) and two credit regulation variables, 
namely foreign bank competition (CR-COMPit) and limitations in the interest rate 
controls (CR-IRit). Thus, Φ is an 4x4 matrix of coefficients, μi is a vector of m 
individual effects and ei,t are iid residuals.  The panel-VAR takes the following 
form: 
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The moving averages (MA) form of the model sets EFFit, C5it, CR-COMPit and 
CR-IRit equal to a set of present and past residuals e1, e2, e3 and e4 from the panel-
VAR estimation: 
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Under the endogeneity assumption the residuals will be correlated and therefore the 
coefficients of the MA representation are not interpretable. As a result, the 
residuals must be orthogonal. We orthogonalize the residuals by multiplying the 
MA representation with the Cholesky decomposition of the covariance matrix of 
the residuals. The orthogonalized, or structural, representation is: 
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where P is the Cholesky decomposition of the covariance matrix of the residuals: 
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We introduce fixed effects in the above panel-VAR model to ensure heterogeneity 
in the levels, denoted μi. In addition, as in Love and Zicchino (2006) we are 
forward mean-differenced the data following the Helmert procedure (Arellano and 
Bover, 1995). Last we employ Monte Carlo simulations to estimate standard errors 
for the impulse response functions (IRFs). Note that for simplicity and facilitating 
the exposition of the vectors and matrixes of panel-VAR model (1) we constrain 
our analysis to two credit regulation variables (CR-COMP and CR-IR). In the 
empirical section, we include a second  panel-VAR  with the other two credit 
regulation variables (CR-OWN and CR-PRS). 
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Chapter 3: The Impact of Business Regulation on Bank 
Performance in the EU-27 
 
3.1 Introduction 
  
Business regulations are central to policy making as setting them right would foster 
competitiveness and boost economic growth, whereas excess regulation could 
prove harmful to the economy. Another important focal point of policy makers is 
the performance of the banking sector, as this is of major significance to the well-
functioning of financial markets in particular and the economy in general. 
Moreover, the recent financial crisis demonstrated that poor bank performance 
asserts a negative effect on the overall economy due to the systemic financial 
stability implications and credit constraints. Given the prominence of both 
regulation and bank performance is not surprising that there has been an extensive 
literature (Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache 1998, Barth et al., 2004; Beck et al., 
2006; Pasiouras, 2008; Pasiouras et al., 2009; Barth et al. 2013; Delis et al., 2011, 
Delis and Staikouras, 2011)
13
, in particular regarding bank specific regulation. 
However, to the best of our knowledge the impact of wider regulations that could 
affect the day-to-day bank operations has not been examined. To this end, we fill a 
gap by studying the impact that wider business regulations, targeting to improve 
competitiveness, could have on bank performance, whilst we also focus on bank 
specific regulations.  
                                                        
13
 Barth et al. (2004) finds that private monitoring regulation has a positive and significant effect on 
bank performance. In the same study official supervisory power and regulation for capital 
requirements are found not be significantly related with the performance of financial institutions. 
Beck et al. (2006) confirm the importance of private monitoring regulation for the banking sector. In 
a study of 2,500 banks across 37 countries they find that enhancing private monitoring of banks by 
obliging them to reveal truthful information to the private sector has as a result to decrease the level 
to which corruption of bank staff posits a hurdle for companies to access finance. In another study, 
Pasiouras et al. (2009) investigate the impact of the three pillars of Basel II and restrictions on bank 
activities on efficiency. They find that market discipline regulation and the supervisory authority is 
positively related with bank efficiency. On the other hand, restrictions on bank activities increase 
profit efficiency but reduce cost efficiency, while stricter capital requirements have the reverse 
impact. Other studies that examine the impact of financial regulation on bank performance include 
Pasiouras (2008), Barth et al. (2013), Delis et al. (2011), Delis and Staikouras, (2011). 
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In early empirical studies variables that reflect the quality of institutions such as 
bureaucratic quality or law observance serve as proxies for regulation and 
supervision that is specific to the banking sectors. Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache 
(1998, 2002) provide evidence that improved institutional quality is negatively 
related with the probability of banking crises and reduces the effect of moral hazard 
due to deposit insurance regulation. The availability of data for regulation specific 
to the banking sector steered research that use these data as main regulatory 
variables while general country-level institutional quality measures serve as control 
variables. A proliferation of research that examines the impact of bank supervision 
and regulation on bank performance has not reached yet an agreement on how 
specific types of bank regulation affect bank performance or what in general is a 
good regulation for the financial sector. 
Furthermore, extant research of the impact of non-financial regulation on bank 
performance is limited although banks operate within the wide spectrum of 
regulations of the country they are located. This is so despite that some studies 
have demonstrated the importance of non-financial institutional and regulatory 
framework in explaining cross-country differences in bank performance 
(Demirgüç-Kunt et al. 2004, 2008; Lensink et al. 2008; Hasan et al. 2009). 
Overall, the literature that links regulation to bank performance is dominated by 
bank-specific regulation, while institutional quality measures serve as control 
variables. Furthermore, the limited literature that focuses specifically on how non-
financial regulation and institutional quality could affect bank performance uses 
wide measures, as for example law observance, making it harder to derive specific 
policy implications in order to prioritise efforts to improve the regulatory 
framework.   
In the light of the above, this chapter provides a missing link by examining a wide 
range of bank but also country-specific regulation on performance. Firstly, we 
examine in both fixed effects and dynamic panel models how several types of 
business regulation derived from the “Doing Business” project of the World Bank 
affect bank performance (as measured by efficiency) in the EU-27 economies over 
the 2004-2010 period. In particular we employ models that account for business 
regulation in the following categories: starting a business; getting credit; 
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protecting investors; enforcing contracts; paying taxes; resolving insolvency and 
employing workers. Secondly, we investigate the extent to which the impact of 
each type of regulation is conditional on institutional quality measures such as the 
rule of law and control of corruption. Finally, as sensitivity analysis, we examine 
for the existence of any potential heterogeneity in the impact of getting credit and 
protecting investors regulation on bank performance during the crisis. 
Although we examine several (seven) types of business regulation we place 
emphasis on getting credit regulation as is directly linked with the banking sector 
and of some importance for financial stability. Also, for the first time in the 
banking literature we investigate the impact of entry and tax regulation on 
performance, both making the top of the agenda of EU’s policy makers as they 
perceived to improve competitiveness and hence expedite the recovery from the 
recent financial and sovereign debt crisis. A first glimpse at the results reveal that 
there is not one size fits all effect of regulation on performance. The observed 
variability is of interest for policy making as it highlights where one could focus to 
boost bank performance and thus financial stability. The rest of this chapter is 
structured as follows. Section 3.2 presents the data and the underlying 
methodology, Section 3.3 presents the related literature and develops hypotheses to 
be tested, Section 3.4 reports and discusses the results, whilst  the final section 
offers some concluding comments related to policy making.  
3.2 Data and Variables  
3.2.1 Measuring Bank Performance  
 
We use data from IBCA-Bankscope for the 2004-2010 period. The sample includes 
2046 commercial and savings banks and, after removing errors and inconsistencies, 
11,421 bank/year observations remain in an unbalanced panel.  The sample 
includes the majority of such banks in the EU-27 economies.   
In this study we measure bank performance in terms of cost efficiency. To this end 
we opt for the stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) and follow the Battese and Coelli 
(1995) methodology in order to estimate bank cost efficiency. The major advantage 
of the SFA methodology is that both random error and inefficiency are 
incorporated in a composite error term (Berger and Humphrey, 1997). The 
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allowance for measurement error in the SFA estimation produces bank-specific 
efficiency estimates that reflect more accurately managerial competence  in 
comparison with non-parametric approaches of efficiency estimation such as DEA 
that do not allow for measurement error caused by lack.  In addition to this, the 
disadvantage of parametric approaches of imposing a structure on the efficiency 
frontier poses less of a problem here as the banks of our sample are located in 
countries (EU-27) that at the time period (2004-2010) we examine could be 
considered as market economies. 
14
 
 
The Battese and Coelli (1995) model is suitable for panel data and allows 
controlling for country-level environmental differences in a single stage 
estimation. The Battese and Coelli (1995) cost SFA model takes the form: 
 
TCi,t = f (Pi,t, Yi,t, Ni,t, Zi,t) + vi,t + ui,t 
                                                                                                                       (1)                                                                                                                            
, where TCi,t  the total cost for firm (bank) i at year t, Pit is a vector of input prices 
Yi,t is a vector of outputs of the firm, Ni,t a vector of fixed netputs while  Zi,t is a 
vector of country-specific environmental variables. vi,t  represents random errors 
that are assumed to be i.i.d. and  have N(0,  
 ) while ui,t  represents non-negative 
inefficiency effects that are assumed to be  independently but not identically 
distributed.  
Moreover, we employ a flexible translog cost specification: 
                               
 
                    
 
                    
      
 
                                                        
14
 As we note in Chapter 2 the misspecification of the efficiency frontier in parametric approaches 
such as SFA is more probable in economies that cannot be considered market economies 
(Bhattacharyya et al., 1997; Ataullah et al., 2004;  Claessens and Van Horen, 2012). In the current 
chapter (Chapter 3) we focus on banks located in the EU-27 over the 2004-2010 period. Altough we 
include in our sample banks located in the new member states (EU-10), we cover only the post-
accession to the EU period (after 2004). Thus, it is realistic to assume that in the 2004-2010 period 
the new member states have already accomplished most the the structural reforms towards a market 
economy as such reforms were a prerequisite for entering the EU. Furthermore, there is a stream of 
recent studies that estimates efficiency in the new member states with SFA (see for example Fang et 
al., 2011; Kosac and Zoric, 2011). 
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In the quadratic terms of the stochastic frontier model (2) we impose standard 
linear homogeneity and symmetry restrictions. We estimate (2) using maximum 
likelihood method parameterized in terms of the variance parameters 
2
t =
2
ut  +
2
vt
and γ = 2ut /
2
t . 
In order to define bank inputs and outputs we follow Sealey and Lindley (1977) 
and opt for the intermediation approach. This approach assumes that the main 
function of banks is to use labour and capital in order to collect funds with the 
scope of transforming them into loans and other income generating assets. More 
specifically, two inputs and two outputs are specified. Inputs include labour, as 
measured by personnel expenses, and financial capital, while loans, net of 
provisions and other earning assets, government securities, bonds, equity 
investments, CDs and T-bills, are the outputs. 
In terms of the input prices, we calculate the price of the financial capital as the 
ratio of total interest expenses to total interest bearing borrowed funds while the 
price of labour is represented with the ratio of personnel expenses to total assets. 
The sum of overheads, such as personnel and administrative expenses, interest, fee 
and commission expenses, represents the total cost of each bank in the sample. 
Furthermore, we include equity as a quasi-fixed netput. The reason for this is 
twofold: firstly, equity represents an alternative source of funding for a bank. In 
this way, the level of equity of each bank has the potential to affect directly its cost 
structure (Berger and Mester, 1997).  In addition to this, ignoring financial capital 
may lead to a biased estimation of efficiency as banks with higher equity capital, 
which denotes that the shareholders have more capital at stake, may behave in a 
more risk averse manner than banks with lower level of equity but still optimally 
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given the risk preferences of their shareholders. Additionally, we include each 
bank’s level of fixed assets, as a proxy for physical capital, which is also a standard 
in the literature related to efficiency estimation (Berger and Mester, 1997). 
 
Finally, for environmental variables (Zi,t) we take account of GDP growth and 
inflation as proxies for the dynamism and the macroeconomic stability of each 
country. To control for the level of concentration in the banking industry, we use 
the assets of the five largest banks as a share of assets of all commercial banks (the 
C5 ratio), while to capture heterogeneity in bank competition we employ the Lerner 
index at the country level.
15
  
3.2.2 Business Regulations 
 
Once we obtain the efficiency scores for each bank i for each year t we provide 
second stage regressions analysis with a wide range of World Bank business 
regulation indexes along with several control variables.
16
 We opt for seven 
categories of business regulation available by the “Doing Business” project of the 
World Bank. Each of these broad categories is composed of different indices that 
                                                        
15
 The Lerner index is a measure of market power in the banking market. It is defined as the 
difference between output prices and marginal costs. In this study the Lerner index at the country 
level is used. This is calculated with the following formula: Lerneri,t = (PTAi,t – MCTAi,t) / PTAi,t, 
where PTAi,t is the price of total assets of the banks in a country proxied by the ratio of total bank 
revenues to total bank assets for country i at time t, and MCTAi,t is the marginal cost of the total 
assets of the banking system for country  i at time t. Higher values of the Lerner index indicate less 
bank competition. The source is the Global Financial Development Database of the World Bank 
(Cihak et al., 2012). 
16
 A number of control variables are used to account for individual bank characteristics:  total assets 
(TA) represent the size of each bank. Bank size might have a positive impact on bank performance 
as it may indicate higher diversification (Mester, 1993). On the other hand bank size can affect 
negatively performance if economies of scale and scope are not realised. The extant empirical 
evidence on the impact of size on bank efficiency is mixed (see for example Altunbas et al., 2001; 
Carbo et al., 2002; Bikker, 2002; Maudos and De Guevara, 2007). We also include the ratio of loans 
to assets (LA), which represents well-functioning intermediation by the bank.  Similarly, the equity 
to assets ratio (EA) and the return on equity (ROE) are employed as control variables as they 
represent increased motivation from the part of shareholders to monitor management and increased 
capacity to generate value for the shareholder. Furthermore, we include the loan loss provisions to 
total loans (LLPL) as a measure the quality of the credit portfolio and a proxy for risk. The 
relationship between risk and performance could be either negative, according to the “bad 
management” and the “bad luck” hypothesis, or positive, according to the “skimping hypothesis”  
(Berger and DeYoung, 1997). In terms of the country-level control variables, we opt for the 
domestic credit to the private sector as a share of GDP (DCP) in order to account for the level of 
financial development. Moreover, to control for the general level of economic development we use 
real GDP per capita (GDPcap) in purchasing power parity (PPP) terms.  
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measure a specific aspect of regulation rigidity faced by firms operating in a 
specific country. Namely we include in our models regulation related to the 
following categories.  
 Starting a business: This category includes both bureaucratic and cost related 
indices that pose hurdles to entrepreneurship in each country. 
 Getting credit: Two kinds of credit regulation are included here. The strength of 
creditor rights such as the collateral efficacy and the availability as well as the 
quality (depth) of the credit information registries.  
 Paying taxes: Regulation related to procedural related tax regulation as well as the 
level of corporate profit taxation is included in this category.  
 Enforcing contracts: This topic measures bureaucracy as well as cost related 
regulation regarding the efficiency of contract enforcement at the country level. 
 Resolving insolvency: Procedural and cost related measures are also included in this 
type of business regulation, which accounts for country-level bankruptcy 
legislation. 
 Protecting investors:  This category of business regulation includes measures 
related to firm transparency as measured by disclosure regulation as well as 
measures that rate how well the interests of shareholders are protected against 
management exploitation of firms for personal benefit.  
 Employing workers: Labour regulation measures are included in this index. They 
are related with the cost of labour (minimum wage) and dismissal costs regulation. 
 
A major advantage of the “Doing Business” indices in comparison with other 
indices that attempt to rate country-level business environment, as for example the 
widely used economic freedom indices, is that each category of regulation is highly 
decomposed enabling to spot specific areas of business regulation that could affect 
bank performance. This could support the prioritisation of reform efforts in a more 
focused manner.  
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3.3  Related Literature and Hypothesis Development 
In this section we review in detail the various channels through which the seven 
types of business regulation sourced from the “Doing Business” project of the 
World Bank could affect bank efficiency. 
3.3.1 Starting a Business 
 
Business regulations and bureaucratic procedures that restrain business entry and 
thus reduce competition may affect bank efficiency through spillover effects. In 
particular regulatory entry barriers can lead to lower levels of competition through 
a reduction in the number of new firms entering an industry (Ciccone and 
Papaioannou, 2007;  Klapper et al. 2006). This decreased competitive pressure can 
lead to lower investment (Alesina et al. 2005), lower growth (Loayza et al. 2005) 
and less productivity (Bastos and Nasir, 2004; Bourlès et al., 2010; Nicoletti and 
Scarpetta, 2003). Thus, stringent regulation of entry can have a negative effect on 
the performance of firms and so affect the fulfilment of the obligations these firms 
have to the banking sector.  In addition, increased business regulation is found to 
induce informality (Loayza et al. 2005) making it harder, and so more costly, for 
banks to assess the creditworthiness of a firm (Hoff and Stiglitz, 1993; Besley, 
1995).  Therefore our first research hypothesis H1.A states that: 
H1.A: Stringent starting a business regulation could have a negative effect on bank 
efficiency. 
3.3.2  Getting Credit 
3.3.2.1  Creditor Rights 
 
Creditor rights have the potential to decrease the information asymmetry between 
lenders and borrowers and thus increase bank efficiency by limiting adverse 
selection and moral hazard issues. In a strong creditor rights environment, banks 
are able to use collateral requirements to differentiate the risk level of the projects 
of seemingly comparable loan applicants. This reduction in adverse selection 
happens through signalling. Candidate borrowers with lower risk projects, and thus 
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lower risk of loan default, post higher levels of collateral that candidate borrowers 
with higher risk projects would not be willing to post (Bester, 1985; Besanko and 
Thakor, 1987a; Besanko and Thakor, 1987b; Dell’Ariccia and Marquez, 2006). 
Strong creditor rights enable also a reduction in the moral hazard of borrowers by 
inducing them to be more reluctant in engaging in risk-taking activities (Acharya et 
al., 2011) and increasing their leverage (Vig, 2013, Cho et al, 2014). This in turn 
could increase bank efficiency because of lower loan defaults. Even after a loan 
default, banks operating in high creditor rights country are more likely to realize 
their claims against debtors (Haselmann et al, 2010) limiting in this way their 
losses. However, strong creditor rights may also lead to efficiency losses by 
increasing the moral hazard of lenders. Manove et al. (2001) show that the use of 
collateral in the process of loan origination could lead to a significant decrease in 
screening efforts and as a consequence induce banks to provide credit to a high 
number of worthless projects. Similar findings are also evident in the study of 
Zazzaro (2005).  As a result, strong creditor rights may increase loan defaults 
(Jiménez and Saurina, 2004) and bank risk (Houston et al., 2010) and thus lead to 
lower bank efficiency.  Drawing from these arguments, the second hypothesis 
H2.A, along with the competing hypothesis H2.B, can be stated as: 
 
H2.A (H2.B) : Creditor rights could have a positive (negative) impact on bank 
efficiency. 
 
3.3.2.2   Credit Information Sharing  
 
Credit information sharing refers to access on information related to the past 
behaviour of borrowers. A high level of credit information sharing reduces adverse 
selection as it makes it easier for banks to assess the creditworthiness of potential 
borrowers (Pagano and Japelli, 1993; Kalberg and Udell; 2003). Thus, at higher 
levels of information sharing bank efficiency could increase because of lower 
screening costs and lower loan defaults. Credit information sharing can also reduce 
the moral hazard of borrowers because it can have a disciplinary effect on them 
(Klein 1992; Padilla and Pagano, 1997; 2000). This is because borrowers would try 
to avoid being black listed and as a result excluded from future bank financing. In 
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this way information sharing can have a negative impact on the access to credit for 
risky borrowers (Hertzberg et al., 2011, Doblas-Madrid and Minetti, 2013), which 
could further lead to lower default rates (Japelli and Pagano, 2002) and lower risk 
(Houston et al., 2010).  The improvement of a bank’s loan portfolio through lower 
risk and loan defaults could lead to higher bank efficiency. However, credit 
information sharing could also have a negative effect on bank efficiency by 
increasing the moral hazard of lenders. The reduction of the information 
asymmetries between creditors and borrowers could result in a relaxation of 
lending standards and lower levels of loan screening effort (Dell’Ariccia and 
Marquez, 2006). As a consequence bank efficiency could decrease because of a 
deterioration in the quality of a bank’s loan portfolio. Thus our third hypothesis 
H3.A, along with the competing hypothesis H3.B, can be stated as: 
 
H3.A (H3.B):  Credit information sharing could have a positive (negative) impact 
on bank efficiency. 
 
3.3.3  Paying Taxes 
 
Another important regulation that has not been investigated in detail in terms of its 
link to bank efficiency refers to tax regulation, also in light of the recent austerity 
throughout the EU. The literature that relates explicit and implicit taxation on the 
banking sector finds a pass-through effect from the banking sector to bank’s 
customers (Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 1999; Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 
2001; Albertazzi and Gambacorta ,2010; Chiorazzo and Milani, 2011). This pass-
through effect might have a direct effect on bank credit risk and thus efficiency, as 
increased loan interest rates might lead to an increase of non-performing loans. 
Through another channel, stringent tax regulation does little to boost growth as it 
acts as disincentive to investment growth (Arnold, 2008; Schwellnus and Arnold, 
2008; Vartia, 2008; Arnold et al., 2011). In turn, lower firm growth in the non-
banking sectors could also have adverse implications on the banking industry 
through higher loan defaults. Thus our fourth hypothesis H4.A  is formulated as 
follows: 
H4.A: Stringent paying taxes regulation could have a negative impact on bank 
efficiency. 
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3.3.4  Enforcing Contracts 
 
The competence of each country’s legal system to enforce contracts is of relevance 
for bank efficiency. Studies from the law and finance literature find that judicial 
capacity has a direct effect on financial  outcomes (La Porta et al., 1997; Qian and 
Strahan, 2007). For the banking sector, a low degree of judicial efficiency 
increases the interest rates that banks charge for loans (Laeven and Majnoni, 2005; 
Qian and Strahan, 2007). As a consequence, poor contract enforcement can lead to 
higher loan default rates (Cristini et al., 2001; Pinheiro and Cabral, 2001) and thus 
lower bank efficiency. Another channel through which low contract enforceability 
could harm bank efficiency is by increasing loan screening  costs. Low judicial 
efficiency tends to reduce firm size (Beck et al., 2006; Laeven and Woodruff; 
2007). Larger firms are more transparent for banks than smaller firms since they 
disclose more “hard” financial information (Berglöf and Pajuste, 2005; Brown et 
al., 2009). Thus, it is easier and less costly for a bank to assess the creditworthiness 
of a large firm. On the other hand, there is the possibility that a high degree of 
contract enforcement could have a negative impact on bank efficiency. Zazzaro 
(2005) develops a theoretical model in which improvements in contract 
enforcement reduce the incentive of creditors to screen borrowers adequately.  
Consistent with the theoretical prediction of Zazzaro (2005), Jappelli et al. (2005) 
find that poor contract enforcement is associated with a lower level of non-
performing loans. Following the above discussion our fifth hypothesis H5.A, along 
with the competing hypothesis H5.B,  is specified as: 
 
H5.A (H5.B) : Efficient enforcing contracts regulation could have a positive 
(negative) impact on bank efficiency. 
 
3.3.5  Protecting Investors 
 
Strong investor protection regulation, through aligning the interests of managers 
with that of shareholders, has a positive impact on firm operating performance and 
firm value (La Porta et al., 2002; Klapper and Love; 2004). In particular, managers 
operating in countries with strong investor protection legislation are less likely to 
use firm resources for their own benefit while they tend to invest in projects with 
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higher potential benefit to the shareholders (Wurgler, 2000; Shleifer and 
Wolfenzon, 2002; Bekaert et al., 2010). Better firm performance due to stronger 
investor protection regulation could be channelled in the banking sector through 
lower loan defaults. Through another channel, stronger investor protection at the 
country level can decrease bank costs through easier and less costly monitoring. 
Countries with stronger investor protection tend to exhibit a higher number of listed 
and large firms (La Porta et al., 1997; Kumar et al., 1999). Listed and large firms 
are more transparent for banks because of higher availability of “hard” financial 
information as the law enforces them to produce extensive information about their 
activities through annual reports and other publications (La Porta et al., 2000; 
Loderer and Waelchli, 2010). Consequently, our sixth hypothesis H6.A is the 
following: 
 
H6.A: Strong protecting investors regulation could have a positive impact on bank 
efficiency. 
 
 
3.3.6  Resolving Insolvency 
 
La Porta et al. (1998) show that debt enforcement mechanisms are important for the 
development of the financial markets around the world. One important debt 
enforcement mechanism is a creditor friendly bankruptcy regulation. When the 
bankruptcy regulation is fast, involves a high loan recovery rate and a low cost of 
enforcement, creditors are less affected since they can retrieve a greater portion of a 
bankrupt firm's assets at a low cost. Davydenko and Franks (2008) provide 
empirical evidence that a creditor friendly bankruptcy regulation leads to a higher 
recovery rate of defaulted loans. Furthermore, creditor friendly bankruptcy 
regulation could decrease the firm cost of debt through lower loan rates (Funchal, 
2008; Araujo et al., 2012). Lower loan rates in turn could improve bank efficiency 
by decreasing non-performing loans. On the other hand, a more creditor friendly 
bankruptcy regulation could disincentive banks from carefully screening borrowers 
(Manove et al.; 2001; Zazzaro, 2005) leading in this way to a higher level of loan 
defaults. As a consequence, a creditor friendly bankruptcy regulation could  have a 
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negative effect on bank efficiency. Thus our seventh  hypothesis H7.A and the 
competing hypothesis H7.B is specified as follows: 
 
 H7.A (H7.B): A more creditor friendly resolving insolvency regulation could have 
a positive (negative) effect on bank efficiency. 
 
3.3.7  Employing Workers 
 
Labour regulation could have an impact on bank efficiency directly by influencing 
the cost structure of banks. Personnel expenses form an important part of bank 
costs, and the ability of managers to control costs is an important success factor in 
the financial industry (Spong et al., 1995). Input prices in the banking sector, such 
as labour costs, can differ significantly in a cross-country framework because of 
labor regulation differences (Dietsch and Lozano-Vivas, 2000). Furthermore, 
labour regulation can affect bank efficiency indirectly, via spill-over effects,  if it 
affects the performance of firms in the non-financial sectors of an economy and so 
the fulfillment of their obligations to the banks. In studies that focus on the impact 
of labour regulation on productivity growth the evidence is mixed. A stream of 
recent papers finds a negative impact of labour regulation on investment and 
productivity growth (Autor et al. 2007; Bassanini et al. 2009; Besley and Burgess 
2004). Such productivity losses can be explained by rising employment costs as a 
result of stricter employment protection legislation (Bassanini and Ernst 2002; 
Scarpetta and Tressel 2004).   On the other hand, other studies find that more strict 
labour regulation can lead to productivity gains (Deakin and Sarkar, 2008; Storm 
and Naastepad, 2009) as firms and employees are more inclined to invest in 
enhancing firm-specific and industry-specific skills in the workforce (Auer 2007; 
Wasmer 2006). Thus, the eighth and final hypothesis H8.A and the competing 
hypothesis H8.B are formulated as follows: 
H8.A (H8.B): Stringent employing workers regulation could have a positive 
(negative) effect on bank efficiency. 
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3.3.8  The Interaction of Regulations and Institutional Quality  
 
An interesting question that arises is whether the effects of different types of 
business regulation on bank performance differ according to the level of 
institutional quality of each country. To explore this issue we interact business 
regulations with the rule of law (RL-WB) variable that serves as a proxy of the 
country-level legislation implementation capacity, but also the degree of 
compliance.
17
 It might be the case that in the presence of low level of law 
observance a specific regulation maybe in place but at the same time it might not 
be followed by the economic agents. Interacting the rule of law (RL-WB) variable 
with the different types of business regulation enables us to identify if the 
individual effect of each type of business regulation on bank performance is more 
subdued when the law might exist on paper but less implemented in practice.  
Moreover, we also take into account corruption by interacting the control of 
corruption (COR-WB) variable with the regulation variables so as to investigate the 
“grease the wheel” or the “sand the wheels’’ hypotheses. The “grease the wheel” 
hypothesis denotes that higher levels of corruption may speed up bureaucratic 
processes (see, for example Lui, 1985) and could thus increase firm operational 
efficiency while the “sand the wheels’’ hypothesis contends that higher levels of 
corruption represent an additional cost when dealing with public sector bureaucracy 
(Murphy et al., 1993) and so further impede operational efficiency. Negative 
(positive) and significant coefficients for the interaction terms would suggest that 
the negative (positive) individual impact of a specific business regulation on bank 
performance would be less (more) pronounced in the presence of higher 
institutional quality. Both of the institutional quality measures, rule of law (RL-
WB) and control of corruption (COR-WB) are sourced from the World Governance 
Indicators of the World Bank. 
 
                                                        
17
 The use of interaction terms between institutional development indices, such as measures of rule 
of law, and regulation is common in the banking and finance literature. For example Cull et al. 
(2002) find that in weak regulatory environments, explicit deposit insurance schemes are related to 
declines in financial depth. In another study Beck et al. (2004) find that the negative relationship 
between bank concentration and financing obstacles is diminished in countries with higher 
institutional quality. 
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3.4  Results and Discussion 
3.4.1 Bank Performance Estimates  
 
Table 1:  Bank Efficiencies EU-27 (2004-2010) based on Stochastic Frontier 
Analysis (SFA)  
Country Bank Efficiency in the EU-27 
Country EFF s.d. Country EFF s.d. 
AUSTRIA 0.861 0.150 LATVIA 0.793 0.084 
BELGIUM 0.767 0.147 LITHUANIA 0.739 0.112 
BULGARIA 0.683 0.116 LUXEMBOURG 0.675 0.171 
CYPRUS 0.817 0.148 MALTA 0.728 0.209 
CZECH REPUBLIC 0.775 0.124 NETHERLANDS 0.737 0.159 
DENMARK 0.907 0.064 POLAND 0.752 0.117 
ESTONIA 0.783 0.123 PORTUGAL 0.797 0.124 
FINLAND 0.825 0.115 ROMANIA 0.606 0.119 
FRANCE 0.791 0.148 SLOVAKIA 0.749 0.127 
GERMANY 0.883 0.087 SLOVENIA 0.902 0.058 
GREECE 0.827 0.075 SPAIN 0.879 0.11 
HUNGARY 0.597 0.133 SWEDEN 0.857 0.103 
IRELAND 0.818 0.131 UNITED KINGDOM 0.746 0.162 
ITALY 0.886 0.103 EU-27 0.834 0.138 
Over Time Bank Efficiency in the EU-27 (2004-2010) 
year EFF s.d. year EFF s.d. 
2004 0.826 0.143 2008 0.808 0.146 
2005 0.846 0.129 2009 0.844 0.135 
2006 0.845 0.135 2010 0.846 0.129 
2007 0.827 0.14       
Note: The table reports the mean cost efficiency scores (EFF) by country and by time over the 2004-2010 
periods. The cost efficiencies were estimated using stochastic frontier analysis and assuming a common cross-
country frontier.  
 
 
Cost efficiency scores are reported in Table 1, showing the average score over the 
period 2004-2010
18
. The average bank cost efficiency for the sample is 0.834, a 
figure that conforms with previous studies for the EU (Koutsomanoli-Filippaki and 
                                                        
18
 Regarding the translog cost function using the Battese and Coelli (1995) model refer to table A1 
in the appendix. The results for the environmental (Z) variables show that the inflation rate (INFL) 
has a positive impact on inefficiency while GDP growth (GDPgr) exerts a negative effect on 
inefficiency in line with Yildirim and Philippatos (2007). The concentration ratio (C5) has a 
negative effect on inefficiency in line with Lensink et al. (2008). Furthermore, the Lerner index at 
the country level has negative effect on inefficiency lending support to the “competition-fragility” 
hypothesis (Berger et al., 2008) according to which higher competition can lead to a deterioration in 
the quality of bank loans (Jimenez et al., 2010) and higher risk (Keeley, 1990). 
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Mamatzakis, 2009; Weill 2009; Casu and Girardone, 2010). It is worth noting that 
despite increased levels of financial integration between the old member states 
(EU-15) and the new member states (EU-10) significant differences in terms of 
bank efficiency still persist. For example the efficiency scores for Hungary, 
Romania and Bulgaria are significantly behind the average efficiency score for the 
EU-27. In terms of the time series, there is a significant drop of efficiency in 2008.  
This is not coincidental as 2008 represents the peak of the financial crisis. Bank 
performance in the EU-27 economies seems to bounce back during 2009 and 2010. 
 
3.4.2  The Impact of the Control Variables 
 
 
Before proceeding in the analysing the impact of different types of business 
regulation on bank performance we provide an overview of the results of bank-
specific, macroeconomic and financial structure variables (see Tables 2-24). The 
intermediation ratio (LA), bank size (lnTA),  the equity to assets ratio (EA) and the 
profitability ratio (ROE)  exert a positive impact on bank performance in line with 
previous studies (Miller and Noulas, 1996; Isik and Hasan, 2003; Casu and 
Girardone, 2004; Rao, 2005). On the other hand, the net interest margin (NIM) 
exerts a negative impact on performance lending support to the view that banks 
pass inefficiencies to consumers using higher interest rates. Furthermore, the loan 
loss provision to total loans ratio (LLPL) is positively associated with performance. 
Such finding resembles the “skimping” hypothesis (Berger and DeYoung; 1997), 
according to which banks that put less effort on loan screening could be more cost 
efficient in short time periods. Finally, in terms of the macroeconomic and financial 
structure control variables, we find that the general level of economic development 
(lnGDPcap) and the level of financial development (DCP) are negatively related 
with bank performance. The negative impact of the general level of economic 
development (lnGDPcap) on bank performance could indicate the higher operating 
and financial costs for supplying a given level of services in richer markets. 
(Dietsch and Lozano-Vivas, 2000).  
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3.4.3  The Impact of Business Regulations 
 
3.4.3.1 Starting a Business 
 
Tables 2 and 3 report the fixed effects and dynamic panel
19
 results for the starting a 
business category respectively. The starting a business category of business 
regulations accounts for the following indices: i) entry procedures, ii) entry time, 
iii) entry cost and iv) entry minimum capital. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
19
 In all the dynamic panel models in this study we use the two-step system GMM  (Arellano and 
Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998) specification with Windmeijer-corrected (robust) standard 
errors. 
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Table 2: Starting a Business - Fixed Effects Panel Analysis. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES EFF EFF EFF EFF EFF 
      
lnTA 0.0148** 0.0141* 0.0118 0.0141* 0.0116 
 (0.00738) (0.00727) (0.00738) (0.00738) (0.00746) 
EA 0.0135 0.0101 0.00428 0.0115 0.00345 
 (0.0662) (0.0661) (0.0659) (0.0662) (0.0661) 
LA 0.0893*** 0.0911*** 0.0834*** 0.0896*** 0.0867*** 
 (0.0214) (0.0212) (0.0214) (0.0211) (0.0216) 
LLPL 0.246*** 0.243*** 0.235*** 0.242*** 0.230*** 
 (0.0788) (0.0787) (0.0783) (0.0784) (0.0779) 
NIM -0.00625*** -0.00608*** -0.00598*** -0.00625*** -0.00597*** 
 (0.00191) (0.00191) (0.00192) (0.00191) (0.00193) 
ROE 0.000520*** 0.000527*** 0.000533*** 0.000532*** 0.000545*** 
 (0.000161) (0.000161) (0.000165) (0.000164) (0.000167) 
lnGDPcap -0.109*** -0.129*** -0.120*** -0.131*** -0.150*** 
 (0.0275) (0.0300) (0.0273) (0.0289) (0.0327) 
DCP -0.000386*** -0.000408*** -0.000451*** -0.000374*** -0.000438*** 
 (9.76e-05) (9.77e-05) (9.69e-05) (9.71e-05) (9.83e-05) 
RL-WB -0.0308** -0.0257* -0.0323** -0.0259* -0.0250 
 (0.0153) (0.0153) (0.0152) (0.0154) (0.0158) 
lnPRO-SB -0.00773    0.0172* 
 (0.00888)    (0.0101) 
lnDAYS-SB  -0.00629**   -0.00418 
  (0.00275)   (0.00296) 
COST-SB   -0.00260***  -0.00246*** 
   (0.000744)  (0.000787) 
MINCAP-SB    -0.000156*** -0.000113** 
    (4.62e-05) (4.79e-05) 
Constant 1.811*** 2.023*** 1.985*** 2.031*** 2.265*** 
 (0.245) (0.282) (0.253) (0.272) (0.307) 
      
Observations 
F-test                                                              
10,883 
8.73*** 
10,883 
     8.68*** 
10,883 
      9.68*** 
10,883 
     9.54*** 
10,883 
      7.74*** 
R-squared 0.036 0.037 0.040 0.037 0.041 
Number of banks 2,014 2,014 2,014 2,014 2,014 
Note: The table reports the fixed-effects regression results for the starting a business category of business regulation. The 
use of the fixed effects specification is justified after a Hausman test for each model. The dependent variable (EFF) is the 
cost efficiency scores calculated using SFA and assuming common frontier across countries. TA stands for total assets, EA 
stands for the equity to assets ratio, LLPL is the ratio of loan loss provision to total loans, LA stands for the loan to total 
assets ratio, NIM stands for net interest margin, ROE stands for return of equity, DCP stands for the ratio of domestic 
credit to the private sector over GDP, GDPcap is GDP per capita in purchasing power parity (PPP) constant 2005 
international $, RL-WB stands for rule of law. PR-SB: the total number of procedures required to register a firm, DAYS-
SB: the total number of days required to register a firm, COST-SB: cost required to complete each procedure, MINCAP-
SB: the amount that the entrepreneur needs to deposit in a bank or with a notary before registration and up to 3 months 
following incorporation and is recorded as a percentage of the economy’s income per capita. To avoid collinearity 
problems with the selected variables, we first analyse correlations of all the selected variables. We observe that there is not 
a high level of correlation between the variables used in the models. ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance 
levels respectively. Robust Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Table 3:   Starting a Business - Dynamic Panel Analysis. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES EFF EFF EFF EFF EFF 
      
L.EFF 0.531*** 0.519*** 0.487*** 0.511*** 0.477*** 
 (0.0492) (0.0517) (0.0522) (0.0495) (0.0533) 
lnTA 0.0188** 0.0165* 0.0166* 0.0170* 0.0136 
 (0.00941) (0.00936) (0.00919) (0.00916) (0.00911) 
EA 0.435*** 0.423*** 0.410*** 0.410*** 0.385*** 
 (0.114) (0.118) (0.118) (0.115) (0.118) 
LA -0.0542 -0.0553 -0.0577 -0.0529 -0.0588* 
 (0.0358) (0.0356) (0.0358) (0.0354) (0.0356) 
LLPL 0.0639 0.0853 0.0355 0.00940 -0.0141 
 (0.123) (0.123) (0.115) (0.110) (0.109) 
NIM -0.00848*** -0.00828*** -0.00838*** -0.00883*** -0.00867*** 
 (0.00184) (0.00186) (0.00182) (0.00180) (0.00178) 
ROE 0.000795*** 0.000839*** 0.000866*** 0.000870*** 0.000943*** 
 (0.000234) (0.000243) (0.000248) (0.000253) (0.000266) 
lnGDPcap -0.412*** -0.432*** -0.420*** -0.432*** -0.453*** 
 (0.0348) (0.0368) (0.0341) (0.0342) (0.0388) 
DCP 0.000128 0.000118 3.52e-06 0.000137 3.40e-05 
 (0.000164) (0.000169) (0.000168) (0.000160) (0.000170) 
RL-WB 0.0324 0.0328 0.0191 0.0422** 0.0327 
 (0.0204) (0.0203) (0.0204) (0.0205) (0.0207) 
lnPRO-SB -0.0109    0.0222 
 (0.0126)    (0.0136) 
lnDAYS-SB  -0.00679   -0.00494 
  (0.00419)   (0.00469) 
COST-SB   -0.00357***  -0.00272** 
   (0.00106)  (0.00131) 
MINCAP-SB    -0.000221*** -0.000196*** 
    (6.99e-05) (7.34e-05) 
Constant 4.345*** 4.603*** 4.544*** 4.577*** 4.890*** 
 (0.301) (0.359) (0.308) (0.312) (0.377) 
      
Observations 8,871 8,871 8,871 8,871 8,871 
Number of banks 
N of instruments 
Wald 
AR2 p-value 
Hansen-J p-value 
1,897 
31 
    346.78*** 
0.1518 
0.250 
1,897 
31 
   343.01*** 
     0.1319 
     0.443 
1,897 
31 
351.17*** 
    0.1428 
     0.278 
1,897 
31 
355.48*** 
     0.1120 
     0.246 
1,897 
31 
360.88*** 
0.1876 
0.446 
Note: The table reports the dynamic panel results for the starting a business category of business regulation. The dependent 
variable (EFF) is the cost efficiency scores calculated using SFA and assuming common frontier across countries. TA 
stands for total assets, EA stands for the equity to assets ratio, LLPL is the ratio of loan loss provision to total loans, LA 
stands for the loan to total assets ratio, NIM stands for net interest margin, ROE stands for return of equity, DCP stands for 
the ratio of domestic credit to the private sector over GDP, GDPcap is GDP per capita in purchasing power parity (PPP) 
constant 2005 international $, RL-WB stands for rule of law. PR-SB: the total number of procedures required to register a 
firm, DAYS-SB: the total number of days required to register a firm, COST-SB: cost required completing each procedure, 
MINCAP-SB: the amount that the entrepreneur needs to deposit in a bank or with a notary before registration and up to 3 
months following incorporation and is recorded as a percentage of the economy’s income per capita. To avoid collinearity 
problems with the selected variables, we first analyse correlations of all the selected variables. We observe that there is not 
a high level of correlation between the variables used in the models. ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance 
levels respectively. Robust Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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The fixed effects results reveal that all the four indices that capture the effect of 
hurdles to start a new business are negatively related with efficiency (see models 1 
to 4 of Table 2) while three of them are statistically significant. In particular, the 
entry time (lnDAYS-SB) is statistically significant at the 5% level, while the entry 
cost (COST-SB) and entry minimum capital (MINCAP-SB) variables are 
significant at the 1% level. All indices are negatively related with efficiency. 
Following a specific to general specification in our empirical estimations we run a 
regression that includes all the starting a business indices (see model 5 of Table 2).  
In the fixed effects model the entry cost (COST-SB) and entry minimum capital 
(MINCAP-SB) variables retain their statistical significance at the 1% and 5% 
levels respectively while the entry time variable (lnDAYS-SB) becomes 
insignificant. The dynamic panel results in Table 3 further confirm the fixed effects 
results as far concerns the entry cost (COST-SB) and entry minimum capital 
(MINCAP-SB) variables  (see modes 3, 4 and 5 of Table 3). It is evident that the 
financial obstacles in starting a business, rather than the procedural ones, matter 
negatively for bank performance. A potential channel through which financial 
obstacles in starting a business can impede bank performance is because of 
reduced performance of existing firms in a country (Nicoletti and Scarpetta, 2003; 
Alesina et al. 2005; Klapper, 2006; Bourlès et al., 2010)  because of  lower levels 
of competition (Klapper et al. 2006; Ciccone and Papaioannou, 2007).  This 
reduced firm performance could negatively affect the fulfilment of the obligations 
these firms have to the banking sector (loans).  Moreover, adding red tape in terms 
of starting business is found to induce informality (Loayza et al. 2005) so making it 
harder and more costly for banks to evaluate the creditworthiness of a firm (Hoff 
and Stiglitz, 1993; Besley, 1995). Another channel through which starting a 
business regulation could have a negative impact on bank performance is because it 
could reduce the innovation efforts of firms (Amable et al. 2009; Barbosa and 
Faria, 2011). This decreased innovation effort could affect negatively firm 
profitability (Leiponen, 2000; Cefis and Ciccarelli, 2005, Cozza et al. 2012) which 
in turn could impair the performance of the banking sector because of increased 
loan defaults.  Lastly, the interaction terms between starting a business regulation 
and institutional quality are not significant as the results in Table 4  demonstrate. 
Overall, the results of this section lend support to hypothesis H1. 
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Table 4:  Starting a Business - Interactions with Institutional Quality. 
 
 
Note: The table reports the dynamic panel results for the starting a business category of business regulation and their interaction with 
institutional quality. The dependent variable (EFF) is the cost efficiency scores calculated using SFA and assuming common frontier 
across countries. TA stands for total assets, EA is the equity to assets ratio, LLPL is the ratio of loan loss provision to total loans, LA 
stands for the loan to total assets ratio, NIM stands for net interest margin, ROE stands for return of equity, DCP stands for the ratio of 
domestic credit to the private sector over GDP, GDPcap is GDP per capita in purchasing power parity (PPP) constant 2005 international $, 
RL-WB stands for rule of law, COR-WB stands for control of corruption. PR-SB: the total number of procedures required to register a 
firm, DAYS-SB: the total number of days required to register a firm, COST-SB: cost required completing each procedure, MINCAP-SB: 
the amount that the entrepreneur needs to deposit in a bank or with a notary before registration and up to 3 months following incorporation 
and is recorded as a percentage of the economy’s income per capita. To avoid collinearity problems with the selected variables, we first 
analyse correlations of all the selected variables. We observe that there is not a high level of correlation between the variables used in the 
models. ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. Robust Standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES EFF EFF EFF EFF EFF EFF EFF EFF 
         
L.eff 0.531*** 0.509*** 0.475*** 0.514*** 0.549*** 0.521*** 0.483*** 0.533*** 
 (0.0494) (0.0517) (0.0575) (0.0497) (0.0519) (0.0519) (0.0561) (0.0508) 
lnTA 0.0189** 0.0175* 0.0160* 0.0177* 0.0213** 0.0185* 0.0192** 0.0197** 
 (0.00929) (0.00947) (0.00916) (0.00914) (0.00944) (0.00946) (0.00917) (0.00908) 
EA 0.432*** 0.436*** 0.401*** 0.411*** 0.432*** 0.429*** 0.408*** 0.420*** 
 (0.115) (0.119) (0.120) (0.112) (0.111) (0.119) (0.115) (0.108) 
LA -0.0542 -0.0592* -0.0588 -0.0552 -0.0539 -0.0600* -0.0564 -0.0541 
 (0.0358) (0.0358) (0.0359) (0.0356) (0.0349) (0.0353) (0.0352) (0.0349) 
LLPL 0.0679 0.0802 0.0366 0.0115 0.0175 0.0636 0.0217 -0.0182 
 (0.123) (0.125) (0.115) (0.110) (0.127) (0.135) (0.119) (0.116) 
NIM -0.00850*** -0.00829*** -0.00837*** -0.00878*** -0.00880*** -0.00848*** -0.00854*** -0.00919*** 
 (0.00184) (0.00186) (0.00181) (0.00180) (0.00199) (0.00202) (0.00196) (0.00198) 
ROE 0.000824*** 0.000896*** 0.000868*** 0.000858*** 0.000784*** 0.000847*** 0.000819*** 0.000779*** 
 (0.000239) (0.000251) (0.000249) (0.000252) (0.000237) (0.000249) (0.000247) (0.000251) 
lnGDPcap -0.411*** -0.435*** -0.422*** -0.431*** -0.378*** -0.430*** -0.403*** -0.398*** 
 (0.0345) (0.0385) (0.0343) (0.0342) (0.0341) (0.0388) (0.0324) (0.0324) 
DCP 0.000140 0.000111 2.05e-05 0.000120 0.000159 9.88e-05 -1.95e-05 0.000131 
 (0.000169) (0.000174) (0.000166) (0.000161) (0.000166) (0.000169) (0.000169) (0.000161) 
RL-WB 0.0363 0.0532 0.0331 0.0326     
 (0.0408) (0.0333) (0.0230) (0.0230)     
lnPRO-SB -0.00982    -0.0239    
 (0.0162)    (0.0154)    
RL-WB*lnPRO-SB -0.00156        
 (0.0179)        
lnDAYS-SB  0.00278    -0.00667   
  (0.0137)    (0.0108)   
RL-WB*lnDAYS-SB  -0.00790       
  (0.00914)       
COST-SB   -0.00185    -0.00255*  
   (0.00185)    (0.00150)  
RL-WB*COST-SB   -0.00150      
   (0.00140)      
MINCAP-SB    -0.000393*    -0.000422** 
    (0.000205)    (0.000178) 
RL-WB*MINCAP-SB    0.000133     
    (0.000131)     
COR-WB     0.0162 0.0602*** 0.0413*** 0.0215* 
     (0.0242) (0.0204) (0.0140) (0.0112) 
COR-WB*lnPRO-SB     0.00762    
     (0.0133)    
COR-WB*lnDAYS-SB      -0.00568   
      (0.00627)   
COR-WB*COST-SB       -0.00145  
       (0.00114)  
COR-WB*MINCAP-SB        0.000169 
        (0.000112) 
Constant 4.336*** 4.599*** 4.563*** 4.570*** 3.976*** 4.533*** 4.301*** 4.191*** 
 (0.300) (0.368) (0.310) (0.313) (0.315) (0.377) (0.306) (0.304) 
         
Observations 8,871 8,871 8,871 8,871 8,871 8,871 8,871 8,871 
Number of banks 
N of instruments 
Wald 
AR2 p-value 
Hansen-J p-value 
1,897 
32 
    345.81***     
0.1494 
0.179 
1,897 
32 
326.18*** 
0.1052 
0.378 
1,897 
32 
359.38*** 
0.1756 
0.443 
1,897 
32 
354.00*** 
0.1239 
0.452 
1,897 
32 
360.62*** 
0.1647 
0.585 
1,897 
32 
349.64*** 
   0.1359 
    0.625 
1,897 
32 
 370.26*** 
0.1113 
0.575 
1,897 
32 
373.60*** 
0.1624 
0.735 
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3.4.3.2 Getting Credit 
 
Tables 5 and 6 present results of the fixed effects and the dynamic models 
respectively for business regulation related to getting credit. This category of 
business regulations includes the following indices: i) legal rights of creditors ii) 
credit information depth, iii) public credit registry coverage and iv)private credit 
registry coverage. 
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Table 5:  Getting Credit - Fixed Effects Panel Analysis. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES EFF EFF EFF EFF EFF 
      
lnTA 0.0136* 0.0119 0.0137* 0.00893 0.00779 
 (0.00759) (0.00761) (0.00803) (0.00817) (0.00851) 
EA 0.0146 0.00829 0.0204 0.0119 0.00626 
 (0.0784) (0.0785) (0.0823) (0.0851) (0.0870) 
LA 0.0739*** 0.0709*** 0.0716*** 0.0676*** 0.0683*** 
 (0.0225) (0.0226) (0.0226) (0.0225) (0.0224) 
LLPL 0.278*** 0.277*** 0.279*** 0.250*** 0.249*** 
 (0.0893) (0.0891) (0.0894) (0.0912) (0.0901) 
NIM -0.00415** -0.00391** -0.00493*** -0.00416** -0.00411** 
 (0.00176) (0.00178) (0.00171) (0.00178) (0.00178) 
ROE 0.000658*** 0.000680*** 0.000654*** 0.000687*** 0.000682*** 
 (0.000159) (0.000163) (0.000165) (0.000173) (0.000174) 
lnGDPcap -0.249*** -0.266*** -0.222*** -0.273*** -0.303*** 
 (0.0307) (0.0318) (0.0295) (0.0332) (0.0349) 
DCP -0.000571*** -0.000603*** -0.000592*** -0.000699*** -0.000676*** 
 (0.000111) (0.000111) (0.000111) (0.000109) (0.000106) 
RL-WB 0.0293* 0.00665 0.00318 0.00880 0.00475 
 (0.0164) (0.0154) (0.0155) (0.0160) (0.0165) 
LEG-CG -0.00572***    -0.00108 
 (0.00160)    (0.00223) 
DEPTH-CG  0.00938***   0.0129*** 
  (0.00361)   (0.00382) 
PB-CG   -0.000247  -0.000277 
   (0.000279)  (0.000337) 
PV-CG     0.000772*** 0.000844*** 
    (0.000209) (0.000240) 
Constant     3.236***      3.389***      2.965***   3.521*** 3.790*** 
 (0.290) (0.302) (0.275) (0.323) (0.341) 
      
Observations 
F-test 
9,274 
    14.80*** 
9,274 
     14.54*** 
9,062 
    13.90*** 
9,027 
     15.41*** 
8,905 
     13.42*** 
R-squared 0.053 0.053 0.051 0.054 0.057 
Number of banks 1,943 1,943 1,933 1,926 1,926 
Note: The table reports the fixed-effects regression results for the getting credit category of business regulation. The use of 
the fixed effects specification is justified after a Hausman test for each model.  The dependent variable (EFF) is the cost 
efficiency scores calculated using SFA and a assuming common frontier across countries. TA stands for total assets, EA is the 
equity to assets ratio, LLPL is the ratio of loan loss provision to total loans, LA stands for the loan to total assets ratio, NIM 
stands for net interest margin, ROE stands for return of equity,  DCP stands for the  ratio of domestic credit to the private 
sector over GDP, GDPcap is GDP per capita in purchasing power parity (PPP) constant 2005 international $, RL-WB stands 
for rule of law. LEG-CG:  this index measures the degree to which collateral and bankruptcy laws protect the rights of 
borrowers and lenders and thus facilitate lending, PB-CG: this indicator reports the number of individuals and firms listed in a 
public credit registry with information on their borrowing history from the past 5 years, PR-CG: This indicator reports the 
number of individuals and firms listed by a private credit bureau with information on their borrowing history from the past 5 
years, DEPTH-CG: this index measures rules and practices affecting the coverage, scope and accessibility of credit 
information available through either a public credit registry or a private credit bureau. To avoid collinearity problems with the 
selected variables, we first analyse correlations of all the selected variables. We observe that there is not a high level of 
correlation between the variables used in the models. ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. 
Robust Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Table 6:  Getting Credit - Dynamic Panel Analysis. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES EFF EFF EFF EFF EFF 
      
L.EFF 0.533*** 0.481*** 0.543*** 0.537*** 0.526*** 
 (0.0493) (0.0511) (0.0541) (0.0526) (0.0549) 
lnTA 0.0158* 0.0262*** 0.0248** 0.0171* 0.0204* 
 (0.00935) (0.00897) (0.00983) (0.00960) (0.0105) 
EA 0.418*** 0.465*** 0.499*** 0.487*** 0.495*** 
 (0.121) (0.112) (0.110) (0.113) (0.112) 
LA -0.0401 -0.0513 -0.0531 -0.0495 -0.0523 
 (0.0343) (0.0344) (0.0357) (0.0362) (0.0347) 
LLPL 0.0761 0.0691 0.0470 0.0642 0.0732 
 (0.121) (0.117) (0.126) (0.131) (0.137) 
NIM -0.00842*** -0.00856*** -0.00926*** -0.00762*** -0.00776*** 
 (0.00193) (0.00182) (0.00185) (0.00178) (0.00173) 
ROE 0.000753*** 0.000812*** 0.000711*** 0.000762*** 0.000710*** 
 (0.000231) (0.000233) (0.000240) (0.000261) (0.000258) 
lnGDPcap -0.387*** -0.424*** -0.415*** -0.434*** -0.397*** 
 (0.0354) (0.0335) (0.0374) (0.0474) (0.0517) 
DCP 0.000169 3.82e-05 0.000229 0.000121 0.000169 
 (0.000159) (0.000165) (0.000160) (0.000176) (0.000180) 
RL-WB 0.0484** 0.0418** 0.0331 0.0376* 0.0610*** 
 (0.0207) (0.0194) (0.0211) (0.0204) (0.0214) 
LEG-CG -0.00825***    -0.00871** 
 (0.00232)    (0.00339) 
DEPTH-CG  0.0185***   0.0113* 
  (0.00433)   (0.00591) 
PB-CG   -0.000983  -0.00112* 
   (0.000691)  (0.000640) 
PV-CG    0.000255 8.39e-05 
    (0.000261) (0.000258) 
Constant 4.136*** 4.292*** 4.252*** 4.547*** 4.103*** 
 (0.303) (0.296) (0.317) (0.416) (0.421) 
      
Observations 8,871 8,871 8,675 8,648 8,535 
Number of banks 
N of instruments 
Wald 
AR2 p-value 
Hansen-J p-value 
1,897 
31 
394.78*** 
0.1652 
0.436 
1,897 
31 
   366.15*** 
0.1180 
0.345 
1,886 
31 
298.66*** 
0.2604 
0.621 
1,881 
31 
286.74*** 
0.1885 
0.418 
1,879 
34 
361.79*** 
0.2620 
0.158 
Note: The table reports the dynamic panel regression results for the getting credit category of business regulation .The dependent variable 
(EFF) is the cost efficiency scores calculated using SFA and assuming common frontier across countries. TA stands for total assets, EA is 
the equity to assets ratio, LLPL: the ratio of loan loss provision to total loans, LA stands for the loan to total assets ratio, NIM stands for 
net interest margin, ROE stands for return of equity, DCP stands for the ratio of domestic credit to the private sector over GDP, GDPcap is 
GDP per capita in purchasing power parity (PPP) constant 2005 international $, RL-WB stands for rule of law. LEG-CG:  this index 
measures the degree to which collateral and bankruptcy laws protect the rights of borrowers and lenders and thus facilitate lending, PB-
CG: this indicator reports the number of individuals and firms listed in a public credit registry with information on their borrowing history 
from the past 5 years, PR-CG: this indicator reports the number of individuals and firms listed by a private credit bureau with information 
on their borrowing history from the past 5 years, DEPTH-CG: this index measures rules and practices affecting the coverage, scope and 
accessibility of credit information available through either a public credit registry or a private credit bureau. To avoid collinearity 
problems with the selected variables, we first analyse correlations of all the selected variables. We observe that there is not a high level of 
correlation between the variables used in the models. ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. Robust 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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An interesting result emerges as strengthening the protection of creditor rights 
(LEG-CG) would reduce performance in both the fixed effects and the dynamic 
panel specifications (see model 1 in Table 5 and model 1 in Table 6).  This result 
would imply that strong creditor rights do little to motivate bank managers to 
actively engage in screening loans in line with the empirical findings of Manove et 
al. (2001) and Zazzaro (2005). Furthermore, low levels of creditor rights induce 
banks to originate loans with shorter maturities in order for banks to be able to stop 
lending when the deterioration in the creditworthiness of a borrower becomes 
evident (Diamond, 2004). Borrowers of loans with short maturities are screened 
more often when they apply for refinancing. Although more frequent screening of 
borrowers represents a cost for banks it could be the case that the benefits in terms 
of the quality of a bank’s credit portfolio because of more frequent monitoring 
outweigh such costs.  
On the other hand, the depth of credit information (DEPTH-LEG) has a positive 
and statistically significant at the 1% level impact on bank performance in both the 
fixed effects (see model 2 in Table 5) and dynamic specifications (see models 2 and 
5 in Table 6). Moreover, the impact of the private sector credit registry coverage 
(PR-CG) is positively related to bank performance at the 1% level in the fixed 
effects specification (see models 4 and 5 in Table 5). The results related to positive 
impact of the private sector credit registry coverage (PR-CG) on efficiency lends 
support to the view that credit information sharing can promote bank performance 
through increased discipline of borrowers (Klein, 1992; Vercammen, 1995; 
Pagano, 1997; Padilla and Pagano, 2000). Along these lines, Houston et al. (2010) 
find that increased credit information sharing at the country-level increases bank 
profitability, lowers bank risk but also decreases the likelihood of financial crisis 
and increases economic growth. Furthermore, credit information sharing 
improvements may contribute to the reduction of the significant informational 
disadvantages foreign and new entrant banks have in a market (Bofondi and Gobbi, 
2006; Gianneti and Ongena, 2009), improving in that way their performance.  
The positive and significant impact of the credit information depth (DEPTH-LEG) 
underlines the importance of credit registries and of information regarding the 
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underlying quality. Similarly, the negative impact, at the 10% significance level, of 
the public registry coverage (PB-CG) on bank performance in the dynamic analysis 
(see model 5 of Table 6) could reflect that, in general, public credit registries have 
relatively lower quality compared to private ones. Overall, the results of this 
section lend support to hypothesis H2.B for creditor rights and H3.A for credit 
information sharing. 
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Table 7:  Getting Credit - Interaction with Institutional Quality  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES EFF EFF EFF EFF EFF EFF EFF EFF 
         
L.EFF 0.532*** 0.512*** 0.537*** 0.533*** 0.559*** 0.509*** 0.545*** 0.539*** 
 (0.0529) (0.0565) (0.0543) (0.0522) (0.0515) (0.0540) (0.0556) (0.0523) 
lnTA 0.0175* 0.0213** 0.0249** 0.0157 0.0204** 0.0228** 0.0224** 0.0188* 
 (0.00984) (0.00925) (0.00976) (0.00956) (0.00983) (0.00962) (0.0101) (0.00984) 
EA 0.420*** 0.432*** 0.496*** 0.502*** 0.419*** 0.427*** 0.469*** 0.494*** 
 (0.121) (0.115) (0.108) (0.110) (0.116) (0.115) (0.106) (0.105) 
LA -0.0373 -0.0495 -0.0491 -0.0513 -0.0381 -0.0502 -0.0422 -0.0570 
 (0.0349) (0.0344) (0.0355) (0.0359) (0.0338) (0.0343) (0.0349) (0.0353) 
LLPL 0.0720 0.0900 0.0529 0.0638 -0.00959 0.0106 -0.0181 0.0432 
 (0.119) (0.113) (0.128) (0.126) (0.119) (0.114) (0.131) (0.129) 
NIM -0.00851*** -0.00825*** -0.00915*** -0.00773*** -0.00946*** -0.00891*** -0.00959*** -0.00778*** 
 (0.00189) (0.00176) (0.00188) (0.00175) (0.00220) (0.00184) (0.00205) (0.00184) 
ROE 0.000747*** 0.000810*** 0.000716*** 0.000735*** 0.000645*** 0.000751*** 0.000706*** 0.000668*** 
 (0.000228) (0.000220) (0.000240) (0.000257) (0.000227) (0.000226) (0.000252) (0.000251) 
lnGDPcap -0.394*** -0.437*** -0.417*** -0.412*** -0.370*** -0.410*** -0.395*** -0.415*** 
 (0.0360) (0.0329) (0.0380) (0.0499) (0.0391) (0.0338) (0.0366) (0.0471) 
DCP 0.000142 8.83e-05 0.000220 5.40e-05 0.000226 0.000104 0.000251 3.44e-05 
 (0.000165) (0.000160) (0.000159) (0.000170) (0.000158) (0.000162) (0.000160) (0.000175) 
RL-WB 0.0443 0.159** 0.0325 0.0768***     
 (0.0480) (0.0664) (0.0209) (0.0276)     
LEG-CG -0.00904    0.00315    
 (0.0118)    (0.00883)    
RL-WB*LEG-CG 0.000560        
 (0.00710)        
DEPTH-CG  0.0279***    0.0243***   
  (0.00673)    (0.00615)   
RL-WB*DEPTH-CG  -0.0206*       
  (0.0112)       
PB-CG   -0.00120    -0.00137*  
   (0.000998)    (0.000729)  
RL-WB*PB-CG   0.000207      
   (0.000880)      
PV-CG    0.00126***    0.000938*** 
    (0.000465)    (0.000357) 
RL-WB*PV-CG    -0.000817**     
    (0.000372)     
COR-WB     0.0800** 0.0958* 0.0136 0.0615*** 
     (0.0344) (0.0544) (0.0121) (0.0196) 
COR-WB*LEG-CG     -0.00666    
     (0.00479)    
COR-WB*DEPTH-CG      -0.0137   
      (0.0106)   
COR-WB*PB-CG       0.00162*  
       (0.000896)  
COR-WB*PV-GC        -0.000358 
        (0.000291) 
Constant 4.186*** 4.400*** 4.275*** 4.305*** 3.817*** 4.161*** 4.093*** 4.292*** 
 (0.315) (0.293) (0.324) (0.449) (0.321) (0.317) (0.320) (0.411) 
         
Observations 8,871 8,871 8,675 8,648 8,871 8,871 8,675 8,648 
Number of banks 
N of instruments 
Wald 
AR2 p-value 
Hansen-J p-value 
1,897 
32   
 395.04*** 
0.1645 
0.397 
1,897 
32 
   390.24*** 
0.1926 
0.451 
1,886 
32 
  298.80*** 
0.2478 
0.517 
1,881 
32 
 319.54*** 
0.1833 
0.490 
1,897 
32 
    399.47*** 
0.2106 
0.313 
1,897 
32 
    383.28*** 
0.1944 
0.516 
1,886 
32 
314.69*** 
0.3145 
0.648 
1,881 
32 
328.29*** 
0.2011 
0.696 
Note: The table reports the dynamic panel regression results for the getting credit category of business regulation and their interaction with 
institutional quality .The dependent variable (EFF) is the cost efficiency scores calculated using SFA and a assuming common frontier 
across countries. TA stands for total assets, EA is the equity to assets ratio, LLPL is the ratio of loan loss provision to total loans, L/A 
stands for the loan to total assets ratio, NIM stands for net interest margin, ROE stands for return of equity, DCP stands for the  ratio of 
domestic credit to the private sector over GDP, GDPcap is GDP per capita in purchasing power parity (PPP) constant 2005 international $, 
RL-WB stands for rule of law, COR-WB stands for  control of corruption. LEG-CG: this index measures the degree to which collateral 
and bankruptcy laws protect the rights of borrowers and lenders and thus facilitate lending, PB-CG: this indicator reports the number of 
individuals and firms listed in a public credit registry with information on their borrowing history from the past 5 years, PR-CG: this 
indicator reports the number of individuals and firms listed by a private credit bureau with information on their borrowing history from the 
past 5 years, DEPTH-CG: this index measures rules and practices affecting the coverage, scope and accessibility of credit information 
available through either a public credit registry or a private credit bureau. To avoid collinearity problems with the selected variables, we 
first analyse correlations of all the selected variables. We observe that there is not a high level of correlation between the variables used in 
the models. ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. Robust Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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The interaction terms between the getting credit variables and the institutional 
quality as measured by the rule of law (RL-WB) and the control of corruption 
variables (COR-WB) reveal the complexities associated with this category of 
regulation. In particular, in model 2 of Table 7 the interaction term between the 
credit information depth (DEPTH-CG) and the rule of law (RL-WB) is negative 
and statistically significant at the 10% level while the individual effect of the credit 
information depth (DEPTH-CG) is positive and significant at the 1% level. The 
positive individual effect of the credit information depth on bank performance 
seems subdues when higher levels of rule of law (RL-WB) prevail. Similarly, in 
model 4 of Table 7 the interaction between the private sector credit registry 
coverage (PV-CG) and the rule of law (RL-WB) is negative and significant at the 
10% level while the individual effect of the private sector credit registry coverage 
(PV-CG) is positive and significant at the 1% level.  This can be justified by 
increased confidence and reliance on hard (purely financial) information in the 
presence of higher rule of law (RL-WB) while at the same time banks could ignore 
critical soft (relationship type) information that could improve the lending decision 
(Petersen and Rajan, 1995; Stein 2002). An alternative explanation could be that 
the marginal informational benefit for banks derived from credit information depth 
(DEPTH-CG) and the private sector credit registry coverage (PV-CG) is higher at 
lower levels of rule of law (RL-WB) where contract obligations such as loans are 
comparatively less respected (Klein, 1992). Finally, an interesting finding is the 
positive and significant, at the 10% level, impact on bank performance of the 
interaction term between control of corruption (COR-WB) and the public credit 
registry coverage variable (PB-CG) when the individual effect of the public credit 
registry coverage (PB-CG) is negative and significant at the 10% level (see model 
7 of Table 7). This finding suggests that reliance of banks on public credit registries 
is beneficial in terms of performance in case of low levels of corruption where 
information of public registries might become more reliable. 
3.4.3.3 Paying Taxes 
 
The paying taxes category of regulations accounts for the following indices: i) 
number of tax payments per year, ii) time dedicated at the firm level in order to 
handle taxation regulation and iii) profit tax. 
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Table 8:  Paying Taxes - Fixed Effects Panel Analysis 
Note: The table reports the fixed-effects regression results for the paying taxes category of business regulation.. The use of 
the fixed effects specification is justified after a Hausman test for each model. The dependent variable (EFF) is the cost 
efficiency scores calculated using SFA and assuming common frontier across countries. TA stands for total assets, EA is 
the equity to assets ratio,  LLPL is the ratio of loan loss provision to total loans, LA stands for the loan to total assets ratio, 
NIM stands for net interest margin, ROE stands for return of equity, DCP stands for the ratio of domestic credit to the 
private sector over GDP, GDPcap is GDP per capita in purchasing power parity (PPP) constant 2005 international $, RL-
WB stands for rule of law. TAX-NUM: the total number of tax payments per year, TAX-HOURS: the time it takes to 
prepare, file and pay (or withhold) the corporate income tax, the value added tax and social security contributions (in hours 
per year), TAX-PROFIT:  the amount of taxes on profits paid by the business as a percentage of commercial profits. To 
avoid collinearity problems with the selected variables, we first analyse correlations of all the selected variables. We 
observe that there is not a high level of correlation between the variables used in the models. ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 
5% and 10% significance levels respectively. Robust Standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES EFF EFF EFF EFF 
     
lnTA 0.0133 0.0157* 0.0147* 0.0124 
 (0.00892) (0.00865) (0.00891) (0.00916) 
EA 0.00317 0.0175 0.0138 -3.69e-05 
 (0.102) (0.101) (0.102) (0.103) 
LA 0.0601** 0.0642*** 0.0628*** 0.0589** 
 (0.0240) (0.0239) (0.0239) (0.0241) 
LLPL 0.303*** 0.300*** 0.295*** 0.298*** 
 (0.114) (0.113) (0.113) (0.114) 
NIM -0.00153 -0.00159 -0.00153 -0.00148 
 (0.00211) (0.00211) (0.00213) (0.00213) 
ROE 0.000633*** 0.000614*** 0.000615*** 0.000634*** 
 (0.000179) (0.000175) (0.000175) (0.000179) 
lnGDPcap -0.341*** -0.346*** -0.352*** -0.346*** 
 (0.0409) (0.0413) (0.0410) (0.0415) 
DCP -0.000761*** -0.000757*** -0.000785*** -0.000783*** 
 (0.000151) (0.000161) (0.000150) (0.000158) 
RL-WB -0.000768 0.00419 0.00743 0.00220 
 (0.0173) (0.0178) (0.0180) (0.0185) 
lnTAX-NUM -0.0149**   -0.0149** 
 (0.00581)   (0.00579) 
lnTAX-HOURS  -0.00721  0.00718 
  (0.0261)  (0.0269) 
TAX-PRO   -0.000486 -0.000430 
   (0.000469) (0.000483) 
Constant 4.257*** 4.266*** 4.324*** 4.305*** 
 (0.420) (0.431) (0.430) (0.435) 
     
Observations 
F-test 
7,660 
     11.62*** 
7,660 
10.90*** 
7,660 
     11.38*** 
7,660 
   10.33*** 
R-squared 0.052 0.050 0.051 0.052 
Number of banks 1,865 1,865 1,865 1,865 
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Table 9:  Paying Taxes - Dynamic Panel Analysis 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES EFF EFF EFF EFF 
     
L.EFF 0.441*** 0.500*** 0.433*** 0.487*** 
 (0.0622) (0.0638) (0.0663) (0.0664) 
lnTA 0.00890 0.00543 0.0100 0.00377 
 (0.00896) (0.00864) (0.00949) (0.00877) 
EA 0.522*** 0.498*** 0.528*** 0.452*** 
 (0.159) (0.158) (0.162) (0.162) 
LA -0.0781** -0.0357 -0.0647* -0.0439 
 (0.0349) (0.0333) (0.0353) (0.0340) 
LLPL 0.231 0.125 0.215 0.126 
 (0.160) (0.156) (0.158) (0.157) 
NIM -0.00662*** -0.00736*** -0.00659*** -0.00718*** 
 (0.00186) (0.00187) (0.00188) (0.00186) 
ROE 0.00101*** 0.000993*** 0.000961*** 0.00105*** 
 (0.000295) (0.000285) (0.000288) (0.000295) 
lnGDPcap -0.436*** -0.482*** -0.469*** -0.465*** 
 (0.0370) (0.0350) (0.0408) (0.0375) 
DCP 0.000215 4.23e-06 0.000195 -6.37e-05 
 (0.000195) (0.000180) (0.000201) (0.000177) 
RL-WB 0.00431 -0.0318 0.0137 -0.0407* 
 (0.0236) (0.0244) (0.0248) (0.0244) 
lnTAX-NUM -0.0280***   -0.0221** 
 (0.00935)   (0.00947) 
lnTAX-HOURS  -0.200***  -0.193*** 
  (0.0386)  (0.0430) 
TAX-PRO   -0.000924** 1.10e-05 
   (0.000443) (0.000482) 
Constant 4.890*** 6.405*** 5.183*** 6.310*** 
 (0.382) (0.425) (0.452) (0.435) 
     
Observations 7,351 7,351 7,351 7,351 
Number of banks 
N of instruments 
Wald 
AR2 p-value 
Hansen-J p-value 
1,822 
30 
  356.11*** 
0.2245 
0.404 
1,822 
30 
420.11*** 
0.4399 
0.431 
1,822 
30 
336.28*** 
0.1479 
0.390 
1,822 
32 
     426.17*** 
0.4774 
           0.617 
Note: The table reports the dynamic panel regression results for the paying taxes category of business regulation. The 
dependent variable (EFF) is the cost efficiency scores calculated using SFA and assuming common frontier across 
countries. TA stands for total assets, EA is the equity to assets ratio, LLPL is the ratio of loan loss provision to total loans, 
LA stands for the loan to total assets ratio, NIM stands for net interest margin, ROE stands for return of equity, DCP stands 
for the ratio of domestic credit to the private sector over GDP, GDPcap is GDP per capita in purchasing power parity (PPP) 
constant 2005 international $, RL-WB stands for rule of law. TAX-NUM: the total number of tax payments per year, TAX-
HOURS: the time it takes to prepare, file and pay (or withhold) the corporate income tax, the value added tax and social 
security contributions (in hours per year), TAX-PROFIT:  the amount of taxes on profits paid by the business as a 
percentage of commercial profits. To avoid collinearity problems with the selected variables, we first analyse correlations 
of all the selected variables. We observe that there is not a high level of correlation between the variables used in the 
models. ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. Robust Standard errors are in 
parentheses. 
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The results indicate that taxation regulation asserts a negative impact on bank 
performance. In particular the number of tax payments per year (lnTAX-NUM) 
negatively affects bank performance in both the fixed effects and dynamic 
specifications (see models 1 and 4 of Table 8 and Table 9). In the dynamic analysis 
(see models 2 and 3 of Table 9) sub-taxation regulation indices such as tax hours 
(lnTAX-HOURS) and profit taxation (TAX-PRO) are negatively associated with 
bank performance at the 1% and 5% levels respectively.   
The finding that bureaucracy related taxation indices (see lnTAX-NUM and 
lnTAX-HOURS) have negative effect on bank performance could be explained by 
increased levels of firm informality due to the stringency of such regulation (La 
Porta and Shleifer, 2008). This increased informality would make it harder and 
more costly for banks to assess the credit worthiness of a firm (Hoff and Stiglitz, 
1993; Besley, 1995). Furthermore, there is evidence that lower levels of firm 
formality, as measured by tax compliance, is associated with lower firm 
profitability and higher risk (Fajnzylber et al., 2006) that could increase loan 
defaults. Another channel trough which stringent taxation regulation can negatively 
affect bank performance would be the reduction of investment and entrepreneurial 
activity in the economy (Djankov et al., 2010, Da Rin et al., 2011). 
Additionally, the tentative evidence that profit taxation (TAX-PRO) is negatively 
associated with bank performance (see model 3 in Table 9) would suggest that 
increasing the taxation burden induces higher levels of loan defaults because of the 
pass-through effect from banks to borrowers (Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 1999; 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 2001; Albertazzi and Gambacorta , 2010; Chiorazzo 
and Milani, 2011) and the reduction of the performance of the non-financial firms 
because of less capital investment (Arnold, 2008; Schwellnus and Arnold, 2008; 
Vartia, 2008; Arnold et al., 2011). 
Turning into the interaction terms between taxation regulation and the rule of law 
(RL-WB) and the control of corruption (COR-WB) it is revealed that the impact of 
some types of tax regulation on bank performance depends on institutional quality.  
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Table 10:  Paying Taxes - Interactions with Institutional Quality 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES EFF EFF EFF EFF EFF EFF 
       
L.EFF 0.454*** 0.500*** 0.453*** 0.504*** 0.534*** 0.489*** 
 (0.0615) (0.0635) (0.0687) (0.0653) (0.0656) (0.0723) 
lnTA 0.00786 0.00510 0.00910 0.0196** 0.0195** 0.0193** 
 (0.00883) (0.00857) (0.00932) (0.00881) (0.00914) (0.00957) 
EA 0.503*** 0.505*** 0.506*** 0.603*** 0.612*** 0.576*** 
 (0.158) (0.157) (0.163) (0.158) (0.162) (0.164) 
LA -0.0705** -0.0351 -0.0609* -0.0535 -0.0234 -0.0507 
 (0.0339) (0.0333) (0.0347) (0.0325) (0.0320) (0.0338) 
LLPL 0.227 0.144 0.194 0.207 0.118 0.204 
 (0.160) (0.158) (0.155) (0.173) (0.170) (0.168) 
NIM -0.00668*** -0.00736*** -0.00671*** -0.00738*** -0.00764*** -0.00714*** 
 (0.00182) (0.00187) (0.00186) (0.00182) (0.00183) (0.00185) 
ROE 0.000962*** 0.00101*** 0.000984*** 0.000886*** 0.000922*** 0.000873*** 
 (0.000291) (0.000287) (0.000292) (0.000273) (0.000272) (0.000265) 
lnGDPcap -0.481*** -0.483*** -0.476*** -0.500*** -0.512*** -0.501*** 
 (0.0378) (0.0349) (0.0402) (0.0362) (0.0349) (0.0396) 
DCP 0.000144 1.86e-05 0.000352 0.000264 8.82e-05 0.000299 
 (0.000190) (0.000184) (0.000238) (0.000182) (0.000182) (0.000213) 
RL-WB -0.178*** 0.0210 0.106*    
 (0.0553) (0.280) (0.0606)    
lnTAX-NUM -0.113***   -0.0687***   
 (0.0269)   (0.0166)   
RL-WB*lnTAX-NUM 0.0705***      
 (0.0193)      
lnTAX-HOURS  -0.187***   -0.261***  
  (0.0657)   (0.0631)  
RL-WB*lnTAX-HOURS  -0.00979     
  (0.0533)     
TAX-PRO   0.00135   -0.000796 
   (0.00140)   (0.00133) 
RL-WB*TAX-PRO   -0.00168*    
   (0.000929)    
COR-WB    -0.0214 -0.400* 0.0840* 
    (0.0355) (0.226) (0.0434) 
COR-WB*lnTAX-NUM    0.0367***   
    (0.0125)   
COR-WB*lnTAX-HOURS     0.0855**  
     (0.0423)  
COR-WB*lnTAX-PRO      -0.000226 
      (0.000774) 
Constant 5.602*** 6.342*** 5.104*** 5.337*** 6.683*** 5.218*** 
 (0.417) (0.525) (0.456) (0.383) (0.504) (0.458) 
       
Observations 7,351 7,351 7,351 7,351 7,351 7,351 
Number of banks 
N of instruments 
Wald 
AR2 p-value 
Hansen-J p-value 
1,822 
31 
     382.37*** 
0.3060 
       0.308 
1,822 
31 
   443.90*** 
0.4421 
0.381 
1,822 
31 
      343.15*** 
0.1604 
0.355 
1,822 
31 
   421.12*** 
0.3454 
0.468 
1,822 
31 
441.14*** 
0.3970 
0.385 
1,822 
31 
389.76*** 
0.1744 
0.668 
Note: The table reports the dynamic panel regression results for the paying taxes category of business regulation and their 
interaction with institutional quality. The dependent variable (EFF) is the cost efficiency scores calculated using SFA and 
assuming common frontier across countries. TA stands for total assets, EA is the equity to assets ratio, LLPL is the ratio of 
loan loss provision to total loans, LA stands for the loan to total assets ratio, NIM stands for net interest margin, ROE 
stands for return of equity, DCP stands for the ratio of domestic credit to the private sector over GDP, GDPcap is GDP per 
capita in purchasing power parity (PPP) constant 2005 international $, RL-WB stands for rule of law, COR-WB stands for 
control of corruption. TAX-NUM: the total number of tax payments per year, TAX-HOURS: the time it takes to prepare, 
file and pay (or withhold) the corporate income tax, the value added tax and social security contributions (in hours per 
year), TAX-PROFIT:  the amount of taxes on profits paid by the business as a percentage of commercial profits. To avoid 
collinearity problems with the selected variables, we first analyse correlations of all the selected variables. We observe that 
there is not a high level of correlation between the variables used in the models. ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% 
significance levels respectively. Robust Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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In model 1 of Table 10 the interaction term between rule of law (RL-WB) and the 
number of tax payments per year (TAX-NUM) asserts a positive and significant, at 
the 1% level, impact on bank performance, whilst the individual effect of the TAX-
NUM variable is negative and significant at the 1% level. At higher levels of rule 
of law, one of the channels through which tax regulation can affect negatively bank 
performance, namely the  higher level of firm informality (La Porta and Shleifer, 
2008) which could increase the cost of financial intermediation (Hoff and Stiglitz, 
1993; Besley, 1995) , may become  restrained. This is because rule of law and 
judicial efficiency are able to decrease the level of the unofficial economy 
(Loayaza, 1996; Johnson et al., 1998; Friedman et al., 2000).  Finally, the 
interaction term between the control of corruption variable (COR-WB) and tax 
hours (lnTAX-HOURS) (see model 5 of Table 10) positively and significantly at 
the 5% level affects performance, whilst the individual effect of the lnTAX-
HOURS variable is negative at the 1% level. This result conforms with the “sand 
the wheels” (Murphy et al., 1993) hypothesis according to which higher levels of 
corruption impose additional costs to economic agents. In this context, the negative 
interaction between the control of corruption variable (COR-WB) and the number 
of tax hours (lnTAX-HOURS) could indicate that the lower level of additional 
costs that are incurred by firms in form of corruption when they deal with tax 
payments may be a factor contributing to the free up of capital available for firms 
to fulfil their obligations (loans) to the banking sector. Overall, the results of this 
section lend support to hypothesis H4.A. 
3.4.3.4 Enforcing Contracts 
 
Moving to the enforcing contracts category of regulations the econometric results 
are presented in Tables 11 and 12. This category accounts for the following indices: 
i) contracts time, ii) contracts cost and iii) contract procedures. 
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Table 11: Enforcing Contracts - Fixed Effects Panel Analysis 
 
 
Note: The table reports the fixed-effects regression results for the enforcing contracts category of business regulation. The 
use of the fixed effects specification is justified after a Hausman test for each model. The dependent variable (EFF) is the 
cost efficiency scores calculated using SFA and assuming common frontier across countries. TA stands for total assets, EA 
is the equity to assets ratio, LLPL is the ratio of loan loss provision to total loans, LA stands for the loan to total assets 
ratio, NIM stands for net interest margin, ROE stands for return of equity, DCP stands for the ratio of domestic credit to the 
private sector over GDP, GDPcap is GDP per capita in purchasing power parity (PPP) constant 2005 international $, RL-
WB stands for rule of law. TIME-CON: the time (in terms of days) to resolve a dispute, counted from the moment the 
plaintiff files the lawsuit in court until payment. This includes both the days when actions take place and the waiting 
periods between, COST-CON: the cost in court fees and attorney fees, where the use of attorneys is mandatory or common, 
expressed as a percentage of the debt value, PRO-CON: the average number of procedures to enforce a contract. The list of 
procedural steps compiled for each economy traces the chronology of a commercial dispute before the relevant court, To 
avoid collinearity problems with the selected variables, we first analyse correlations of all the selected variables. We 
observe that there is not a high level of correlation between the variables used in the models. ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 
5% and 10% significance levels respectively. Robust Standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES EFF EFF EFF 
    
lnTA 0.0155** 0.0153** 0.0153** 
 (0.00735) (0.00727) (0.00728) 
EA 0.0163 0.0151 0.0151 
 (0.0662) (0.0661) (0.0660) 
LA 0.0909*** 0.0909*** 0.0909*** 
 (0.0212) (0.0211) (0.0211) 
LLPL 0.246*** 0.243*** 0.244*** 
 (0.0788) (0.0784) (0.0787) 
NIM -0.00635*** -0.00629*** -0.00638*** 
 (0.00190) (0.00190) (0.00190) 
ROE 0.000517*** 0.000519*** 0.000520*** 
 (0.000162) (0.000162) (0.000162) 
lnGDPcap -0.110*** -0.111*** -0.113*** 
 (0.0273) (0.0273) (0.0272) 
DCP -0.000368*** -0.000371*** -0.000381*** 
 (9.69e-05) (9.71e-05) (9.81e-05) 
RL-WB -0.0305** -0.0293* -0.0307** 
 (0.0152) (0.0157) (0.0152) 
lnTIME-CON 0.00349   
 (0.0172)   
COST-CON  0.000761  
  (0.00116)  
lnPRO-CON   -0.0545 
   (0.0740) 
Constant 1.772*** 1.785*** 2.016*** 
 (0.283) (0.247) (0.364) 
    
Observations 
F-test 
10,883 
      8.47*** 
10,883 
   8.63*** 
10,883 
     8.57*** 
R-squared 0.036 0.036 0.036 
Number of banks 2,014 2,014 2,014 
90 
 
90 
 
Table 12: Enforcing Contracts - Dynamic Panel Analysis 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES EFF EFF EFF EFF 
     
L.EFF 0.528*** 0.514*** 0.554*** 0.544*** 
 (0.0497) (0.0484) (0.0524) (0.0527) 
lnTA 0.0197** 0.0170* 0.0228** 0.0212** 
 (0.00952) (0.00910) (0.00919) (0.00916) 
EA 0.441*** 0.420*** 0.454*** 0.441*** 
 (0.117) (0.116) (0.108) (0.109) 
LA -0.0453 -0.0566 -0.00954 -0.0114 
 (0.0357) (0.0359) (0.0349) (0.0355) 
LLPL 0.113 0.0971 0.0158 0.0314 
 (0.128) (0.121) (0.114) (0.115) 
NIM -0.00834*** -0.00818*** -0.00897*** -0.00873*** 
 (0.00187) (0.00187) (0.00180) (0.00182) 
ROE 0.000793*** 0.000802*** 0.000801*** 0.000801*** 
 (0.000232) (0.000241) (0.000223) (0.000224) 
lnGDPcap -0.418*** -0.402*** -0.471*** -0.463*** 
 (0.0349) (0.0341) (0.0342) (0.0353) 
DCP 0.000155 0.000155 -0.000106 -0.000106 
 (0.000163) (0.000162) (0.000165) (0.000165) 
RL-WB 0.0346* 0.0455** 0.0301 0.0352* 
 (0.0203) (0.0202) (0.0190) (0.0193) 
lnTIME-CON 0.00545   0.00775 
 (0.0177)   (0.0172) 
COST-CON  0.00356**  0.00170 
  (0.00152)  (0.00155) 
lnPRO-CON   -0.463*** -0.452*** 
   (0.112) (0.119) 
Constant 4.329*** 4.179*** 6.463*** 6.283*** 
 (0.352) (0.303) (0.555) (0.634) 
     
Observations 8,871 8,871 8,871 8,871 
Number of banks 
N of instruments 
Wald 
AR2 p-value 
Hansen-J p-value 
1,897 
31 
   344.36*** 
0.1596 
0.475 
1,897 
31 
     342.59*** 
0.1577 
0.561 
1,897 
31 
 372.77*** 
0.2364 
0.414 
1,897 
33 
373.92*** 
0.2385 
0.775 
Note: The table reports the dynamic panel regression results for the enforcing contracts category of business regulation. 
The dependent variable (EFF) is the cost efficiency scores calculated using SFA and a assuming common frontier across 
countries. TA stands for total assets, EA is the equity to assets ratio, LLPL is the ratio of loan loss provision to total loans, 
LA stands for the loan to total assets ratio, NIM stands for net interest margin, ROE stands for return of equity, DCP stands 
for the ratio of domestic credit to the private sector over GDP, GDPcap is GDP per capita in purchasing power parity (PPP) 
constant 2005 international $, RL-WB stands for rule of law. TIME-CON: the time (in terms of days) to resolve a dispute, 
counted from the moment the plaintiff files the lawsuit in court until payment. This includes both the days when actions 
take place and the waiting periods between. COST-CON: the cost in court fees and attorney fees, where the use of 
attorneys is mandatory or common, expressed as a percentage of the debt value, PRO-CON: the average number of 
procedures to enforce a contract. The list of procedural steps compiled for each economy traces the chronology of a 
commercial dispute before the relevant court. To avoid collinearity problems with the selected variables, we first analyse 
correlations of all the selected variables. We observe that there is not a high level of correlation between the variables used 
in the models. ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. Robust Standard errors are in 
parentheses. 
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None of the enforcing contracts variables has a statistically significant impact on 
bank performance in the fixed effects specification (see Table 11). On the other 
hand, the dynamic panel analysis reveals that the cost of contract enforcement 
(COST-CON) is positively related to performance at the 5% level (see model 2 of 
Table 12).  This finding is in line with the negative association of the strength of 
creditor rights with bank performance discussed in section 3.4.3.2.  In more detail, 
when the enforcement of contracts and in effect of loans is costly, bank managers 
may engage in more careful screening in the loan origination process (Manove et 
al., 2001; Zazzaro, 2005) improving in that way the quality of the bank’s loan 
portfolio. The contract procedures variable (lnPRO-CON), on the other hand, has a 
negative and statistically significant impact at the 1% level on performance while 
this result, unlike the one of the contract costs (COST-CON) variable, remains 
robust in the fourth model of Table 12 where the rest of the enforcing contracts 
regulation variables are accounted for. Overall, the results of this section lend 
support to the hypothesis H5.B. 
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Table 13: Enforcing Contracts - Interactions with Institutional Quality 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES eff eff eff eff eff eff 
       
L.eff 0.529*** 0.525*** 0.564*** 0.551*** 0.541*** 0.569*** 
 (0.0511) (0.0501) (0.0530) (0.0511) (0.0481) (0.0531) 
lnTA 0.0217** 0.0168* 0.0250*** 0.0229** 0.0186** 0.0244*** 
 (0.00961) (0.00933) (0.00919) (0.00989) (0.00917) (0.00945) 
EA 0.440*** 0.417*** 0.454*** 0.456*** 0.415*** 0.449*** 
 (0.116) (0.119) (0.106) (0.114) (0.112) (0.112) 
LA -0.0415 -0.0544 -0.00778 -0.0390 -0.0569 -0.0204 
 (0.0359) (0.0362) (0.0345) (0.0358) (0.0352) (0.0350) 
LLPL 0.0688 0.103 0.00710 0.0767 0.0739 -0.0102 
 (0.126) (0.128) (0.114) (0.136) (0.132) (0.116) 
NIM -0.00868*** -0.00785*** -0.00897*** -0.00910*** -0.00844*** -0.00942*** 
 (0.00185) (0.00188) (0.00179) (0.00203) (0.00210) (0.00184) 
ROE 0.000798*** 0.000747*** 0.000808*** 0.000767*** 0.000694*** 0.000767*** 
 (0.000232) (0.000218) (0.000219) (0.000234) (0.000230) (0.000222) 
lnGDPcap -0.424*** -0.410*** -0.458*** -0.419*** -0.363*** -0.459*** 
 (0.0355) (0.0345) (0.0338) (0.0394) (0.0338) (0.0324) 
DCP 0.000136 0.000154 -0.000115 0.000143 0.000211 -1.05e-05 
 (0.000166) (0.000162) (0.000164) (0.000168) (0.000158) (0.000167) 
RL-WB 0.0608 0.0623 -0.692**    
 (0.124) (0.0410) (0.351)    
lnTIME-CON 0.0130   -0.0564   
 (0.0368)   (0.0486)   
RL-WB*lnTIME-CON -0.00411      
 (0.0188)      
COST-CON  0.00383   0.00426  
  (0.00331)   (0.00264)  
RL-WB*COST-CON  -0.000751     
  (0.00188)     
lnPRO-CON   -0.693***   -0.653*** 
   (0.169)   (0.134) 
RL-WB*lnPRO-CON   0.206**    
   (0.100)    
COR-WB    -0.161 0.0371 -0.576** 
    (0.135) (0.0281) (0.227) 
COR-WB*lnTIME-CON    0.0296   
    (0.0217)   
COR-WB*COST-CON     0.000158  
     (0.00135)  
COR-WB*lnPRO-CON      0.171*** 
      (0.0654) 
Constant 4.325*** 4.248*** 7.108*** 4.684*** 3.719*** 6.990*** 
 (0.422) (0.308) (0.673) (0.589) (0.340) (0.638) 
       
Observations 8,871 8,871 8,871 8,871 8,871 8,871 
Number of banks 
N of instruments 
Wald 
AR2 p-value 
Hansen-J p-value 
1,897 
32 
      344.81*** 
0.1535 
0.491 
1,897 
32 
    347.28*** 
0.1850 
0.578 
1,897 
32 
392.03*** 
0.2252 
0.372 
1,897 
32 
     350.49*** 
0.1858 
0.486 
1,897 
32 
366.23*** 
0.2328 
0.187 
1,897 
32 
384.76*** 
0.2988 
0.327 
Note: The table reports the dynamic panel regression results for the enforcing contracts category of business regulation and 
their interaction with institutional quality. The dependent variable (EFF) is the cost efficiency scores calculated using SFA 
and assuming common frontier across countries. TA stands for total assets, EA is the equity to assets ratio,  LLPL is the 
ratio of loan loss provision to total loans, LA stands for the loan to total assets ratio, NIM stands for net interest margin, 
ROE stands for return of equity, DCP stands for the ratio of domestic credit to the private sector over GDP, GDPcap is 
GDP per capita in purchasing power parity (PPP) constant 2005 international $, RL-WB stands for rule of law, COR-WB 
stands for control of corruption. TIME-CON: the time (in terms of days) to resolve a dispute, counted from the moment the 
plaintiff files the lawsuit in court until payment. This includes both the days when actions take place and the waiting 
periods between. COST-CON: the cost in court fees and attorney fees, where the use of attorneys is mandatory or common, 
expressed as a percentage of the debt value, PRO-CON: the average number of procedures to enforce a contract. The list of 
procedural steps compiled for each economy traces the chronology of a commercial dispute before the relevant court. To 
avoid collinearity problems with the selected variables, we first analyse correlations of all the selected variables. We 
observe that there is not a high level of correlation between the variables used in the models. ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 
5% and 10% significance levels respectively. Robust Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Table 13 presents a positive and significant effect of the interaction between 
contract procedures (lnPRO-CON) and the rule of law (RL-WB) (see model 3 of 
Table 13). Note that, the individual effect of the contract procedures (lnPRO-CON) 
on bank performance is negative at the 1% level. The combination of the above 
results imply that the negative impact of contract procedures on bank performance 
becomes restrained in the presence of higher levels of law observance that may act 
as block for further delays (Ashan, 2013). Finally, in model 6 of Table 13 the effect 
of contract procedures (lnPRO-CON) on bank performance remains negative at the 
1% as the coefficient of its interaction with the control of corruption variable 
(COR-WB), providing evidence in accordance with the “grease the wheel” 
hypothesis (Lui, 1985) of corruption. 
3.4.3.5 Protecting investors 
 
The protecting investors category accounts for the following indices: i) extent of 
disclosure, ii) extent of director liability and iii) ease of shareholder suits. 
Regulation related to the protection of investors appears to be an important 
determinant of bank performance (see Table 14  and Table 15).  
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Table 14:  Protecting Investors - Fixed Effects Panel Analysis 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES EFF EFF EFF EFF 
     
lnTA 0.0158* 0.0147* 0.0148* 0.0139 
 (0.00865) (0.00873) (0.00874) (0.00882) 
EA 0.0166 0.0135 0.0158 0.0115 
 (0.101) (0.101) (0.101) (0.101) 
LA 0.0632*** 0.0632*** 0.0621*** 0.0606** 
 (0.0238) (0.0239) (0.0239) (0.0239) 
LLPL 0.300*** 0.301*** 0.304*** 0.306*** 
 (0.113) (0.113) (0.109) (0.109) 
NIM -0.00167 -0.00160 -0.00146 -0.00153 
 (0.00210) (0.00211) (0.00211) (0.00210) 
ROE 0.000614*** 0.000620*** 0.000617*** 0.000627*** 
 (0.000174) (0.000176) (0.000173) (0.000175) 
lnGDPcap -0.342*** -0.341*** -0.372*** -0.360*** 
 (0.0410) (0.0410) (0.0431) (0.0434) 
DCP -0.000703*** -0.000760*** -0.000786*** -0.000760*** 
 (0.000153) (0.000151) (0.000151) (0.000153) 
RL-WB 0.00946 0.00727 -0.00458 0.00227 
 (0.0175) (0.0175) (0.0177) (0.0178) 
DISC-PI -0.00499***   -0.00445*** 
 (0.00134)   (0.00134) 
LIA-PI  0.0262***  0.0254*** 
  (0.00822)  (0.00823) 
SUI-PI   0.0495** 0.0470** 
   (0.0199) (0.0199) 
Constant 4.207*** 4.071*** 4.247*** 4.050*** 
 (0.420) (0.424) (0.422) (0.427) 
     
Observations 
F-test 
7,669 
13.50*** 
7,669 
12.39*** 
7,669 
 12.37*** 
7,669 
13.43*** 
R-squared 0.051 0.051 0.052 0.054 
Number of banks 1,867 1,867 1,867 1,867 
Note: The table reports the fixed-effects regression results for the protecting investors category of business regulation. The 
use of the fixed effects specification is justified after a Hausman test for each model. The dependent variable (EFF) is the 
cost efficiency scores calculated using SFA and assuming common frontier across countries. TA stands for total assets, EA 
is the equity to assets ratio,  LLPL is the ratio of loan loss provision to total loans, LA stands for the loan to total assets 
ratio, NIM stands for net interest margin, ROE stands for return of equity, DCP stands for the  ratio of domestic credit to 
the private sector over GDP, GDPcap is GDP per capita in purchasing power parity (PPP) constant 2005 international $, 
RL-WB stands for rule of law. DISC-PI: an index that measures the extent of disclosure, LIA-PI: an index that measures 
the extend of director liability, SUI-PI: an index that accounts for the shareholders’ ability to sue officers and directors for 
misconduct. To avoid collinearity problems with the selected variables, we first analyse correlations of all the selected 
variables. We observe that there is not a high level of correlation between the variables used in the models. ***, ** and * 
indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. Robust Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Table 15:  Protecting Investors - Dynamic Panel Analysis 
Note: The table reports the dynamic panel regression results for the protecting investors category of business regulation. 
The dependent variable (EFF) is the cost efficiency scores calculated using SFA and assuming common frontier across 
countries. TA stands for total assets, EA is the equity to assets ratio,  LLPL is the ratio of loan loss provision to total loans, 
LA stands for the loan to total assets ratio, NIM stands for net interest margin, ROE stands for return of equity, DCP stands 
for the ratio of domestic credit to the private sector over GDP, GDPcap is GDP per capita in purchasing power parity (PPP) 
constant 2005 international $, RL-WB stands for rule of law. DISC-PI: an index that measures the extent of disclosure, 
LIA-PI: an index that measures the extend of director liability, SUI-PI: an index that accounts for the shareholders’ ability 
to sue officers and directors for misconduct. To avoid collinearity problems with the selected variables, we first analyse 
correlations of all the selected variables. We observe that there is not a high level of correlation between the variables used 
in the models. ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. Robust Standard errors are in 
parentheses. 
 
 
 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES EFF EFF EFF EFF 
     
L.EFF 0.474*** 0.489*** 0.490*** 0.484*** 
 (0.0655) (0.0654) (0.0706) (0.0675) 
lnTA 0.0129 0.0196** 0.00599 0.0195* 
 (0.00899) (0.00963) (0.00953) (0.0101) 
EA 0.592*** 0.468*** 0.551*** 0.474*** 
 (0.164) (0.166) (0.169) (0.163) 
LA -0.0734** -0.0145 -0.0547 -0.0153 
 (0.0350) (0.0347) (0.0340) (0.0352) 
LLPL 0.220 0.0373 0.448*** 0.240 
 (0.160) (0.162) (0.151) (0.171) 
NIM -0.00669*** -0.00670*** -0.00462** -0.00524*** 
 (0.00188) (0.00192) (0.00184) (0.00196) 
ROE 0.000929*** 0.000918*** 0.000984*** 0.000994*** 
 (0.000284) (0.000290) (0.000283) (0.000296) 
lnGDPcap -0.439*** -0.511*** -0.453*** -0.509*** 
 (0.0377) (0.0425) (0.0373) (0.0429) 
DCP 0.000356* -1.03e-05 0.000308 -4.26e-05 
 (0.000208) (0.000188) (0.000196) (0.000198) 
RL-WB 0.0208 -0.0466* 0.0178 -0.0338 
 (0.0249) (0.0239) (0.0240) (0.0235) 
DISC-PI -0.00256   -0.000524 
 (0.00194)   (0.00192) 
LIA-PI  0.0940***  0.0929*** 
  (0.0181)  (0.0192) 
SUI-PI   -0.0397* 0.00129 
   (0.0231) (0.0303) 
Constant 4.739*** 5.043*** 5.172*** 5.005*** 
 (0.388) (0.394) (0.406) (0.389) 
     
Observations 7,359 7,359 7,359 7,359 
Number of banks 
N of instruments 
Wald 
AR2 p-value 
Hansen-J p-value 
1,824 
30 
    355.65*** 
0.1999 
0.417 
1,824 
30 
304.86*** 
0.1939 
0.406 
1,824 
30 
347.37*** 
0.2762 
0.693 
1,824 
32 
328.93*** 
0.2102 
0.516 
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The fixed effect results show that the extent of director liability (LIA-PI) and ease 
of shareholder suits  (SUI-PI) have a significant, at the 1% level, and positive 
impact on bank performance (see models 2, 3 and 4 of Table 14). The dynamic 
panel analysis confirms these results for the extent of director liability (LIA-PI) 
variable (see models 2 and 4 of Table 15). Legislation that protects the interests of 
investors from director misconduct has a beneficial effect on the banking sector in 
terms of efficiency. This result is in line with previous studies that confirm that 
managers operating in countries with strong investor protection legislation are less 
likely to use firm resources for their own benefit at the expense of shareholders 
while they tend to invest in projects with higher potential benefit the shareholders 
(Wurgler, 2000; Shleifer and Wolfenzon, 2002; Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad, 
2010). A surprising result is that the extent of disclosure variable (DISC-PI) is 
negatively associated with bank performance in the fixed effects specification (see 
models 1 and 4 of Table 14). Disclosure regulations can raise the cost structure of a 
firm not only because of the direct expenses related to such legislation, as for 
example meeting stricter accounts regulation, but also through magnifying or even 
creating new agency problems (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2012). Finally, the 
interactions between protecting investor regulation and the rule of law (RL-WB) 
and the control of corruption (COR-WB) in Table 16 show that the impact of 
protecting investors regulation on bank performance is not dependent on 
institutional quality. Overall, the evidence from this section is supportive for 
hypothesis H6.A. 
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Table 16:  Protecting Investors - Interactions with Institutional Quality. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES eff eff eff eff eff eff 
       
L.eff 0.470*** 0.490*** 0.495*** 0.514*** 0.501*** 0.512*** 
 (0.0655) (0.0651) (0.0692) (0.0695) (0.0678) (0.0690) 
lnTA 0.0126 0.0187* 0.00647 0.0241** 0.0294*** 0.0204** 
 (0.00904) (0.00989) (0.00989) (0.00963) (0.00985) (0.00947) 
EA 0.575*** 0.471*** 0.545*** 0.654*** 0.583*** 0.590*** 
 (0.167) (0.168) (0.163) (0.165) (0.163) (0.158) 
LA -0.0755** -0.0164 -0.0492 -0.0532 -0.0132 -0.0476 
 (0.0350) (0.0354) (0.0352) (0.0335) (0.0343) (0.0335) 
LLPL 0.201 0.0208 0.429** 0.216 0.132 0.318* 
 (0.163) (0.159) (0.173) (0.168) (0.174) (0.188) 
NIM -0.00669*** -0.00679*** -0.00471** -0.00672*** -0.00677*** -0.00596*** 
 (0.00189) (0.00193) (0.00197) (0.00189) (0.00185) (0.00199) 
ROE 0.000954*** 0.000914*** 0.000954*** 0.000763*** 0.000839*** 0.000923*** 
 (0.000295) (0.000292) (0.000286) (0.000254) (0.000267) (0.000263) 
lnGDPcap -0.436*** -0.510*** -0.443*** -0.466*** -0.530*** -0.455*** 
 (0.0385) (0.0427) (0.0364) (0.0372) (0.0410) (0.0357) 
DCP 0.000363* -2.51e-05 0.000308 0.000361* 5.54e-05 0.000377** 
 (0.000212) (0.000186) (0.000194) (0.000219) (0.000189) (0.000181) 
RL-WB 0.0104 -0.00797 -0.0309    
 (0.0746) (0.0799) (0.134)    
DISC-PI -0.00502   0.0239   
 (0.0209)   (0.0161)   
RL-WB*DISC-PI 0.00115      
 (0.0112)      
LIA-PI  0.105***   0.0816***  
  (0.0253)   (0.0165)  
RL-WB*LIA-PI  -0.00827     
  (0.0161)     
SUI-PI   -0.0437   -0.00867 
   (0.0371)   (0.0327) 
RLWB*SUI-PI   0.00829    
   (0.0222)    
COR-WB    0.147*** 0.0989* 0.0332 
    (0.0423) (0.0548) (0.0978) 
COR-WB*DISC-PI    -0.0125*   
    (0.00711)   
COR-WB*LIA-PI     -0.00890  
     (0.0114)  
COR-WB*SUI-PI      0.00699 
      (0.0169) 
Constant 4.733*** 4.997*** 5.079*** 4.569*** 4.980*** 4.700*** 
 (0.388) (0.407) (0.452) (0.374) (0.385) (0.408) 
       
Observations 7,359 7,359 7,359 7,359 7,359 7,359 
Number of banks 
N of instruments 
Wald 
AR2 p-value 
Hansen-J p-value 
1,824 
31 
359.29*** 
0.1913 
0.331 
1,824 
31 
    310.11*** 
0.1973 
0.521 
1,824 
31 
359.08*** 
0.2625 
0.690 
1,824 
31 
390.97*** 
0.1772 
0.232 
1,824 
31 
361.20*** 
0.1682 
0.536 
1,824 
31 
371.46*** 
0.1981 
0.355 
Note: The table reports the dynamic panel regression results for the protecting investors category of business regulation and their 
interaction with institutional quality. The dependent variable (EFF) is the cost efficiency scores calculated using SFA and a assuming 
common frontier across countries. TA stands for total assets, EA is the equity to assets ratio,  LLPL is the ratio of loan loss provision to 
total loans, LA stands for the loan to total assets ratio, NIM stands for net interest margin, ROE stands for return of equity, DCP stands for 
the ratio of domestic credit to the private sector over GDP, GDPcap is GDP per capita in purchasing power parity (PPP) constant 2005 
international $, RL-WB stands for rule of law. DISC-PI: an index that measures the extent of disclosure, LIA-PI: an index that measures 
the extend of director liability, SUI-PI: an index that accounts for the shareholders’ ability to sue officers and directors for misconduct. To 
avoid collinearity problems with the selected variables, we first analyse correlations of all the selected variables. We observe that there is 
not a high level of correlation between the variables used in the models. ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels 
respectively. Robust Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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3.4.3.6  Resolving Insolvency 
 
This category accounts for the following indices: i) insolvency time, ii) insolvency 
cost and iii) insolvency recovery rate. 
 
Table 17:  Resolving Insolvency - Fixed Effects Panel Analysis. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES EFF EFF EFF EFF 
     
lnTA 0.0158** 0.0154** 0.0154** 0.0148** 
 (0.00729) (0.00728) (0.00727) (0.00728) 
EA 0.0121 0.0128 0.0161 0.00771 
 (0.0661) (0.0661) (0.0662) (0.0663) 
LA 0.0901*** 0.0937*** 0.0908*** 0.0897*** 
 (0.0211) (0.0213) (0.0211) (0.0212) 
LLPL 0.261*** 0.240*** 0.246*** 0.254*** 
 (0.0804) (0.0788) (0.0789) (0.0799) 
NIM -0.00625*** -0.00621*** -0.00634*** -0.00604*** 
 (0.00189) (0.00190) (0.00190) (0.00189) 
ROE 0.000501*** 0.000523*** 0.000517*** 0.000504*** 
 (0.000159) (0.000163) (0.000162) (0.000159) 
lnGDPcap -0.111*** -0.130*** -0.111*** -0.148*** 
 (0.0274) (0.0308) (0.0273) (0.0318) 
DCP -0.000301*** -0.000345*** -0.000370*** -0.000256** 
 (0.000101) (9.86e-05) (9.88e-05) (0.000103) 
RL-WB -0.0352** -0.0334** -0.0302* -0.0240 
 (0.0154) (0.0153) (0.0166) (0.0166) 
lnTIME-INS 0.0216***   0.0373*** 
 (0.00643)   (0.00783) 
COST-INS  0.00104***  0.00144*** 
  (0.000344)  (0.000368) 
REC-INS   1.24e-05 0.000754*** 
   (0.000223) (0.000266) 
Constant 1.793*** 1.992*** 1.800*** 2.093*** 
 (0.246) (0.284) (0.245) (0.289) 
     
Observations 
F-test 
10,883 
      10.20*** 
10,883 
     8.50*** 
10,883 
     8.47*** 
10,883 
9.16*** 
R-squared 0.037 0.036 0.035 0.040 
Number of banks 2,014 2,014 2,014 2,014 
Note: The table reports the fixed-effects regression results for the resolving insolvency category of business regulation. The 
use of the fixed effects specification is justified after a Hausman test for each model. The dependent variable (EFF) is the 
cost efficiency scores calculated using SFA and assuming common frontier across countries. TA stands for total assets, EA 
is the equity to assets ratio, LLP is the ratio of loan loss provision to total loans, LA stands for the loan to total assets ratio, 
NIM stands for net interest margin, ROE stands for return of equity, DCP stands for the  ratio of domestic credit to the 
private sector over GDP, GDPcap is GDP per capita in purchasing power parity (PPP) constant 2005 international $, RL-
WB stands for rule of law. REC-INS: the recovery rate calculates how many cents on the dollar claimants (creditors, tax 
authorities, and employees) recover from an insolvent firm, COST-INS: the average cost of bankruptcy proceedings. The 
cost of the proceedings is recorded as a percentage of the estate’s value. TIME-INS: the average time (in terms of years) to 
close a business. Information is collected on the sequence of procedures and on whether any procedures can be carried out 
simultaneously. To avoid collinearity problems with the selected variables, we first analyse correlations of all the selected 
variables. We observe that there is not a high level of correlation between the variables used in the models. ***, ** and * 
indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. Robust Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Table 18:  Resolving Insolvency - Dynamic Panel Analysis. 
 
Note: The table reports the dynamic panel regression results for the resolving insolvency category of business regulation. 
The dependent variable (EFF) is the cost efficiency scores calculated using SFA and assuming common frontier across 
countries. TA stands for total assets, EA is the equity to assets ratio, LLPL is the ratio of loan loss provision to total loans, 
LA stands for the loan to total assets ratio, NIM stands for net interest margin, ROE stands for return of equity, DCP stands 
for the ratio of domestic credit to the private sector over GDP, GDPcap is GDP per capita in purchasing power parity (PPP) 
constant 2005 international $, RL-WB stands for rule of law. REC-INS: the recovery rate calculates how many cents on the 
dollar claimants (creditors, tax authorities, and employees) recover from an insolvent firm, COST-INS: the average cost of 
bankruptcy proceedings. The cost of the proceedings is recorded as a percentage of the estate’s value. TIME-INS: the 
average time (in terms of years) to close a business. Information is collected on the sequence of procedures and on whether 
any procedures can be carried out simultaneously. To avoid collinearity problems with the selected variables, we first 
analyse correlations of all the selected variables. We observe that there is not a high level of correlation between the 
variables used in the models. ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. Robust Standard 
errors are in parentheses. 
 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES EFF EFF EFF EFF 
     
L.EFF 0.522*** 0.513*** 0.531*** 0.524*** 
 (0.0489) (0.0514) (0.0490) (0.0537) 
lnTA 0.0198** 0.0157* 0.0152 0.0135 
 (0.00950) (0.00938) (0.00968) (0.00944) 
EA 0.435*** 0.419*** 0.398*** 0.409*** 
 (0.117) (0.119) (0.121) (0.120) 
LA -0.0489 -0.0581 -0.0472 -0.0409 
 (0.0354) (0.0358) (0.0354) (0.0354) 
LLPL 0.0955 0.0944 0.0946 0.0734 
 (0.124) (0.126) (0.120) (0.123) 
NIM -0.00841*** -0.00833*** -0.00822*** -0.00864*** 
 (0.00187) (0.00187) (0.00184) (0.00185) 
ROE 0.000754*** 0.000825*** 0.000791*** 0.000873*** 
 (0.000230) (0.000241) (0.000229) (0.000257) 
lnGDPcap -0.409*** -0.433*** -0.399*** -0.399*** 
 (0.0347) (0.0370) (0.0348) (0.0416) 
DCP 0.000246 0.000191 0.000269 0.000241 
 (0.000170) (0.000164) (0.000170) (0.000169) 
RL-WB 0.0312 0.0293 0.0320 0.0318 
 (0.0204) (0.0216) (0.0208) (0.0226) 
lnTIME-INS 0.0238***   -0.00841 
 (0.00760)   (0.0192) 
COST-INS  0.00117***  0.000368 
  (0.000386)  (0.000638) 
REC-INS   -0.00138*** -0.00176* 
   (0.000378) (0.000961) 
Constant 4.268*** 4.593*** 4.320*** 4.382*** 
 (0.303) (0.345) (0.302) (0.364) 
     
Observations 8,871 8,871 8,871 8,871 
Number of banks 
N of instruments 
Wald 
AR2 p-value 
Hansen-J p-value 
1,897 
32 
 440.42*** 
0.2176 
0.416 
1,897 
32 
412.21*** 
0.2136 
0.465 
1,897 
32 
434.70*** 
0.2459 
           0.446 
1,897 
34 
    452.74*** 
0.2360 
0.378 
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All the resolving insolvency variables appear to have a positive and statistically 
significant impact on bank performance in the fixed effect models (see models 1, 2 
and 4 of Table 17). The impact of the recovery rate (REC-INS) variable, though, is 
significant only in model 4 of Table 17 where we control for the rest of the 
resolving insolvency variables. The positive impact of insolvency time (lnTIME-
INS) and insolvency cost (COST-INS) is further confirmed in the dynamic panel 
analysis (see models 1 and 2 of Table 18). On the other hand the recovery rate 
variable (REC-INS) is negatively associated with bank performance at the 1% 
significance level in model 3 of Table 18. This result of the recovery rate variable 
(REC-INS) remains significant in model 4 of Table 18 where all the resolving 
insolvency variables are accounted for. The positive association of time to 
insolvency (lnTIME-INS) with bank performance could indicate, in accordance 
with previous evidence, that the recovery rate for creditors is higher for firms that 
can stay in business during the bankruptcy procedure (Franks et al, 2004). In 
addition, the positive association between bank performance and insolvency costs 
(COST-INS) and the negative association between the recovery rate (REC-INS) on 
bank performance suggests that a careful loan screening exercise during the loan 
origination process pays off (Manove et al., 2001; Zazzaro, 2005) even in the 
presence of creditor friendly bankruptcy regulation (Franks and Sussman, 2005). 
The interaction terms between resolving insolvency regulation and the rule of law 
(RL-WB) and the control of corruption (COR-WB) show that the impact of these 
types of insolvency regulation on bank performance is conditional on institutional 
quality.  
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Table 19:  Resolving Insolvency - Interactions with Institutional Quality. 
Note: The table reports the dynamic panel regression results  for the resolving insolvency category of business regulation and their 
interaction with institutional quality. The dependent variable (EFF) is the cost efficiency scores calculated using SFA and assuming 
common frontier across countries. TA stands for total assets, EA is the equity to assets ratio, LLPL is  the ratio of loan loss provision to 
total loans, LA stands for the loan to total assets ratio, NIM stands for net interest margin, ROE stands for return of equity, DCP stands for 
the  ratio of domestic credit to the private sector over GDP, GDPcap is GDP per capita in purchasing power parity (PPP) constant 2005 
international $, RL-WB stands for rule of law, COR-WB stands for control of corruption. REC-INS: the recovery rate calculates how 
many cents on the dollar claimants (creditors, tax authorities, and employees) recover from an insolvent firm, COST-INS: the average cost 
of bankruptcy proceedings. The cost of the proceedings is recorded as a percentage of the estate’s value. TIME-INS: the average time (in 
terms of years) to close a business. Information is collected on the sequence of procedures and on whether any procedures can be carried 
out simultaneously. To avoid collinearity problems with the selected variables, we first analyse correlations of all the selected variables. 
We observe that there is not a high level of correlation between the variables used in the models. ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% 
significance levels respectively. Robust Standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES EFF EFF EFF EFF EFF EFF 
       
L.EFF 0.562*** 0.500*** 0.554*** 0.556*** 0.517*** 0.556*** 
 (0.0508) (0.0548) (0.0504) (0.0514) (0.0529) (0.0519) 
lnTA 0.0224** 0.0181* 0.0159* 0.0242*** 0.0178* 0.0194** 
 (0.00895) (0.00953) (0.00921) (0.00938) (0.00953) (0.00953) 
EA 0.393*** 0.428*** 0.366*** 0.405*** 0.416*** 0.389*** 
 (0.115) (0.119) (0.120) (0.121) (0.120) (0.123) 
LA -0.0473 -0.0518 -0.0518 -0.0471 -0.0583 -0.0450 
 (0.0334) (0.0366) (0.0335) (0.0335) (0.0356) (0.0334) 
LLPL -0.0112 0.0904 0.0688 -0.0269 0.0851 0.0658 
 (0.106) (0.132) (0.110) (0.113) (0.137) (0.121) 
NIM -0.00823*** -0.00831*** -0.00780*** -0.00891*** -0.00855*** -0.00853*** 
 (0.00181) (0.00185) (0.00180) (0.00188) (0.00204) (0.00190) 
ROE 0.000678*** 0.000820*** 0.000642*** 0.000619*** 0.000789*** 0.000583*** 
 (0.000224) (0.000237) (0.000208) (0.000226) (0.000243) (0.000212) 
lnGDPcap -0.429*** -0.441*** -0.427*** -0.429*** -0.426*** -0.421*** 
 (0.0335) (0.0389) (0.0333) (0.0332) (0.0401) (0.0353) 
DCP 0.000154 0.000133 0.000321** 0.000194 0.000249 0.000411** 
 (0.000162) (0.000166) (0.000162) (0.000166) (0.000167) (0.000167) 
RL-WB -0.0276 0.0593 0.188***    
 (0.0228) (0.0480) (0.0379)    
lnTIME-INS -0.172***   -0.132***   
 (0.0548)   (0.0454)   
RL-WB*lnTIME-INS 0.100***      
 (0.0275)      
COST-INS  0.00497   0.00520  
  (0.00471)   (0.00323)  
RL-WB*COST-INS  -0.00237     
  (0.00297)     
REC-INS   0.00225**   0.000830 
   (0.000879)   (0.000913) 
RL-WB*REC-INS   -0.00242***    
   (0.000497)    
COR-WB    -0.00293 0.0644*** 0.124*** 
    (0.0127) (0.0248) (0.0282) 
COR-WB*lnTIME-INS    0.0619***   
    (0.0180)   
COR-WB*COST-INS     -0.00166  
     (0.00170)  
COR-WB*REC-INS      -0.00131*** 
      (0.000397) 
Constant 4.536*** 4.599*** 4.362*** 4.477*** 4.410*** 4.304*** 
 (0.298) (0.381) (0.287) (0.316) (0.396) (0.301) 
       
Observations 8,871 8,871 8,871 8,871 8,871 8,871 
Number of banks 
N of instruments 
Wald 
AR2 p-value 
Hansen-J p-value 
1,897 
33 
      472.63*** 
0.2366 
0.607 
1,897 
33 
      412.74*** 
0.2075 
0.375 
1,897 
33 
  480.92*** 
0.3027 
0.644 
1,897 
33 
      415.00*** 
0.1871 
0.541   
1,897 
33 
   360.79*** 
0.1703 
0.506 
1,897 
33 
    409.16*** 
0.2377 
0.522 
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102 
 
Model 1 of Table 19 shows that the effect of insolvency time (ln-TIME-INS) on 
bank performance is negative whilst its interaction with the rule of law (RL-WB) is 
positive, implying that insolvency time could have a positive impact on bank 
performance in line with Franks et al. (2004), in presence of high levels of rule of 
law and judicial efficiency, which ensures that creditors continue to receive 
payments during the time that a firm remains operational.  Similarly, the interaction 
between the insolvency time (lnTIME-INS) and the control of corruption (COR-
WB) is positive (see model 4 of Table 19) in line with the “sand the wheels” 
hypothesis (Murphy et al., 1993), whereas the individual effect of insolvency time 
on bank performance is negative. Finally, in model 3 of Table 19 there is a negative 
effect stemming from the interaction between recovery rate (REC-INS) and the rule 
of law (RL-WB), while the individual effect of the recovery rate (REC-INS) on 
bank performance is positive. This suggests an excessive reliance, at the expense of 
careful monitoring, of bank managers on the recovery rate in case of insolvency 
(REC-INS) when the observance of law is high. Overall, the results of this section 
lend support to the hypothesis H7.A but also to  the competing hypothesis H7.B as 
far as concerns the recovery rate variable (REC-INS). 
3.4.3.7 Employing Workers 
 
Finally the impact of regulation related to employing workers on bank performance 
is depicted in Tables 20 and 21. The components of this category are the following: 
i) minimum wage, ii) severance payment and iii) notice period for worker 
dismissal. 
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Table 20: Employing Workers - Fixed Effects Panel Analysis. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES EFF EFF EFF EFF 
     
lnTA 0.0158 0.00963 0.00747 0.0108 
 (0.0138) (0.00986) (0.00978) (0.0178) 
EA 0.00437 -0.0498 -0.0547 -0.0668 
 (0.107) (0.118) (0.119) (0.132) 
LA 0.0312 0.0540** 0.0520* 0.00963 
 (0.0296) (0.0270) (0.0270) (0.0364) 
LLPL 0.416*** 0.254 0.249 0.460*** 
 (0.103) (0.156) (0.157) (0.115) 
NIM 0.00396 -0.00404** -0.00384** 0.000826 
 (0.00274) (0.00187) (0.00186) (0.00239) 
ROE 0.000586*** 0.000738*** 0.000736*** 0.000736*** 
 (0.000181) (0.000171) (0.000171) (0.000183) 
lnGDPcap -0.361*** -0.421*** -0.407*** -0.433*** 
 (0.0568) (0.0428) (0.0385) (0.0625) 
DCP -0.000820*** -0.000614*** -0.000626*** -0.000609** 
 (0.000240) (0.000156) (0.000156) (0.000259) 
RL-WB 0.0306 0.0115 0.00461 0.0559** 
 (0.0228) (0.0197) (0.0196) (0.0258) 
MW-EW 0.543***   0.669*** 
 (0.122)   (0.130) 
NOT-EW  -0.00155**  -0.00202*** 
  (0.000643)  (0.000726) 
SEV-EW   0.00510 0.00482 
   (0.00465) (0.00550) 
Constant 4.247*** 5.104*** 4.858*** 4.921*** 
 (0.650) (0.450) (0.423) (0.788) 
     
Observations 
F-test 
6,105 
      10.59*** 
6,294 
      13.38*** 
6,294 
      14.73*** 
4,730 
      11.62*** 
R-squared 0.063 0.073 0.073 0.082 
Number of banks 1,790 
 
1,843 
 
1,848 1,769 
 
Note: The table reports the fixed-effects regression results for the employing workers category of business regulation. The 
use of the fixed effects specification is justified after a Hausman test for each model. The dependent variable (EFF) is the 
cost efficiency scores calculated using SFA and assuming common frontier across countries. TA stands for total assets, EA 
is the equity to assets ratio,  LLPL is the ratio of loan loss provision to total loans, LA stands for the loan to total assets 
ratio, NIM stands for net interest margin, ROE stands for return of equity, DCP stands for the ratio of domestic credit to the 
private sector over GDP, GDPcap is GDP per capita in purchasing power parity (PPP) constant 2005 international $, RL-
WB stands for rule of law. MW-EW: ratio of minimum wage to average wage, SP-EW: severance pay for redundancy 
dismissal after 20 years of continuous employment (in salary weeks), NOT-MW: notice period for redundancy dismissal 
after 20 years of continuous employment (in salary weeks). To avoid collinearity problems with the selected variables, we 
first analyse correlations of all the selected variables. We observe that there is not a high level of correlation between the 
variables used in the models. ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. Robust Standard 
errors are in parentheses. 
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Table 21: Employing Workers - Dynamic Panel Analysis. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES EFF EFF EFF EFF 
     
L.EFF 0.462*** 0.404*** 0.379*** 0.645*** 
 (0.0772) (0.0705) (0.0688) (0.136) 
lnTA 0.0279** 0.00458 -0.0119 0.0160 
 (0.0112) (0.0109) (0.0101) (0.0197) 
EA 0.633*** 0.311 0.292 0.398 
 (0.193) (0.206) (0.218) (0.273) 
LA -0.0704* -0.0456 -0.0831** -0.0893** 
 (0.0386) (0.0377) (0.0402) (0.0442) 
LLPL 0.259*** -0.139 0.184 0.379** 
 (0.0750) (0.250) (0.304) (0.161) 
NIM -0.00625** -0.00768*** -0.00568*** -0.00512* 
 (0.00244) (0.00195) (0.00207) (0.00279) 
ROE 0.000911*** 0.000930*** 0.00119*** 0.00105*** 
 (0.000306) (0.000272) (0.000271) (0.000315) 
lnGDPcap -0.450*** -0.581*** -0.514*** -0.702*** 
 (0.0510) (0.0417) (0.0430) (0.0688) 
DCP 0.000316 0.000258 0.000410** 0.000233 
 (0.000376) (0.000191) (0.000174) (0.000399) 
RL-WB -0.0507* 0.0169 0.0384 0.0740** 
 (0.0291) (0.0249) (0.0255) (0.0324) 
MW-EW 0.0309   0.908*** 
 (0.172)   (0.132) 
SEV-EW  0.00886***  0.00589** 
  (0.00208)  (0.00248) 
NOT-EW   0.000340 -0.00355*** 
   (0.000922) (0.000968) 
Constant 4.721*** 6.187*** 5.917*** 6.946*** 
 (0.532) (0.383) (0.428) (0.777) 
     
Observations 5,853 6,009 6,009 4,503 
Number of banks 
N of instruments 
Wald 
AR2 p-value 
Hansen-J p-value 
1,743 
27 
     290.38*** 
  0.3124 
0.528 
1,791 
24 
     362.35 *** 
0.0718 
0.499 
1,791 
24 
    374.77*** 
0.1284 
0.360 
1,705 
23 
   258.58*** 
0.0862 
0.358 
Note: The table reports the dynamic panel regression results for the employing workers category of business regulation. 
The dependent variable (EFF) is the cost efficiency scores calculated using SFA and assuming common frontier across 
countries. TA stands for total assets, EA is the equity to assets ratio, LLPL is the ratio of loan loss provision to total loans, 
LA stands for the loan to total assets ratio, NIM stands for net interest margin, ROE stands for return of equity, DCP stands 
for the ratio of domestic credit to the private sector over GDP, GDPcap is GDP per capita in purchasing power parity (PPP) 
constant 2005 international $, RL-WB stands for rule of law. MW-EW: ratio of minimum wage to average wage, SP-EW: 
severance pay for redundancy dismissal after 20 years of continuous employment (in salary weeks), NOT-MW: notice 
period for redundancy dismissal after 20 years of continuous employment (in salary weeks). To avoid collinearity problems 
with the selected variables, we first analyse correlations of all the selected variables. We observe that there is not a high 
level of correlation between the variables used in the models. ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels 
respectively. Robust Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Minimum wage (MW-EW) and severance payment (SEV-EW) are positively 
related to bank performance in both the fixed effects and dynamic specifications.  
In more detail, the minimum wage (MW-EW) has a positive and statistically 
significant impact at the 1% level in the fixed effects panel (see models 1 and 4 of 
Table 20) and it retains its significance level in the dynamic panel (see model 4 of 
Table 21). Similarly, the positive coefficient of the impact of severance payment 
(SEV-EW) on bank performance is statistically significant at the 1% in the 
dynamic panel specifications (see models 2 and 4 of Table 21).  On the other hand, 
the variable related to the notice period of worker dismissal (NOT-EW) is 
negatively and significantly related with bank performance in both the fixed effects 
and dynamic models (see models 2 and 4 of Table 20 and model 4 of Table 21).  
The magnitude of the coefficients though of the minimum wage (MW-EW) and the 
severance payment (SEV-EW) variables are larger than the coefficient of the notice 
dismissal variable implying that, overall, stricter employment legislation has a 
positive impact on bank performance. Stringent labour regulation can have a 
positive impact on bank performance as it could increase the length  of the 
relationship between employees and  employers, rising in that way the returns on 
the acquisition of firm and industry specific skills (Wasmer, 2006). Furthermore, 
more stringent labour regulation can have a negative impact on labour turnover, 
reducing in that way costs, and lead to job matches of high quality (Auer, 2007). 
 Moreover, significant employment security provides workers with insurance 
against wage risk (Agell, 1999) and thereby could stimulate workers to raise their 
productivity. These results also conform to extant studies in the labour economics 
literature with regards to the impact of labour regulation on economic performance 
(Storm and Naastepad, 2009; Deakin and Sarkar, 2008). Finally, the interaction 
terms of the employment legislation variables and institutional quality reveals that 
the impact of strict labour regulation on bank performance is conditional on law 
observance. 
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Table 22: Employing Workers - Interactions with Institutional Quality. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES eff eff eff eff eff eff 
       
L.eff 0.465*** 0.379*** 0.389*** 0.502*** 0.439*** 0.452*** 
 (0.0777) (0.0682) (0.0734) (0.0767) (0.0735) (0.0764) 
lnTA 0.0199* 0.00897 0.00619 0.0241** 0.00792 0.0126 
 (0.0114) (0.0118) (0.0114) (0.0110) (0.0110) (0.0114) 
EA 0.525*** 0.467** 0.324 0.623*** 0.482** 0.389* 
 (0.195) (0.214) (0.211) (0.191) (0.238) (0.218) 
LA -0.0596 -0.0523 -0.0436 -0.0607 -0.0548 -0.0406 
 (0.0369) (0.0379) (0.0378) (0.0373) (0.0369) (0.0362) 
LLPL 0.243*** 0.125 -0.139 0.266*** 0.255 -0.108 
 (0.0789) (0.292) (0.253) (0.0846) (0.308) (0.264) 
NIM -0.00593** -0.00659*** -0.00766*** -0.00660*** -0.00623*** -0.00800*** 
 (0.00243) (0.00198) (0.00197) (0.00239) (0.00214) (0.00205) 
ROE 0.000980*** 0.00113*** 0.000924*** 0.000920*** 0.00106*** 0.000852*** 
 (0.000317) (0.000263) (0.000273) (0.000305) (0.000257) (0.000268) 
lnGDPcap -0.492*** -0.549*** -0.578*** -0.550*** -0.520*** -0.575*** 
 (0.0503) (0.0403) (0.0411) (0.0514) (0.0395) (0.0464) 
DCP 0.000113 0.000346** 0.000229 0.000233 0.000334* 0.000371* 
 (0.000370) (0.000172) (0.000198) (0.000345) (0.000202) (0.000206) 
RL-WB -0.130*** -0.0614* 0.00460    
 (0.0389) (0.0354) (0.0305)    
MW-EW -0.538*   -0.0703   
 (0.282)   (0.166)   
RL-WB*MW-EW 0.526***      
 (0.197)      
NOT-EW  -0.00333***   0.000646  
  (0.00123)   (0.000992)  
RL-WB*NOT-EW  0.00889***     
  (0.00261)     
SEV-EW   0.00734***   0.00800*** 
   (0.00228)   (0.00259) 
RL-WB*SEV-EW   0.00105    
   (0.00116)    
COR-WB    0.00775 0.0206 0.0377* 
    (0.0288) (0.0263) (0.0202) 
COR-WB*MW-EW    0.240**   
    (0.103)   
COR-WB*NOT-EW     0.00259*  
     (0.00150)  
COR-WB*SEV-EW      0.000233 
      (0.000823) 
Constant 5.395*** 5.947*** 6.164*** 5.664*** 5.578*** 5.935*** 
 (0.553) (0.399) (0.380) (0.526) (0.429) (0.449) 
       
Observations 5,853 6,009 6,009 5,853 6,009 6,009 
Number of banks 
N of instruments 
Wald 
AR2 p-value 
Hansen-J p-value 
1,743 
28 
     314.61*** 
0.489 
0.302 
1,791 
25 
 424.32*** 
0.0436 
0.320 
1,791 
25 
382.70*** 
0.1637 
0.256 
1,743 
28 
315.93*** 
0.3612 
0.287 
1,791 
25 
  448.14*** 
0.0772 
0.239 
1,791 
25 
414.65*** 
0.330 
0.316 
Note: The table reports the dynamic panel regression results for the employing workers category of business regulation and 
their interaction with institutional quality. The dependent variable (EFF) is the cost efficiency scores calculated using SFA 
and assuming common frontier across countries. TA stands for total assets, EA is the equity to assets ratio,  LLPL is the 
ratio of loan loss provision to total loans, LA stands for the loan to total assets ratio, NIM stands for net interest margin, 
ROE stands for return of equity, DCP stands for the ratio of domestic credit to the private sector over GDP, GDPcap is 
GDP per capita in purchasing power parity (PPP) constant 2005 international $, RL-WB stands for rule of law. MW-EW: 
ratio of minimum wage to average wage, SP-EW: severance pay for redundancy dismissal after 20 years of continuous 
employment (in salary weeks), NOT-MW: notice period for redundancy dismissal after 20 years of continuous 
employment (in salary weeks). To avoid collinearity problems with the selected variables, we first analyse correlations of 
all the selected variables. We observe that there is not a high level of correlation between the variables used in the models. 
***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. Robust Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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An important finding is that the interaction between rule of law (RL-WB) and the 
minimum wage (MW-EW) is positive and significant (see model 1 of Table 22), 
whereas the individual effect of minimum wage (MW-EW) on bank performance is 
negative.  This interaction suggests that minimum wage (MW-EW) could prove 
beneficial for bank performance when such legislation is actually enforced. The 
mere existence of the minimum wage regulation without its strict enforcement may 
induce informality (Ullyssea, 2010; Almedia and Carneiro, 2011) making it harder 
for banks to evaluate the creditworthiness of individuals which could in turn result 
to decreased performance of the banking sector. Overall, the empirical evidence 
from this section is more supportive of hypothesis H8.A rather than for the 
competing hypothesis H8.B. 
3.4.4 Sensitivity Analysis: Is the Impact of Getting Credit and Protecting 
Investors regulation on Bank Performance heterogeneous in the Crisis Years?  
 
As part of sensitivity analysis we examine if the getting credit and protecting 
investors regulation variables have a heterogeneous impact on bank performance 
over the financial crisis. For this reason we follow Anginer et al. (2012) and use a 
crisis dummy variable for the years from 2008 to 2010. Then we interact the crisis 
dummy with the different indices of the getting credit and protecting investors 
regulation variables.  Results are depicted in Tables 23 and 24.  
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Table 23:  Getting Credit - Interactions with the Crisis Dummy. 
Note: The table reports the dynamic panel regression results for the getting credit category of business regulation and their interaction with 
the crisis dummy (CRISIS DUM). The CRISIS DUM variable takes a value of 1 for the years 2008 to 2010 and zero otherwise. The 
dependent variable (EFF) is the cost efficiency scores calculated using SFA and assuming common frontier across countries. TA stands for 
total assets, EA is the equity to assets ratio, LLPL is  the ratio of loan loss provision to total loans, LA stands for the loan to total assets 
ratio, NIM stands for net interest margin, ROE stands for return of equity, DCP stands for the ratio of domestic credit to the private sector 
over GDP, GDPcap is GDP per capita in purchasing power parity (PPP) constant 2005 international $, RL-WB stands for rule of law, 
COR-WB stands for control of corruption. LEG-CG:  this index measures the degree to which collateral and bankruptcy laws protect the 
rights of borrowers and lenders and thus facilitate lending, PB-CG: this indicator reports the number of individuals and firms listed in a 
public credit registry with information on their borrowing history from the past 5 years, PR-CG: this indicator reports the number of 
individuals and firms listed by a private credit bureau with information on their borrowing history from the past 5 years, DEPTH-CG: this 
index measures rules and practices affecting the coverage, scope and accessibility of credit information available through either a public 
credit registry or a private credit bureau. To avoid collinearity problems with the selected variables, we first analyse correlations of all the 
selected variables. We observe that there is not a high level of correlation between the variables used in the models. ***, ** and * indicate 
1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. Robust Standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES EFF EFF EFF EFF 
     
L.EFF 0.519*** 0.462*** 0.541*** 0.540*** 
 (0.0526) (0.0545) (0.0575) (0.0581) 
lnTA 0.0200** 0.0321*** 0.0258*** 0.0215** 
 (0.00981) (0.00902) (0.00978) (0.00954) 
EA 0.432*** 0.466*** 0.504*** 0.495*** 
 (0.120) (0.106) (0.111) (0.114) 
LA -0.0342 -0.0349 -0.0510 -0.0381 
 (0.0344) (0.0349) (0.0358) (0.0357) 
LLPL 0.0529 0.0242 0.0362 0.0109 
 (0.122) (0.117) (0.126) (0.128) 
NIM -0.00869*** -0.00869*** -0.00940*** -0.00787*** 
 (0.00192) (0.00175) (0.00183) (0.00173) 
ROE 0.000653*** 0.000658*** 0.000694*** 0.000667** 
 (0.000239) (0.000242) (0.000260) (0.000271) 
lnGDPcap -0.382*** -0.435*** -0.415*** -0.435*** 
 (0.0377) (0.0364) (0.0413) (0.0475) 
DCP 0.000152 1.64e-05 0.000223 0.000178 
 (0.000167) (0.000169) (0.000169) (0.000177) 
RL-WB 0.0469** 0.0531*** 0.0338 0.0484** 
 (0.0218) (0.0205) (0.0226) (0.0223) 
LEG-CG -0.00987***    
 (0.00230)    
CRISIS DUM -0.0247** -0.0565*** 0.000816 -0.0224*** 
 (0.0103) (0.0163) (0.00284) (0.00707) 
LEG-CG*CRISIS DUM 0.00318**    
 (0.00142)    
DEPTH-CG  0.0152***   
  (0.00419)   
DEPTH-CG*CRISIS DUM  0.0103***   
  (0.00292)   
PB-CG   -0.000754  
   (0.000695)  
PB-CG*CRISIS DUM   -0.000263  
   (0.000262)  
PV-CG    0.000107 
    (0.000312) 
PV-CG*CRISIS DUM    0.000305*** 
    (7.54e-05) 
Constant 4.045*** 4.331*** 4.238*** 4.471*** 
 (0.321) (0.319) (0.350) (0.416) 
     
Observations 8,871 8,871 8,675 8,648 
Number of banks 
N of instruments 
Wald 
AR2 p-value 
Hansen-J p-value 
1,897 
33 
     398.22*** 
0.1085 
0.317 
1,897 
33 
      421.57*** 
0.1683 
0.2622 
1,886 
33 
    340.49*** 
0.2718 
0.553 
1,881 
33 
382.32*** 
0.3141 
0.432 
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The interaction between the creditor rights (LEG-CG) and the crisis dummy 
(CRISIS DUM) (see model 1 of Table 23) is positive and significant at the 5% 
level. On the other hand, the individual effect of creditor rights (LEG-CG) asserts a 
negative and significant impact on performance, which is in line with the previous 
findings of this chapter. The positive sign of the interaction between creditor rights 
(LEG-CG) and the crisis dummy (CRISIS DUM) implies that although the 
individual effect of creditor rights on bank performance is negative, it becomes 
restrained during the crisis. Agency problems that restrict a firm’s access to credit 
are particularly important during periods of economic contraction (Bernanke and 
Gertler; 1989) and increased creditor rights may moderate them as they warrant a 
higher level of recovery of impaired loans. Furthermore, the interaction between 
the depth of credit information (DEPTH-CG) and the crisis dummy (CRISIS 
DUM) (see model 2 of Table 23) has a positive and significant effect on 
performance, whilst the individual effect of the depth of credit information 
(DEPTH-CG) is positive. It appears that the positive impact of the depth of credit 
information (DEPTH-CG) on bank performance strengthens during the crisis, 
acting as an assistance mechanism for banks to make more informed decisions with 
regards to the supply of credit. Similarly, the positive and significant interaction 
between the private sector credit registry coverage (PV-CG) and the crisis dummy 
(CRISIS DUM) in model 4 of Table 23 suggest that during the crisis, higher credit 
registry coverage supports performance.   
Next we examine if the different types of regulation of the protecting investors 
category had a heterogeneous impact on the performance of banks located in the 
EU-27 economies during the crisis period. 
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Table 24:  Protecting Investors - Interactions with the Crisis Dummy. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES EFF EFF EFF 
    
L.EFF 0.441*** 0.421*** 0.482*** 
 (0.0705) (0.0717) (0.0777) 
lnTA 0.0167* 0.0280*** 0.00825 
 (0.00884) (0.0102) (0.00944) 
EA 0.590*** 0.482*** 0.515*** 
 (0.160) (0.159) (0.168) 
LA -0.0624* 0.00311 -0.0446 
 (0.0351) (0.0351) (0.0338) 
LLPL 0.187 0.0430 0.432*** 
 (0.159) (0.159) (0.154) 
NIM -0.00710*** -0.00706*** -0.00454** 
 (0.00183) (0.00184) (0.00181) 
ROE 0.000751*** 0.000720*** 0.000816*** 
 (0.000276) (0.000279) (0.000276) 
lnGDPcap -0.428*** -0.497*** -0.442*** 
 (0.0386) (0.0440) (0.0381) 
DCP 0.000398* -5.73e-05 0.000418** 
 (0.000222) (0.000203) (0.000209) 
RL-WB 0.00911 -0.0437* 0.0176 
 (0.0275) (0.0260) (0.0266) 
CRISIS-DUM -0.0158* -0.0396*** 0.0106 
 (0.00934) (0.00990) (0.0174) 
DISC-PI -0.00215   
 (0.00194)   
CRISIS-DUM*DISC-PI 0.00178   
 (0.00159)   
LIA-PI  0.0822***  
  (0.0174)  
CRISIS-DUM*LIA-PI  0.00732***  
  (0.00205)  
SUI-PI   -0.0369 
   (0.0231) 
CRISIS-DUM*SUI-PI   -0.00266 
   (0.00296) 
Constant 4.597*** 4.883*** 5.005*** 
 (0.387) (0.401) (0.413) 
    
Observations 7,359 7,359 7,359 
Number of banks 
N of instruments 
Wald 
AR2 p-value 
Hansen-J p-value 
1,824 
32 
    430.45*** 
0.2163 
0.341 
1,824 
32 
    357.37*** 
0.1404 
0.126 
1,824 
32 
     402.73*** 
0.2013 
0.448 
Note: The table reports the dynamic panel regression results for the protecting investors  category of business regulation and their 
interaction with the crisis dummy (CRISIS DUM). The CRISIS DUM variable takes a value of 1 for the years 2008 to 2010 and zero 
otherwise. The dependent variable (EFF) is the cost efficiency scores calculated using SFA and assuming common frontier across 
countries. TA stands for total assets, EA is the equity to assets ratio,  LLPL is the ratio of loan loss provision to total loans, LA stands for 
the loan to total assets ratio, NIM stands for net interest margin, ROE stands for return of equity, DCP stands for the ratio of domestic 
credit to the private sector over GDP, GDPcap is GDP per capita in purchasing power parity (PPP) constant 2005 international $, RL-WB 
stands for rule of law. DISC-PI: an index that measures the extent of disclosure, LIA-PI: an index that measures the extend of director 
liability, SUI-PI: an index that accounts for the shareholders’ ability to sue officers and directors for misconduct. To avoid collinearity 
problems with the selected variables, we first analyse correlations of all the selected variables. We observe that there is not a high level of 
correlation between the variables used in the models. ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. Robust 
Standard errors are in parentheses.  
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We find that the interaction between the director liability index (LIA-PI) with the 
crisis dummy (CRISIS-DUM) is positive and significant at the 1% level (see model 
2 of Table 24) while the individual effect of the director liability index (LIA-PI) is 
positive and significant at the 1% level. The results for the individual effects 
confirm the fixed effects and dynamic analysis results in Table 14 and Table 15. 
The result of the interaction term denotes that in times of crisis the positive effect 
of the director liability index (LIA-PI) on bank performance is further enhanced. 
This is consistent with the findings of Peni and Vähämaa (2012) who argue that 
banks with stronger corporate governance mechanisms performed better during the 
financial crisis. Furthermore, improved corporate governance regulation can 
positively affect firm performance in the non-financial sector (Ammann et al., 
2011; Brown and Caylor, 2006, Brown and Caylor 2009; Gompers et al. 2003), 
especially at times of crisis when the deterioration of economic conditions can lead 
to increased expropriation by managers (Johnson et al, 2000; Mitton, 2002; Baek et 
al. 2004). This positive impact of corporate governance regulation on the 
performance of non-financial firms could be channelled to the banking sector via 
spillover effects such as lower loan defaults. 
3.5  Conclusion 
 
Our results, from both fixed effects models as well as dynamic panel specifications, 
confirm that several types of business regulation have a heterogeneous in terms of 
sign and magnitude impact on bank performance, as measured by cost efficiency, 
in the EU-27 over 2004-2010. In some detail, the strength of creditor rights is 
negatively related with bank performance, whereas credit information sharing 
improves bank efficiency.  Regulation related to business entry is reported to have 
a negative effect on bank performance. The same applies for taxation regulation. 
On the other hand, labour regulation, in terms of minimum wage and dismissal 
costs, as well as regulation related to investor protection, with the exception of 
mandatory corporate disclosure, exert a positive impact on bank performance. 
This study also finds, in many cases, a statistically significant impact of the 
interaction terms between the business regulation variables and country-specific 
institutional quality as measured by the rule of law (RL-WB) and corruption (COR-
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WB) variables. The impact of these interaction terms on bank performance is 
heterogeneous in terms of sign. For example, the positive impact of information 
sharing on bank performance, as measured by private sector credit registry 
coverage, subdues in the presence of higher law observance, as the interaction term 
between rule of law (RL-WB) and the private sector credit registry coverage (PV-
CG) is negative. Similarly, the coefficient of the interaction term between tax hours 
(TAX-HOURS) and control of corruption (COR-WB) is positive, which implies 
that the negative individual effect of (TAX-HOURS) on bank performance 
becomes more restrained in the presence of higher control of corruption (COR-
WB). 
Regarding policy implications, regulators should take into account that enhancing 
creditor rights could have an adverse impact on bank performance. On the other 
hand strengthening regulation related to credit information sharing is warranted as 
it improves bank performance especially at the crisis period.  In addition, less rigid 
business entry regulations in the EU not only could positively affect 
competitiveness but also significantly increase bank performance. Taxation 
regulation exerts a negative effect on bank performance. For many EU economies 
the taxation level is a mean of increased government revenue in order to wither the 
sovereign debt crisis. However, governments should simplify at least the 
bureaucracy related tax compliance costs in order to offset this negative taxation 
impact. EU regulators should also take into account that less rigid labour market 
regulation, a policy measure that many EU economies are adapting to improve their 
competitiveness, may adversely affect bank performance. Furthermore, the 
enhancement of corporate governance regulation is desirable as the extent of 
director liability is found to exert a positive effect on bank performance especially 
during the crisis.  Finally, the quality of institutions such as the rule of law and 
control of corruption does matter in terms of the impact of business regulation on 
bank performance and policy makers should take note of this.   
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Appendix to Chapter 3 
 Table A1: Cost Function following Battese and Coelli (1995)  
  Coefficient Standard         Errors t-ratio 
lnP1 0.448 0.031 14.24 
lnP2 0.308 0.026 11.67 
lnY1 0.622 0.02 31.24 
lnY2 0.552 0.017 32.753 
lnN1 0.079 0.014 5.78 
lnN2 -0.218 0.026 -8.252 
(lnP1)
2 
0.135 0.005 29.484 
(lnP2)
2 
-0.066 0.003 -19.197 
(lnP1)(lnP2) -0.102 0.007 -13.997 
(lnY1)
2 
0.114 0.002 70.281 
(lnY2)
2 
0.121 0.002 70.725 
(lnY1)(lnY2) -0.312 0.005 -62.475 
(lnP1)(lnY1) -0.04 0.003 -15.16 
(lnP2)(lnY1) 0.01 0.002 3.921 
(lnP1)(lnY2) -0.02 0.003 -6.832 
(lnP2)(lnY2) 0.005 0.003 1.906 
(lnN1)
2 
0.009 0.002 4.922 
(lnN2)
2 
-0.057 0.006 -10.049 
(lnN1)(lnN2) -0.023 0.004 -5.126 
(lnN1)(lnY1) 0.002 0.002 1.299 
(lnN1)(lnY2) -0.005 0.001 -3.443 
(lnN1)(lnP1) -0.005 0.002 -2.225 
(lnN1)(lnP2) 0.018 0.002 8.323 
(lnN2)(lnY1) 0.036 0.003 10.349 
(lnN2)(lnY2) 0.039 0.003 12.881 
(lnN2)(lnP1) 0.077 0.005 15.648 
(lnN2)(lnP2) -0.025 0.005 -5.146 
t 0.027 0.009 3.053 
(t)
2 
-0.008 0.001 -6.952 
t(lnP1) 0.005 0.002 2.915 
t(lnP2) 0.008 0.002 4.24 
t(lnY1) 0.001 0.001 0.639 
t(lnY2) -0.007 0.001 -6.194 
t(lnN1) 0.002 0.001 1.713 
t(lnN2) 0.005 0.001 3.695 
constant -3.029 0.093 -32.701 
Z variables affecting cost inefficiency 
C5 -0.013 0.002 -7.264 
GDPgr -0.01 0.003 -3.798 
INFL 0.025 0.005 4.553 
Lerner -0.702 0.038 -18.482 
Country Dummies                                                             yes 
Number of observations 11428 
Log likelihood 4665.24 
 
Notes: The table depicts the estimations of the cost efficiency frontier and the correlates of bank cost inefficiencies using the Battese and Coelli 
(1995) model. P1 and  P2  stand for the input prices of labour and physical capital  Y1 and Y2 stand for the outputs of loans and other earning 
assets respectively, N1 and N2 are the fixed netputs of fixed assets and equity.  As environmental (Z) variables that could affect inefficiency we 
employ the five banks concentration ratio (C5), GDP growth (GDPgr), the Lerner index at the country level as a measure of bank competition 
(Lerner) and the inflation rate (INFL). We also impose country dummies.  
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Chapter 4: The Impact of Labour Regulation on Bank Performance 
in the Eurozone Periphery (Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal and 
Spain) 
 
              4.1   Introduction and Literature Review 
 
The ever increasing importance of the banking industry in the global economy has 
led to  numerous studies related to bank performance, as measured by efficiency, 
and its determinants. A large part of this research is focusing on the efficiency of the 
European banking systems (e.g. Allen and Rai, 1996; Altunbas et al., 2001; Lozano-
Vivas et al., 2002; Maudos et al., 2002; Casu and Molyneux, 2003; Pasiouras et al., 
2009; Brissimis et al., 2010). A major common ground between most of the studies 
on bank efficiency in the European Union (EU) is the persistence of  cross-country 
heterogeneity in efficiency scores. This is so despite the evidence that some 
convergence of bank efficiency is taking place across the EU (Weil, 2009; Casu and 
Girardone ,2010; Brissimis et al., 2010; Koutsomanoli-Filippaki and Mamatzakis, 
2010). Another common characteristic of most studies is that, in most cases, banks 
located in the European periphery (i.e. Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal and Spain) are 
less efficient than banks located in the countries of the European core (Allen and 
Rai, 1996; Dietsch and Lozano-Vivas, 2000; Bikker, 2001; Bikker, 2002; Brissimis 
et al., 2010)
20
. Environmental (country-level) variables are important determinants in 
explaining such cross-country heterogeneity in bank cost efficiency across the EU 
(Dietsch and Lozano-Vivas, 2000; Cavallo and Rossi, 2002; Guevara and Maudos, 
2002; Maudos et. al., 2002; Hollo and Nagy,  2006).  
An important source of cross-country heterogeneity inthe business environment in 
which firms operate is regulation. The literature that examines the impact of 
regulations on bank performance is mainly focused on bank-specific supervisory and 
prudential regulation (Barth et al., 2004; Beck et al., 2006; Pasiouras, 2008;  
Pasiouras et al.,2009; Barth et al. 2013; Delis et al., 2011). Banks that are located in 
a country though are obliged not only to operate under the domestic financial 
regulations but also under the spectrum of the non-financial regulatory and 
                                                        
20
 For a summary of  bank efficiency studies focusing in the European Union see table A1 in 
Appendix A. 
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institutional framework. So far, very few studies have explored the impact of the 
non-financial regulation and institutional quality on bank performance (Demirgüç-
Kunt and Detragiache, 1998, 2002; Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2004; Lensink et al. 2008; 
Hasan et al. 2009). Furthermore, there is no study, to the best of our knowledge, that 
examines if labour regulation can affect bank performance.  
The first contribution of this chapter then is that it focuses on country-level factors in 
order to explain differences of bank performance, as measured by cost efficiency, in 
the countries of the Eurozone periphery. This is important in the light of the recent 
financial and sovereign debt crisis that has hit particularly hard these economies. 
The second contribution of this study is that it investigates if labour regulation 
affects bank performance. This is important in the context of the economies of the 
Eurozone periphery because reductions in the stringency of labour regulation is one 
of the key policies that these countries adopt in order to wither the crisis and restore 
competitiveness.  
Labour regulation can have an impact on bank performance directly by influencing 
the cost structure of banks. Personnel expenses form an important part of bank costs, 
and the ability of managers to control costs is an important success factor in the 
financial industry (Spong et al., 1995). Input prices in the banking sector, such as 
labour costs, can differ significantly in a cross-country framework because of labour 
regulation differences (Dietsch and Lozano-Vivas, 2000). Casu and Girardone  
(2010) also argue that the financial integration taking place in the EU implies 
increased integration of the prices of bank inputs, such as labour costs, and these 
could be affected by country-specific structural differences such as labour 
regulation. Furthermore, labour regulation can affect bank performance indirectly, 
via spillover effects,  if it affects the performance of firms in the non-financial 
sectors of an economy and so the fulfillment of their obligations to the banking 
sector. 
Most of the literature that links labour regulation to economic performance finds that 
stringent regulation of labour reduces employment and production levels (Botero et 
al., 2004,  Nickel and Layard, 1999; Heckman and Pagés, 2004,  Lazear, 
1990, Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000; Blanchard and Portugal, 2001).  On the other 
hand, the evidence regarding the impact of  labour regulation on productivity growth 
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is more mixed.  Some studies find that stringent regulation of labour decreases 
productivity growth and investment levels (Besley and Burgess 2004; Bassanini et 
al. 2009; Autor et al. 2007). This could attributed to various channels such as the 
direct rise in the  employment costs that labour regulation implies (Nickel, 1997; 
Bassanini and Ernst 2002; Scarpetta and Tressel 2004), reduced innovation effort of 
firms (Koeniger, 2005; Barbosa and Faria, 2011) and reduced employee effort 
because of higher job-security (Ichino and Riphahn, 2005; Riphahn 2004). However, 
there  are studies that find a positive link between the strigency of labour regulation 
and productivity (Deakin and Sarkar, 2008; Storm and Naastepad, 2009). This could 
be explained by increased willingness of employees to enhance skills that are 
directly relevant to the firm they are working for (Wasmer 2006; Auer 2007). 
Our results, in line with the stream of studies that find an negative effect of labour 
regulation rigidities on economic outcomes, show that stringent labour regulation 
exerts a negative and statistically significant  impact on the performance of banks 
located in the Eurozone periphery  mainly via the regulation of dismissal costs. The 
rest of this chapter is organised as follows; section 4.2 provides a description of the 
data and variables used, section 4.3 presents and discusses the results while section 
4.4 concludes. 
 
4.2  Data and Variables 
4.2.1 Measuring Bank Performance (Cost Inefficiency) 
 
We use data from IBCA-Bankscope for the 2000-2010 periods. The sample includes 
425 commercial and savings banks and, after removing errors and inconsistencies, 
2,906 bank/year observations remain in an unbalanced panel.  The sample includes 
the majority of such financial institutions in the Eurozone periphery.   
In this study we  follow Aigner et al. (1977) and Meeusen and Van den Broeck 
(1977) and opt for the stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) methodology in order to 
estimate bank cost inefficiency. The major advantage of the SFA methodology is 
that both random error and inefficiency are incorporated in a composite error term 
(Berger and Humphrey, 1997). The allowance for measurement error in the SFA 
estimation produces bank-specific (in)efficiency estimates that reflect more 
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accurately managerial competence in comparison with non-parametric approaches of 
efficiency estimation such as DEA that do not allow for measurement error caused 
by lack.  In addition to this, the disadvantage of parametric approaches of imposing a 
structure on the efficiency frontier poses less of a problem here as the banks of our 
sample are located in countries that are considered market economies. 
21
 
 
More specifically, we assume the following specification for the cost frontier: 
 
TCit = f (Pit, Yit,, Nit,  Zit) + vit + uit                             (1) 
 
Where TCit  the total cost for firm (bank) i at year t, P is a vector of input prices Y is 
a vector of outputs of the firm, N a vector of fixed netputs while Z is a vector of 
control variables. SFA, separates the error term into two components; The term ui, 
stands for bank inefficiency that is in the control of management  and follows the 
half-normal distribution. Such  inefficiency has the potential to increase the costs of 
a bank above the best-practice level. The term vi on the other hand, represents 
fluctuations that are beyond the firm’s management (are random).  
For the empirical implementation of the cost frontier, the following translog 
specification is used: 
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21
 As we note in Chapter 2 the misspecification of the efficiency frontier by employing parametric 
approaches such as SFA is more possible in economies that cannot be considered market economies 
(Bhattacharyya et al., 1997; Ataullah et al., 2004;  Claessens and Van Horen, 2012).  
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In the quadratic terms of the  stochastic frontier model (2) we impose standard linear 
homogeneity and symmetry restrictions. Additionally, we include time and country 
effects. The model then is estimated via a maximum likelihood procedure 
parameterized in terms of the variance parameters 
2
 =
2
u  +
2
v and γ = 
2
u /
2
 . 
In order to define bank inputs and outputs we follow Sealey and Lindley (1977) and 
opt for the intermediation approach. This approach assumes that the main function 
of banks is to use labour and capital in order to collect funds with the scope of 
transforming them into loans and other income generating assets. More specifically, 
two inputs and two outputs are specified. Inputs include labour (as measured by 
personnel expenses)  and financial capital while loans (net of provisions) and other 
earning assets (government securities, bonds, equity investments, CDs and T-bills) 
are the outputs. 
In terms of the input prices, we calculate the price of the financial capital as the ratio 
of total interest expenses to total interest bearing borrowed funds while the price of 
labour is represented with the ratio of personnel expenses to total assets. The sum of 
overheads, such as personnel and administrative expenses, interest, fee, and 
commission expenses, represent the total cost of each bank in the sample. 
Furthermore,  we include the total level of equity of  each bank in the model as a 
quasi-fixed netput. The reason for this is twofold: Firstly, equity represents an 
alternative source of funding for a bank. In this way, the level of equity of each bank 
has the potential to affect directly its cost structure (Berger and Mester, 1997).  In 
addition to this, ignoring financial capital may lead to a biased estimation of 
efficiency as firms with higher equity capital, which denotes that the shareholders 
have more capital at stake, may behave in a more riskaverse manner than firms with 
lower level of equity but still optimally (efficiently) given the risk preferences of 
their shareholders. We also include each bank’s level of fixed assets, as a proxy for 
physical capital, which is a standard in the literature related to inefficiency 
estimation (Berger and Mester, 1997). 
 
Finally, in estimating the efficiency frontier in a cross-country context is important 
to use variables that could capture country-level heterogeneity both in terms of the 
general macroeconomic environment but also in terms of the banking industry of 
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each country. Both of these kind of country-level variables have an influence on the 
technology of banks located within specific national boundaries. Thus, we also 
include real GDP growth per capita (GDPgr) as an indicator of the dynamism of 
each economy. To control for macroeconomic stability we include the inflation rate 
(INFL). Finally, to account for the level of competition on the banking industry in 
each country, we use the sum of the assets of the three largest banks as a share of 
assets of all commercial banks (the C3 ratio). 
 
4.2.2 Determinants of Bank Performance  (Cost inefficiency) 
 
The next part of the analysis uses the cost inefficiency scores obtained with the 
methodology described in 4.2.1 to estimate the impact of labour regulation on the 
performance of banks located in the EU periphery. We also use bank-specific and 
country-specific control variables. 
 
4.2.2.1 Labour Regulations 
 
The  focus of this chapter is to examine the impact of labour regulations on the 
performance of the banking sector of the EU periphery countries and therefore the 
Fraser Index of Economic Freedom (Gwartney et. al, 2012) is included in the 
model
22
. The use of this index is common in the economics literature and consists of 
five factors: size of government; legal structure and security of property rights; 
access to sound money; freedom to exchange with foreigners; and regulation of 
credit, labour, and business. These are weighted and form a composite index, with 0 
indicating the lowest and 10 the highest level of economic freedom. It is the last 
component that is of most interest as the emphasis in this paper is primarily on 
labour regulations and their impact on the banking industry.  
To this end, the labour regulations component is decomposed to account for the 
following: i) Hiring regulations and minimum wage (MW-FR), ii) Hiring and firing 
regulations (HF-FR), iii) Centralized collective bargaining (CCB-FR),  iv) Hours 
regulations (HR-FR),  v) Mandated cost of worker dismissal (DISS-FR) and vi) 
                                                        
22
 See table A2 of Appendix A  for more details related to the Fraser Index of Economic Freedom. 
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Obligatory conscription to military service (CON-FR). The overall labour regulation 
index (LR-FR) is the average of these six subcomponents
23
. 
In order to enrich the results of the analysis we add an alternative index of labour 
regulation; the Strictness of Employment Protection index, which is published by the 
Organisation of Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD). The overall 
OECD Strictness of Employment Protection index
24
 (EMP-OECD) has a more 
narrow focus than the Fraser Index described above as it is mostly focused on the 
dismissal costs.  It is composed of three sub-indices: 
 An indicator which accounts for strictness of regulation in relation to regular 
contract employees (EMPREG-OECD), 
  An indicator which accounts for strictness of regulation in relation to fixed-
term and temporary work agency contracts (EMPTEMP-OECD), and  
  An indicator accounting for the additional costs for collective dismissals 
(EMPCOLL-OECD).  
Each indicator takes a score from 0-6 with higher values indicating more stringent 
regulation.  
Scores for the labour regulation  variables are shown in a cross-country context in 
Table 1.  This breakdown of dismissal costs in categories according to employment 
type allow us to further investigate how dismissal cost regulation could affect bank 
performance. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
23
 Note that the subcomponent (v), dismissal regulation, is available for these economies from 2002 to 
2010. This implies that the overall index of labour regulation using the Fraser Index of Economic 
Freedom is available from 2002-2010. The rest of the subcomponents are available for the 2000-2010 
period. 
24
 See table A3 of Appendix A for more details related to this index. 
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Table 1: Labour Regulation in the  Economies of the Eurozone Periphery(2000-
2010) 
 
Country MW-FR HF-FR CCB-FR HR-FR 
DISS-
FR CON-FR LR-FR 
EMPREG-
OECD 
EMPTEMP-
OECD 
EMPCOLL-
OECD EMP-OECD 
GREECE 5.44 3.04 3.85 3.93 7.66 1.82 4.30 2.30 3.64 3.25 2.97 
IRELAND 8.00 4.15 3.69 9.00 8.33 10.00 7.55 1.60 0.48 2.38 1.04 
ITALY 5.41 2.52 3.69 6.07 9.67 6.52 5.92 1.77 2.14 4.88 1.95 
PORTUGAL 5.47 2.61 5.63 5.48 1.36 8.18 4.97 4.17 2.71 2.58 3.44 
SPAIN 2.39 2.85 5.33 5.66 4.88 9.25 5.20 2.52 3.47 3.13 2.99 
 Average 4.52 2.71 4.37 5.85 7.37 7.34 5.57 2.22 2.65 3.97 2.43 
 
Note: For the Fraser Index components figures are in means and in a 0-10 scale. Higher values denote a more liberal regulatory environment. LR-FR: 
overall regulations index, MW-FR: hiring and minimum wage regulation, HF-FR: hiring and firing regulation, CCB-FR: centralised collective bargaining, 
DISS-FR: dismissal cost, CON-FR: conscription regulation. For the OECD Strictness of Employment Protection index figures are in means and in a 0-6 
scale. Higher values denote a less liberal regulatory environment. EMP-OECD: overall index of strictness of employment protection, EMPREG-OECD:  
strictness of employment protection for regular contract, EMPTEMP-OECD: strictness of employment protection for temporary contracts, EMPCOLL-
OECD: additional costs for collective dismissal 
Source: The 2012  version of the Fraser Index of Economic Freedom for LR-FR, MW-FR, CCB-FR, HR-FR, CON-FR and the OECD Strictness of 
Employment Protection index for EMP-OECD, EMPREG-OECD, EMPTEMP-OECD and EMPCOLL-OECD. 
 
In terms of the Fraser Index, the overall labour regulation (LR-FR) performance of 
Ireland is significantly higher, with a 7.55 score, than the rest of the periphery 
economies. This reflects the strong adoption of liberal economic policies in this 
country in recent years. On the other hand the periphery economies located in 
southern Europe show relatively low levels of labour market flexibility as the scores 
for all of them are centred around 5. Similarly, according to the overall OECD index 
of employment protection (EMP-OECD), which focuses mostly on dismissal costs, 
Ireland again represents the least regulated economy in terms of labour. Ireland’s 
overall employment protection index stands at 1.04 while none of the rest of the 
periphery economies scores lower than 1.9.  
With respect to the subcomponents of the Fraser Index a relatively similar picture 
emerges with Ireland being the highest performer in terms of minimum wage 
restrictions (MW-FR) and hours regulations (HR-FR) while it also scores highly in 
terms of dismissal costs (DISS-FR). The rest of the countries score low in most of 
the Fraser Index labour regulation subcomponents although there are cases that a 
country might be performing well in a specific component. For example Italy is the 
highest performer in terms of dismissal costs (DISS-FR) scoring 9.67 when the 
overall average for this component is 7.37.   Another important characteristic of the 
individual component scores in the Fraser Index is than on average some types of 
labour regulation are less flexible than others in the overall sample. For example, 
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although the overall figure for dismissal costs (DISS-FR) is 7.37, denoting a  liberal 
behaviour of the periphery economies (with the exception of Portugal) towards 
labour redundancy, the figure for centralised collective bargaining (CCB-LR) stands 
only at the 4.37  level reflecting the importance of trade union in all these 
economies.  
Similar initial conclusions can also be derived by having a cursory look in the 
individual subcomponents of the OECD  Strictness of Employment Protection index.  
The index for the cost for collective dismissal (EMPCOLL-OECD), a proxy for 
trade union bargaining power, is much higher than the average for the other two 
subcomponents. This verifies the importance of trade unions in all the countries of 
our sample as it was also found by looking at the qualitatively similar indicator of 
the Fraser Index (CCB-LR).  In terms of country specific scores, Ireland is the best 
performer (lowest scores) in all the components of the OECD index while the worst 
performers differ in each component. Portugal is the most strictly regulated 
periphery market when it comes to dismissal of employees on regular contracts 
(EMPREG-OECD), while in terms of temporary contracts (EMPTEMP-OECD) is 
Spain. Finally, Italy exhibits the highest collective dismissal costs (EMPCOLL-
OECD) denoting the high bargaining power that trade unions exhibit in this country. 
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Table 2 : Cross-Country Labour Regulation Over Time in the Economies of the 
Eurozone Periphery (2000-2010) 
  Greece Ireland Italy Portugal Spain 
year LR-FR OECD-EMP LR-FR OECD-EMP LR-FR OECD-EMP LR-FR OECD-EMP LR-FR OECD-EMP 
2000 . 3.50 . 0.93 . 2.51 . 3.67 . 2.93 
2001 . 3.50 . 0.93 . 2.01 . 3.67 . 3.05 
2002 4.08 3.50 7.62 0.93 4.87 2.01 4.27 3.67 5.14 3.05 
2003 4.14 2.73 7.28 1.11 4.92 1.82 4.35 3.67 5.20 2.98 
2004 4.15 2.73 7.40 1.11 5.35 1.82 5.33 3.46 5.43 2.98 
2005 4.01 2.73 7.48 1.11 6.49 1.82 5.26 3.46 5.33 2.98 
2006 4.39 2.73 7.48 1.11 6.40 1.82 5.27 3.46 5.36 2.98 
2007 4.66 2.73 7.54 1.11 6.17 1.82 5.29 3.46 5.30 2.98 
2008 4.43 2.73 7.58 1.11 6.30 1.89 5.18 3.15 5.14 2.98 
2009 4.50 . 7.77 . 6.76 . 5.16 2.88 5.05 . 
2010 4.36 . 7.93 . 6.48 . 4.67 . 4.72 . 
 
Note: For the Fraser Index components figures are in means and in a 0-10 scale. Higher values denote a more liberal regulatory 
environment. LR-FR: overall regulations index, MW-FR: hiring and minimum wage regulation, HF-FR: hiring and firing regulation, 
CCB-FR: centralised collective bargaining, DISS-FR: dismissal cost, CON-FR: conscription regulation. For the OECD Strictness of 
Employment Protection index figures are in means and in a 0-6 scale. Higher values denote a less liberal regulatory environment. EMP-
OECD: overall index of strictness of employment protection, EMPREG-OECD:  strictness of employment protection for regular 
contract, EMPTEMP-OECD: strictness of employment protection for temporary contracts, EMPCOLL-OECD: additional costs for 
collective dismissal 
Source: The 2012  version of the Fraser Index of Economic Freedom for LR-FR, MW-FR, CCB-FR, HR-FR, CON-FR and the OECD 
Strictness of Employment Protection index for EMP-OECD, EMPREG-OECD, EMPTEMP-OECD and EMPCOLL-OECD. 
The time series data on the regulation indices in Table 2 suggest that some periphery 
economies have significantly improved their scores in terms of labour regulations 
over the 2000-2010 period. In particular Italy has increased its overall Fraser Index 
of labour regulation (LR-FR) scores from 4.87 in 2002 to 6.48 in 2010. This 
improvement is also reflected in the overall OECD Strictness of Employment 
Protection index (EMP-OECD), which has decreased from 2.51 in 2000 to 1.89 in 
2008. Portugal and Greece have also improved significantly in terms of the overall 
OECD index  (EMP-OECD). The EMP-OECD score for Greece has declined from 
3.50 in 2000 to 2.73 in 2008, while the corresponding figures for Portugal are 3.67 
in 2000 and 2.88 in 2009. 
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4.2.2.2 Control Variables 
 
A number of control variables are used to account for individual bank 
characteristics. We include a bank size measure, total assets (TA), as it may indicate 
higher diversification of a bank’s loan portfolio (Mester, 1993). The ratio of equity 
to total assets (EA)  is employed as a measure of the incentives of shareholders to 
monitor management performance (Aysan and Ceyhan, 2008; Tanna et al., 2011). 
The ratio of loans to assets (LA) is also included as it represents the level of focus on 
traditional banking activities (Fries and Taci, 2005). As a proxy for bank default risk 
we use the loan loss provisions as a share to total loans (LLPL). The ratio of liquid 
assets to total assets (LIQAS) is used as a proxy for liquidity risk (Demirguc-Kunt 
and Huizinga, 2004)  From the one side, a high  liquidity ratio (LIQAS) can serve as 
a defence mechanism in case of urgent liquidity issues, but on the other hand 
relatively high availability of liquid assets could increase bank expenditures because 
of additional expenses required in terms of storage costs. We also use the return on 
assets  ratio (ROA) as a measure of profitability and the net interest margin (NIM). 
With regards to country level variables, in order to control for financial development 
we use domestic credit to the private sector as a share of GDP (DCP) while to 
control for the general level of economic development the real GDP per capita 
(GDPcap) in purchasing power parity (PPP) terms is employed. These measures of 
development are used regularly in the bank efficiency literature (Grigorian and 
Manole, 2006; Kasman and Yildirim, 2006; Pasiouras, 2008).  Finally, we use the 
ratio of inhabitants per square kilometre (DENS), a measure of population density, 
as a proxy for bank accessibility to potential customers. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
125 
 
 
4.3  Results and Discussion 
4.3.1  Cost Inefficiency Estimates 
 
Cross-country and cross-time cost inefficiency scores for the periphery economies 
over the 2000-2010 period are reported in Table 3
25
.  
Table 3: Cross-Country and Cross-Time Bank Cost Inefficiency in the 
Periphery Economies (2000-2010) 
Cross-Country Inefficiency Scores 
  Mean s.d. Obs 
Greece 0.162 0.065 179 
Ireland 0.189 0.100 84 
Italy 0.169 0.090 1633 
Portugal 0.175 0.088 234 
Spain 0.167 0.093 1000 
Average 0.169 0.090 3130 
Cross-Time  Inefficiency Scores 
  Mean s.d. Obs 
2000 0.166 0.094 314 
2001 0.177 0.095 327 
2002 0.171 0.093 313 
2003 0.170 0.097 308 
2004 0.174 0.112 296 
2005 0.152 0.069 285 
2006 0.163 0.085 275 
2007 0.176 0.079 260 
2008 0.191 0.089 265 
2009 0.157 0.084 265 
2010 0.155 0.066 222 
Note: The table reports the mean cost inefficiency scores 
by country and by year over the 2000-2010 periods. The 
cost inefficiencies were estimated using stochastic frontier 
analysis and assuming a common cross-country frontier.  
 
One cannot fail to notice that that the average bank cost inefficiency for the sample 
stands at around 0.17 implying that these banks need to improve by 17%, to reach 
the cost efficiency frontier. Such inefficiency scores are compatible with the extant 
literature on bank efficiency in the EU (Brissimis et al., 2010; Chortareas et al. 
2011). Bank inefficiency scores are higher in Ireland (0.189), a country that recently 
experienced tremendous difficulties in its banking system. On the other hand, the 
                                                        
25
 For the results of the stochastic frontier estimation see table B1 of Appendix B. 
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banking systems of the  periphery economies of southern Europe, with the exception 
of Portugal, are found to performing better than the periphery average. In terms of 
the time series, it is noticeable an acute increase of  the inefficiency of the banks in 
our sample in 2008, a year that represents the European onset of the global financial 
crisis. This inefficiency increase in 2008 is followed by two years  (2009 and 2010) 
of improved bank performance before the commencement of the severe phase of the 
sovereign debt crisis from 2011 onwards. 
 
4.3.2 The Determinants of Bank Performance (Cost Inefficiency) 
 
4.3.2.1 The Impact of the Control Variables 
 
As a first part of the analysis of the second stage results we provide an overview of 
the impact of the bank-specific and country-level control variables on bank 
inefficiency (see Tables 4 to 11). Bank size, as measured by the natural logarithm of 
total assets (lnTA), exerts a negative and statistically significant impact on 
inefficiency. This results provides  supporting evidence to the view that larger banks 
are able to perform better than smaller ones duo to better diversified asset portfolio 
(Mester, 1993). The coefficient of the equity to assets (EA) ratio is also negative and 
significant in most models in line with Tanna et al. (2011). In terms of the risk 
measures we find that the loan loss provisions to total loans ratio (LLPL)  has a 
positive and statistically significant on bank inefficiency, while the effect of the 
liquidity ratio (LIQAS) is significant and negative in most models. The positive 
association between the loan loss provision to total loans ratio (LLPL) and bank 
inefficiency resembles the “bad management” and the “bad luck” hypothesis (Berger 
and De Young, 1997). According to the “bad management” hypothesis the 
capabilities of the bank managers determine the quality of a bank’s loan portfolio. 
This suggests a negative association between bank performance and the LLPL ratio. 
On the other hand, the “bad luck” hypothesis posits that increases of impaired loans 
due to exogenous events forces banks to increase their cost in order to administer 
such situation. The negative impact of liquidity (LIQAS) on inefficiency is in line 
with previous studies who find that liquidity has a positive effect on bank 
performance (Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 1999; Kosmidou, 2008). Furthermore, 
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the net interest margin (NIM) exerts a positive effect on inefficiency.  In terms of the 
development control variables, we find that GDP per capita (lnGDPcap) and the 
level of financial development (DCP) have a positive impact on bank inefficiency in 
line with previous studies (Dietsch and Lozano-Vivas, 2000; Grigorian and Manole, 
2006; Kasman and Yildirm, 2006).  
 
4.3.2.2  The Impact of Labour Regulation on Bank Performance using the 
Fraser Index 
 
Tables 4 and 5 report the fixed effects and dynamic panel
26
 results respectively for 
the subcomponents and the overall score of the Fraser index of labour regulation.
27
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
26
 In all of our dynamic panel models we use the two-step system GMM  estimator (Arellano and 
Bover, 1995) specification with Windmeijer-corrected (robust) standard errors. 
27
 Note also that except this traditional  two stage set-up approach (estimation of  inefficiency scores 
in the first stage and consequently regression of  these inefficiency scores over the labour regulation 
variables), we have also performed additional robustness checks with regards to the impact of labour 
regulation  on bank inefficiency by employing the single stage estimation approach of Battese and 
Coelli (1995). The results remain similar in the single stage estimation framework and are depicted in 
Table B2 of the appendix of Chapter 4. 
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Table 4: The Impact of Labour Regulation on Bank Performance using the  
Fraser Index - Fixed Effects Models 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES INEF INEF INEF INEF INEF INEF INEF INEF 
         
lnTA -0.00309 -0.00193 -0.00235 0.00305 -0.00121 -0.00272 0.00586 0.00626 
 (0.0114) (0.0115) (0.0112) (0.0155) (0.0115) (0.0113) (0.0171) (0.0168) 
LA 0.0186 0.0201 0.0233 0.0453 0.0248 0.0197 0.0486 0.0485 
 (0.0379) (0.0374) (0.0375) (0.0347) (0.0370) (0.0384) (0.0367) (0.0344) 
EA -0.164** -0.163** -0.159** -0.113 -0.160** -0.165** -0.109 -0.114 
 (0.0783) (0.0797) (0.0799) (0.125) (0.0783) (0.0783) (0.129) (0.126) 
LLPL -0.0183 -0.0175 -0.0179 0.184** -0.0168 -0.0183 0.181** 0.184** 
 (0.0645) (0.0648) (0.0650) (0.0904) (0.0651) (0.0646) (0.0904) (0.0876) 
NIM 0.0164*** 0.0164*** 0.0160*** 0.0179*** 0.0160*** 0.0163*** 0.0179*** 0.0188*** 
 (0.00545) (0.00543) (0.00572) (0.00447) (0.00561) (0.00547) (0.00476) (0.00432) 
ROA -0.00317 -0.00326 -0.00321 -0.00718*** -0.00319 -0.00319 -0.00738*** -0.00757*** 
 (0.00234) (0.00234) (0.00235) (0.00271) (0.00235) (0.00234) (0.00265) (0.00266) 
LIQAS -0.00867 -0.0103 -0.00574 0.0480 -0.00720 -0.00862 0.0436 0.0423 
 (0.0435) (0.0443) (0.0432) (0.0371) (0.0431) (0.0438) (0.0394) (0.0375) 
lnGDPcap -0.0511 -0.0701 -0.0486 0.0632 -0.0965 -0.0594 -0.0251 0.0447 
 (0.0744) (0.0656) (0.0704) (0.0831) (0.0931) (0.0766) (0.106) (0.101) 
DCP 0.000287** 0.000322** 0.000269* 0.000193 0.000322** 0.000294** 0.000256 0.000231 
 (0.000143) (0.000130) (0.000148) (0.000174) (0.000141) (0.000142) (0.000162) (0.000159) 
lnDENS -0.00269 -0.00379** -0.00320* -0.000688 -0.00354* -0.00311 -0.00284 -0.00380 
 (0.00226) (0.00182) (0.00190) (0.00227) (0.00202) (0.00190) (0.00298) (0.00264) 
MW-FR 0.000709      0.00234  
 (0.00192)      (0.00162)  
HF-FR  -0.000482     -0.00126  
  (0.000746)     (0.00123)  
CCB-FR   -0.00406    -0.00240  
   (0.00377)    (0.00439)  
DISS-FR    -0.0138***   -0.0143***  
    (0.00492)   (0.00539)  
HR-FR     -0.00296  -0.00127  
     (0.00313)  (0.00324)  
CON-FR      -0.00139 0.00582  
      (0.00310) (0.00383)  
LR-FR        -0.00342 
        (0.00517) 
Constant 0.672 0.855 0.657 -0.521 1.123 0.759 0.342 -0.459 
 (0.747) (0.658) (0.708) (0.825) (0.932) (0.770) (0.988) (0.933) 
         
Observations 
F-test                               
2,906 
    5.33*** 
2,906 
    5.02*** 
2,906 
    6.31*** 
2,269 
     9.65*** 
2,906 
     5.13*** 
2,906 
     5.55*** 
2,269 
     8.28*** 
2,269 
   9.78*** 
R-squared 0.051 0.051 0.052 0.099 0.052 0.051 0.103 0.095 
Number of banks        425         425         425          373        425         425         373         373 
Note: The table reports the fixed-effects regression results for the 2000-2010 periods. The use of the fixed effects 
specification is justified after a Hausman test for each model. The dependent variable is the cost inefficiency scores (INEF)  
calculated using SFA and assuming a common frontier across countries. TA stands for total assets, LA stands for the loan to 
total assets ratio, EA is the equity to assets ratio, LLPL is the ratio of loan loss provision to total loans, NIM stands for net 
interest margin, ROA stands for return on assets, LIQAS stands for the liquid assets to total assets ratio, GDPcap is GDP per 
capita in purchasing power parity (PPP) constant 2005 international $, DCP stands for the ratio of domestic credit to the 
private sector over GDP, DENS stands for population density, MW-FR is hiring and minimum wage regulation, HF-FR 
stands for  hiring-firing regulation, CCB stands for centralised collective bargaining, HR-FR is hours regulation, DISS-FR 
stands for dismissal cost regulation and, LR-FR stands for  the overall labour regulation. To avoid collinearity problems with 
the selected variables, we first analyse correlations of all the selected variables. We observe that there is not a high level of 
correlation between the variables used in the models. ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels 
respectively. Robust Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Table 5: The Impact of Labour Regulation on Bank Performance using the  
Fraser Index - Dynamic Panel Models 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES INEF INEF INEF INEF INEF INEF INEF INEF 
         
L.INEF 0.543*** 0.528*** 0.539*** 0.535*** 0.540*** 0.541*** 0.555*** 0.538*** 
 (0.108) (0.107) (0.107) (0.102) (0.107) (0.108) (0.106) (0.0975) 
lnTA -0.0234* -0.0266** -0.0230* -0.0145 -0.0225* -0.0245* -0.0229 -0.0134 
 (0.0129) (0.0116) (0.0127) (0.0148) (0.0126) (0.0130) (0.0154) (0.0128) 
LA 0.0198 0.0106 0.0254 0.0879** 0.0450 0.0139 0.0956** 0.0800* 
 (0.0525) (0.0547) (0.0552) (0.0427) (0.0574) (0.0579) (0.0432) (0.0443) 
EA -0.306* -0.329** -0.339** -0.244* -0.363** -0.353** -0.278** -0.262* 
 (0.168) (0.153) (0.166) (0.146) (0.152) (0.171) (0.135) (0.135) 
LLPL 0.0314* 0.0347** 0.0337** -0.152 0.0305* 0.0290 -0.136 -0.159 
 (0.0182) (0.0157) (0.0166) (0.161) (0.0165) (0.0183) (0.168) (0.176) 
NIM 0.0109*** 0.0104*** 0.0108*** 0.0102** 0.0100*** 0.0114*** 0.00922** 0.0101** 
 (0.00327) (0.00339) (0.00325) (0.00444) (0.00318) (0.00350) (0.00421) (0.00474) 
ROA 0.000205 0.000208 0.000436 -0.00258 0.000275 7.87e-05 -0.000947 -0.00320 
 (0.00359) (0.00271) (0.00313) (0.00468) (0.00296) (0.00357) (0.00409) (0.00500) 
LIQAS -0.0928* -0.111** -0.0841 -0.0280 -0.0690 -0.0930* -0.0403 -0.0554 
 (0.0515) (0.0531) (0.0539) (0.0356) (0.0539) (0.0553) (0.0376) (0.0386) 
lnGDPcap 0.107 0.0555 0.115 0.268*** 0.0583 0.125 0.212* 0.114 
 (0.0883) (0.0954) (0.0902) (0.101) (0.0992) (0.0935) (0.125) (0.125) 
DCP 0.000364** 0.000530*** 0.000336* 0.000106 0.000380** 0.000364** 0.000246 0.000336 
 (0.000183) (0.000185) (0.000183) (0.000204) (0.000191) (0.000184) (0.000228) (0.000211) 
lnDENS -0.00333 -0.00565* -0.00247 0.00390 -0.00239 -0.00255 0.00137 -0.00283 
 (0.00246) (0.00315) (0.00245) (0.00274) (0.00260) (0.00249) (0.00398) (0.00376) 
MW-FR -0.00183      -0.00285**  
 (0.00134)      (0.00138)  
HF-FR  -0.00211**     -0.000454  
  (0.00100)     (0.00101)  
CCB-FR   -0.00195    0.00136  
   (0.00242)    (0.00266)  
DISS-FR    -0.0113***   -0.0120***  
    (0.00413)   (0.00458)  
HR-FR     -0.00411  -0.00602  
     (0.00264)  (0.00385)  
CON-FR      0.00434 0.00104  
      (0.00289) (0.00270)  
LR-FR        -0.00947** 
        (0.00406) 
Constant -0.689 -0.0942 -0.779 -2.446** -0.206 -0.871 -1.732 -0.911 
 (0.973) (1.051) (0.989) (1.170) (1.095) (1.010) (1.407) (1.416) 
         
Observations 2,456 2,456 2,456 2,159 2,456 2,456 2,159 2,159 
Number of banks 
N of instruments 
Wald 
AR2 p-value 
Hansen-J p-value 
381 
66 
      86.19*** 
0.2809 
0.561 
381 
66 
       75.21*** 
0.2552 
0.210 
381 
66 
     78.98*** 
0.2650 
0.213 
355 
65 
      81.86*** 
0.2259 
0.186 
381 
66 
    70.22*** 
0.2585 
0.144 
381 
66 
      81.80*** 
0.2683 
0.139 
355 
70 
     84.15*** 
0.2456 
0.547 
355 
65 
    78.37*** 
0.2348 
0.190 
Note: The table reports the dynamic panel results for the 2000-2010 periods. The two step system GMM estimator (Arellano 
and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998) is used with Windmeijer-corrected robust standard errors. The dependent 
variable is the cost inefficiency scores (INEF)  calculated using SFA and assuming a common frontier across countries. TA 
stands for total assets, LA stands for the loan to total assets ratio, EA is the equity to assets ratio, LLPL is the ratio of loan 
loss provision to total loans, NIM stands for net interest margin, ROA stands for return on assets, LIQAS stands for the 
liquid assets to total assets ratio, GDPcap is GDP per capita in purchasing power parity (PPP) constant 2005 international $, 
DCP stands for the ratio of domestic credit to the private sector over GDP, DENS stands for population density, MW-FR is 
hiring and minimum wage regulation, HF-FR stands for  hiring-firing regulation, CCB stands for centralised collective 
bargaining, HR-FR is hours regulation, DISS-FR stands for dismissal cost regulation and, LR-FR stands for  the overall 
labour regulation. To avoid collinearity problems with the selected variables, we first analyse correlations of all the selected 
variables. We observe that there is not a high level of correlation between the variables used in the models. ***, ** and * 
indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. Robust Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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In the fixed effects models the overall index of labour regulation (LR-FR) has a 
negative impact on inefficiency but this is not statistically significant (see model 8 of 
Table 4). The results for the subcomponents of the index reveal that most of them 
have a negative impact on inefficiency, while only the dismissal cost (DISS-FR) 
variable is statistically significant at the 1% level (see model 4 of Table 4). When all 
the subcomponents of the Fraser Index of labour regulation  are included in the 
same regression (see model 7 of Table 4) dismissal cost regulation (DISS-FR) retain 
its negative sign and significance. The dynamic panel results in Table 5 further 
confirm the negative impact at the 1% level of dismissal cost (DISS-FR) on bank 
inefficiency (see models 4 and 7 of Table 5). Furthermore, in the dynamic panel 
models, the hiring-firing variable (HF-FR) is also significant at the 5% level (see 
model 2 of Table 5). The hiring-firing variable (HF-FR) though loses its significance 
in model 8 of Table 5 when we control for the rest of the labour regulation variables, 
while the minimum wage and hiring regulation (MW-FR) variable becomes 
significant at the 5% level exerting a negative effect on inefficiency. Finally, in the 
dynamic panel results the overall Fraser Index of labour regulation (LR-FR) is 
negative and  statistically significant at the 5% level. The above results provide 
evidence that stringent regulation of labour has a negative impact on bank 
performance. However, not all types of labour regulation matter equally. The 
negative effect of labour regulation on bank performance is channelled mainly 
through the regulation of dismissal costs and less through rigidities in the hiring 
process. These results are in accordance with the previous literature that finds a 
negative relationship between the stringency of labour regulation and performance, 
which stems from increased dismissal costs (Bassanini et al. 2009; Autor et al. 
2007). Less stringent dismissal cost regulation can liberate firms from unproductive 
workers, that otherwise would be retained as employees, resulting in performance 
gains  (Eslava et al., 2004).  Additionally , less rigid labour regulation can have a 
positive impact on the productivity of employees  as it stimulates their motivation 
(Ichino and Riphahn, 2005; Riphahn 2004), and thus can have a positive impact on 
bank performance. Furthermore, a decrease in the labour regulation rigidities can 
increase firm profitability (Almeida and Carneiro, 2009; Draca et al., 2011) which 
can lead to further efficiency gains. 
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4.3.2.3  The Impact of Labour Regulation on Bank Performance using  the 
OECD Strictness of Employment Protection index 
 
In order to enrich the analysis and add more validity to the results obtained with the 
use of the Fraser Index of labour regulation we also present results from fixed 
effects and dynamic panel models that use the OECD Strictness of Employment 
Protection index as a measure of  regulation rigidities in the dismissal process. 
These results are available in Tables 6 and 7. 
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Table 6: The Impact of Labour Regulation on Bank Performance using the  
OECD Strictness of Employment Protection index - Fixed Effects Models 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES INEF INEF INEF INEF INEF 
      
lnTA 0.00418 0.00105 0.00258 0.00282 0.00131 
 (0.0119) (0.0121) (0.0119) (0.0120) (0.0122) 
LA -0.00148 -0.0140 -0.0130 -0.00519 -0.0136 
 (0.0462) (0.0456) (0.0440) (0.0463) (0.0457) 
EA -0.168* -0.180** -0.175** -0.164* -0.182** 
 (0.0871) (0.0837) (0.0810) (0.0852) (0.0841) 
LLPL -0.00724 -0.00756 -0.00748 -0.00816 -0.00723 
 (0.0678) (0.0675) (0.0676) (0.0677) (0.0676) 
NIM 0.0178*** 0.0187*** 0.0185*** 0.0179*** 0.0188*** 
 (0.00641) (0.00617) (0.00605) (0.00645) (0.00617) 
ROA -0.00406 -0.00401 -0.00408 -0.00396 -0.00402 
 (0.00279) (0.00274) (0.00274) (0.00280) (0.00273) 
LIQAS -0.0496 -0.0565 -0.0547 -0.0479 -0.0577 
 (0.0557) (0.0551) (0.0546) (0.0551) (0.0553) 
lnGDPcap -0.270*** -0.230** -0.211** -0.291*** -0.218** 
 (0.104) (0.108) (0.103) (0.100) (0.109) 
DCP 0.000726*** 0.000584*** 0.000563*** 0.000757*** 0.000561*** 
 (0.000164) (0.000175) (0.000167) (0.000164) (0.000174) 
lnDENS 0.000797 0.00209 -0.000177 0.00261 0.00150 
 (0.00221) (0.00221) (0.00218) (0.00226) (0.00221) 
EMPREG-OECD 0.0854***   0.0925***  
 (0.0326)   (0.0324)  
EMPTEMP-OECD  -0.0113  -0.0115  
  (0.03474)  (0.03482)  
EMPCOLL-OECD   0.0246 -0.00561  
   (0.0196) (0.0194)  
EMP-OECD     -0.0154 
     (0.0103) 
Constant 2.568** 2.450** 2.109** 2.836*** 2.331** 
 (1.021) (1.063) (1.018) (0.999) (1.071) 
      
Observations 
F-test 
2,461 
    7.63*** 
2,461 
    5.49*** 
2,479 
    5.77*** 
2,461 
    7.02*** 
2,461 
     5.65*** 
R-squared 0.082 0.078 0.071 0.087 0.076 
Number of banks 412 412 412 412 412 
Note: The table reports the fixed-effects regression results for the 2000-2009 periods. The use of the fixed effects 
specification is justified after a Hausman test for each model. The dependent variable is the cost inefficiency scores (INEF)  
calculated using SFA and assuming a common frontier across countries. TA stands for total assets, LA stands for the loan to 
total assets ratio, EA is the equity to assets ratio, LLPL is the ratio of loan loss provision to total loans, NIM stands for net 
interest margin, ROA stands for return on assets, LIQAS stands for the liquid assets to total assets ratio, GDPcap is GDP per 
capita in purchasing power parity (PPP) constant 2005 international $, DCP stands for the ratio of domestic credit to the 
private sector over GDP, DENS stands for population density,  EMP-OECD stands for the overall index of employment 
protection strictness, EMPREG-OECD stands for the strictness of regulation related to employees on regular contracts, 
EMPTEMP-OECD stands for the strictness of regulation related to employees in fixed-term/temporary contracts and 
EMPCOLL-OECD accounts for additional costs for collective dismissals. To avoid collinearity problems with the selected 
variables, we first analyse correlations of all the selected variables. We observe that there is not a high level of correlation 
between the variables used in the models. ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. Robust 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Table 7: The Impact of Labour Regulation on Bank Performance using the  
OECD Strictness of Employment Protection index - Dynamic Panel Models 
 
 
Note: The table reports the dynamic panel results for the 2000-2009 periods. The two step system GMM estimator (Arellano 
and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998) is used with Windmeijer-corrected robust standard errors. The dependent 
variable is the cost inefficiency scores (INEF)  calculated using SFA and assuming a common frontier across countries. TA 
stands for total assets, LA stands for the loan to total assets ratio, EA is the equity to assets ratio, LLPL is the ratio of loan 
loss provision to total loans, NIM stands for net interest margin, ROA stands for return on assets, LIQAS stands for the 
liquid assets to total assets ratio, GDPcap is GDP per capita in purchasing power parity (PPP) constant 2005 international $, 
DCP stands for the ratio of domestic credit to the private sector over GDP, DENS stands for population density,  EMP-
OECD stands for the overall index of employment protection strictness, EMPREG-OECD stands for the strictness of 
regulation related to employees on regular contracts, EMPTEMP-OECD stands for the strictness of regulation related to 
employees in fixed-term/temporary contracts and EMPCOLL-OECD accounts for additional costs for collective dismissals. 
To avoid collinearity problems with the selected variables, we first analyse correlations of all the selected variables. We 
observe that there is not a high level of correlation between the variables used in the models. ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% 
and 10% significance levels respectively. Robust Standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES INEF INEF INEF INEF INEF 
      
L.INEF 0.614*** 0.611*** 0.673*** 0.594*** 0.603*** 
 (0.109) (0.132) (0.102) (0.107) (0.132) 
lnTA -0.0243** -0.0156 -0.00210 -0.0203 -0.0200 
 (0.0122) (0.0110) (0.00981) (0.0157) (0.0123) 
LA -0.0347 -0.0298 0.0117 -0.0240 -0.0227 
 (0.0542) (0.0571) (0.0643) (0.0577) (0.0616) 
EA -0.226 -0.218 -0.243 -0.235 -0.266 
 (0.171) (0.159) (0.190) (0.170) (0.162) 
LLPL 0.0218 0.0231 0.0242 0.0222 0.0275 
 (0.0340) (0.0326) (0.0338) (0.0345) (0.0307) 
NIM 0.00994* 0.0123** 0.0141** 0.0101* 0.0108** 
 (0.00578) (0.00559) (0.00681) (0.00573) (0.00533) 
ROA -0.00506 -0.00352 -0.00227 -0.00485 -0.00277 
 (0.00774) (0.00746) (0.00806) (0.00783) (0.00696) 
LIQAS -0.140** -0.124** -0.0593 -0.130** -0.124* 
 (0.0561) (0.0610) (0.0598) (0.0552) (0.0635) 
lnGDPcap 0.0490 -0.0799 -0.0950 0.0721 0.0376 
 (0.107) (0.137) (0.0992) (0.104) (0.161) 
DCP 0.000612*** 0.000591*** 0.000513*** 0.000566*** 0.000530** 
 (0.000183) (0.000214) (0.000155) (0.000207) (0.000239) 
lnDENS 0.00305 0.00247 0.00144 0.00368 0.00336 
 (0.00210) (0.00205) (0.00239) (0.00235) (0.00216) 
EMPREG-OECD 0.0953***   0.101***  
 (0.0209)   (0.0254)  
EMPTEMP-OECD  0.00531  0.00855  
  (0.00828)  (0.00812)  
EMPCOLL-OECD   0.0313** 0.0101  
   (0.0142) (0.0248)  
EMP-OECD     0.0382** 
     (0.0176) 
Constant -0.309 1.061 0.855 -0.683 -0.143 
 (1.108) (1.468) (0.993) (1.140) (1.705) 
      
Observations 2,031 2,031 2,049 2,031 2,031 
Number of banks 
N of instruments 
Wald 
AR2 p-value 
Hansen-J p-value 
366 
56 
   153.23*** 
0.3405 
0.520 
366 
56 
     185.55*** 
0.3352 
0.436 
366 
66 
   386.02*** 
0.3141 
0.347 
366 
58 
    171.95*** 
0.3484 
0.763 
366 
56 
    155.76*** 
0.3473 
0.518 
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The overall OECD employment protection variable (EMP-OECD) has a positive and 
statistically significant at the 1% level impact on bank inefficiency in the dynamic 
panel analysis (see model 5 of Table 7). This result confirms the findings of the 
models in section 4.3.2.2 with regards to the impact of dismissal costs on bank 
inefficiency using the Fraser Index. Moving to the three subcomponents of the 
OECD index, the employment protection of regular contracts (EMPREG-OECD) 
asserts a positive and significant at the 1% level impact on bank inefficiency in both 
the fixed effects and the dynamic panel estimations (see model 1 of Table 6 and 
Table 7). These findings  remain robust when the rest of the subcomponents of the 
OECD index are included in the models (see models 4 of Table 6 and Table 7). The 
two other subcomponents of the OECD index, employment protection of temporary 
contracts (EMPTEMP-OECD) and protection from collective dismissals 
(EMPCOLL-OECD) are generally not found to have a significant impact on bank 
inefficiency. Only the protection from collective dismissal variable (EMPCOLL-
OECD) exerts a positive and significant at the 1% level impact on inefficiency (see 
model 3 of Table 7), however its coefficient becomes insignificant when we control 
for the rest of the subcomponents of the OECD index. The use of the OECD 
Strictness of Employment Protection index adds further validity to the results 
obtained with the use of the Fraser Index that the main channel through which 
labour regulation can harm bank performance is through dismissal costs. Labour 
regulation rigidities, such as high dismissal costs, could also have a negative effect 
on bank performance because they can act as barriers to entry for new firms 
(Scarpetta et al. 2004; Klapper et al. 2006), decreasing in such way competition. 
Decreased competition may have a negative effect on the performance of the non-
banking sectors, hampering in that way the fulfilment of their obligations, such as 
loans, to banks. In addition to this, stringent labour regulation may increase firm 
informality (Loayza, 1996; Schneider and Enste, 2000; Botero et al., 2004), making 
it in that way harder and more costly for banks to evaluate the creditworthiness of 
potential borrowers (Hoff and Stiglitz, 1993; Besley, 1995). Furthermore, the 
regulation of labour can also decrease performance because it reduces the incentives 
of firms to innovate (Saint Paul, 2002;  Michie and Sheehan, 2003; Koeniger, 2005; 
Barbosa and Faria, 2011).  
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4.3.2.4  Is the impact of Labour Regulation on Bank Performance Dependent 
on the Rule of Law?  
 
An interesting issue to explore further is whether the impact of labour regulation on 
bank performance differs according to the level of law enforcement capabilities of 
each country. This is because in the presence of weak rule of law and low 
bureaucratic quality, a regulation might exist formally but is not actually 
implemented. Previous literature on the impact of labour regulation on economic 
outcomes find that being able to enforce the regulation is of importance (Almeida 
and Carneiro, 2009; Caballero et al. 2013). In this study we follow Caballero et al. 
(2013) and interact the labour regulation variables with the rule of law variable (RL-
WB) from the World Governance Indicators of the World Bank. This indicator 
captures the level to which regulations are enforced in a country as well as judicial 
efficiency. The results for the dynamic panel models that include the interaction 
terms of the rule of law (RL-WB) with the labour regulation  components of the 
Fraser Index and of the OECD Strictness of Employment Protection index are 
presented in Tables 8 and 9 respectively.  
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Table 8: The Impact of Labour Regulation on Bank Performance using the  
Fraser Index - Interaction with the Rule of Law 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES INEF INEF INEF INEF INEF INEF INEF 
        
L.INEF 0.512*** 0.512*** 0.498*** 0.496*** 0.543*** 0.500*** 0.511*** 
 (0.101) (0.105) (0.105) (0.107) (0.108) (0.0986) (0.104) 
lnTA -0.0121 -0.0163 -0.0190 -0.0204 -0.0132 -0.0164 -0.0154 
 (0.0143) (0.0130) (0.0144) (0.0152) (0.0136) (0.0138) (0.0130) 
LA 0.0680 0.0701 0.0758* 0.0892** 0.0803** 0.0745* 0.0732* 
 (0.0423) (0.0432) (0.0438) (0.0393) (0.0407) (0.0406) (0.0430) 
EA -0.240 -0.260* -0.285* -0.209 -0.242* -0.273* -0.245* 
 (0.151) (0.145) (0.170) (0.143) (0.138) (0.146) (0.141) 
LLPL -0.149 -0.173 -0.168 -0.153 -0.179 -0.156 -0.168 
 (0.177) (0.180) (0.182) (0.170) (0.177) (0.181) (0.183) 
NIM 0.0130*** 0.0114** 0.0125** 0.0103** 0.0129*** 0.0127*** 0.0108** 
 (0.00481) (0.00495) (0.00488) (0.00462) (0.00440) (0.00479) (0.00486) 
ROA -0.00460 -0.00419 -0.00460 -0.00373 -0.00420 -0.00352 -0.00377 
 (0.00514) (0.00563) (0.00577) (0.00511) (0.00488) (0.00514) (0.00520) 
LIQAS -0.0513 -0.0561 -0.0453 -0.0171 -0.0373 -0.0422 -0.0551 
 (0.0410) (0.0406) (0.0400) (0.0362) (0.0353) (0.0373) (0.0392) 
lnGDPcap 0.168 0.137 0.166 0.282*** 0.266** 0.158 0.143 
 (0.104) (0.118) (0.107) (0.105) (0.127) (0.118) (0.125) 
DCP 0.000302 0.000400* 0.000458** 0.000233 0.000289 0.000358* 0.000378* 
 (0.000223) (0.000214) (0.000226) (0.000232) (0.000216) (0.000216) (0.000218) 
lnDENS -0.00233 -0.00306 -0.00109 -0.00281 -0.00185 -0.00158 -0.00308 
 (0.00297) (0.00367) (0.00305) (0.00341) (0.00315) (0.00298) (0.00361) 
RL-WB -0.0166 -0.0541 -0.0606 -0.156** -0.222*** -0.0163 -0.0950 
 (0.0354) (0.0368) (0.0634) (0.0613) (0.0541) (0.0269) (0.0818) 
MW-FR -0.00686**       
 (0.00348)       
MW-FR*RL-WB -0.0105*       
 (0.00568)       
HF-FR  0.000730      
  (0.00249)      
HF-FR*RL-WB  -0.00258      
  (0.00370)      
CCB-FR   -0.0204     
   (0.0133)     
CCB-FR*RL-WB   -0.0280*     
   (0.0170)     
DISS-FR    -0.000404    
    (0.00513)    
DISS-FR*RL-WB    -0.0158**    
    (0.00707)    
HR-FR     -0.0161**   
     (0.00720)   
HR-FR*RL-WB      -0.0306***   
     (0.00921)   
CON-FR      -0.000907  
      (0.00690)  
CON-FR*RL-WB      0.00988  
      (0.00974)  
LR-FR       0.00193 
       (0.0105) 
LR-FR*RL-WB       -0.0122 
       (0.0133) 
Constant -1.521 -1.185 -1.391 -2.632** -2.658* -1.408 -1.258 
 (1.196) (1.322) (1.221) (1.206) (1.426) (1.344) (1.419) 
        
Observations 2,159 2,159 2,159 2,159 2,159 2,159 2,159 
Number of banks 
N of instruments 
Wald 
AR2 p-value 
Hansen-J p-value 
355 
67 
    107.86*** 
0.2329 
0.383 
355 
67 
    87.78*** 
0.2115 
0.169 
355 
67 
    89.49*** 
0.2309 
0.212 
355 
67 
     90.53*** 
0.2331 
0.180 
355 
67 
   86.89*** 
0.2285 
0.583 
355 
67 
      84.64*** 
0.2213 
0.278 
355 
67 
   87.23*** 
0.2167 
0.149 
Note: The table reports the dynamic panel results for the 2000-2010 periods for the labour regulation components of  the Fraser Index of 
Economic Freedom and their interaction with the rule of law . The two step system GMM estimator (Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell 
and Bond, 1998) is used with Windmeijer-corrected robust standard errors. The dependent variable is the cost inefficiency scores (INEF)  
calculated using SFA and assuming a common frontier across countries. TA stands for total assets, LA stands for the loan to total assets 
ratio, EA is the equity to assets ratio, LLPL is the ratio of loan loss provision to total loans, NIM stands for net interest margin, ROA stands 
for return on assets, LIQAS stands for the liquid assets to total assets ratio, GDPcap is GDP per capita in purchasing power parity (PPP) 
constant 2005 international $, DCP stands for the ratio of domestic credit to the private sector over GDP, DENS stands for population 
density, MW-FR is hiring and minimum wage regulation, HF-FR stands for  hiring-firing regulation, CCB stands for centralised collective 
bargaining, HR-FR is hours regulation, DISS-FR stands for dismissal cost regulation, LR-FR stands for  the overall labour regulation, and 
RL-WB stands for rule of law. To avoid collinearity problems with the selected variables, we first analyse correlations of all the selected 
variables. We observe that there is not a high level of correlation between the variables used in the models. ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% 
and 10% significance levels respectively. Robust Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Table 9: The Impact of Labour Regulation on Bank Performance using the  
OECD Strictness of Employment Protection index - Interaction with the Rule of 
Law  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES INEF INEF INEF INEF 
     
L.INEF 0.617*** 0.591*** 0.590*** 0.583*** 
 (0.0992) (0.121) (0.144) (0.130) 
lnTA -0.0187* -0.0115 0.00166 -0.0128 
 (0.0112) (0.0107) (0.00959) (0.0115) 
LA 0.00994 0.00811 0.0496 0.0198 
 (0.0442) (0.0435) (0.0504) (0.0462) 
EA -0.0878 -0.104 -0.107 -0.0879 
 (0.0954) (0.0889) (0.125) (0.0985) 
LLPL -0.102 -0.192 -0.0703 -0.234 
 (0.234) (0.181) (0.211) (0.233) 
NIM 0.0143*** 0.0177*** 0.0193*** 0.0169*** 
 (0.00535) (0.00604) (0.00671) (0.00610) 
ROA -0.0105 -0.0114 -0.0119 -0.0129 
 (0.00816) (0.00773) (0.00781) (0.00959) 
LIQAS -0.0967** -0.0797** -0.0132 -0.0719* 
 (0.0413) (0.0402) (0.0370) (0.0434) 
lnGDPcap 0.0853 -0.00376 -0.0138 0.0837 
 (0.155) (0.145) (0.142) (0.164) 
DCP 0.000569** 0.000597*** 0.000556*** 0.000528** 
 (0.000240) (0.000229) (0.000183) (0.000242) 
lnDENS 0.00293 0.00231 -0.000521 0.00348 
 (0.00346) (0.00249) (0.00389) (0.00265) 
RL-WB -0.0941* -0.0264 -0.102 -0.0445 
 (0.0507) (0.0404) (0.112) (0.0569) 
EMPREG-OECD 0.134***    
 (0.0329)    
EMPREG-OECD*RL-WB 0.0448*    
 (0.0240)    
EMPTEMP-OECD  -0.00971   
  (0.0135)   
EMPTEMP-OECD*RL-WB  0.0163   
  (0.0180)   
EMPCOLL-OECD   0.0537*  
   (0.0304)  
EMPCOLL-OECD*RL-WB   -0.0164  
   (0.0232)  
EMP-OECD    0.00962 
    (0.0252) 
EMP-OECD*RL-WB    0.0239 
    (0.0271) 
Constant -0.896 0.194 -0.196 -0.728 
 (1.679) (1.580) (1.351) (1.795) 
     
Observations 1,734 1,734 1,752 1,734 
Number of banks 
N of instruments 
Wald 
AR2 p-value 
Hansen-J p-value 
340 
57 
     109.78*** 
0.3232 
0.467 
340 
57 
     104.25*** 
0.3223 
0.310 
340 
67 
   74.48*** 
0.2865 
0.197 
340 
57 
105.13*** 
0.3500 
0.154 
Note: The table reports the dynamic panel results for the 2000-2009 periods for the labour regulation components of  the 
OECD Strictness of Employment Protection and their interaction with the rule of law. The two step system GMM estimator 
(Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998) is used with Windmeijer-corrected robust standard errors. The 
dependent variable is the cost inefficiency scores (INEF)  calculated using SFA and assuming a common frontier across 
countries. TA stands for total assets, LA stands for the loan to total assets ratio, EA is the equity to assets ratio, LLPL is the 
ratio of loan loss provision to total loans, NIM stands for net interest margin, ROA stands for return on assets, LIQAS stands 
for the liquid assets to total assets ratio, GDPcap is GDP per capita in purchasing power parity (PPP) constant 2005 
international $, DCP stands for the ratio of domestic credit to the private sector over GDP, DENS stands for population 
density, RL-WB stands for rule of law,  EMP-OECD stands for the overall index of employment protection strictness, 
EMPREG-OECD stands for the strictness of regulation related to employees on regular contracts, EMPTEMP-OECD stands 
for the strictness of regulation related to employees in fixed-term/temporary contracts and EMPCOLL-OECD accounts for 
additional costs for collective dismissals. To avoid collinearity problems with the selected variables, we first analyse 
correlations of all the selected variables. We observe that there is not a high level of correlation between the variables used 
in the models. ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. Robust Standard errors are in 
parentheses. 
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In model 1 of Table 8 we can see that the individual effect of hiring and minimum 
wage regulation (MW-FR) on bank inefficiency is negative and statistically 
significant at the 5% level while its interaction with the rule of law (RL-WB) has a 
negative and statistically significant at the 10% level coefficient.  Similarly, the 
interaction between hours regulation (HR-FR) and the rule of law (RL-WB) is 
negative and statistically significant at the 1% level when the individual effect of the 
hours regulation (HR-FR) variable on bank performance is negative and significant 
at the 5% level (see model 5 of table 8).  Furthermore, the interaction between 
dismissal costs (DISS-FR) and the rule of law (RL-WB) is negatively and 
significantly at the 5% level related with inefficiency (see model 4 of Table 8). In 
this case though, the negative coefficient of the individual effect of the dismissal 
cost (DISS-FR) variable is not statistically different from zero. These results are 
confirmed in the models that use the alternative labour regulation measure; the 
OECD Strictness of Employment Protection index. More particularly, in model 1 of 
Table 9 the employment protection of regular contracts (EMPREG-OECD) has a 
positive and statistically significant at the 1% level impact on bank inefficiency 
while the coefficient of its interaction with the rule of law (RL-WB) is also positive 
and significant at the 10% level. Interestingly, the interaction terms between both 
labour regulation measures, the Fraser Index and OECD Strictness of Employment 
Protection index, and the rule of law (RL-WB) show that the negative impact of 
rigid labour regulation on bank performance is magnified in the presence of higher 
levels of law observance. These results are in accordance with Caballero et al. 
(2013) who find that it is the actual enforcement of labour regulation that can affect 
negatively economic performance by reducing productivity growth due to increased 
compliance costs. Furthermore Almeida and Carneiro (2009) find that the 
enforcement of labour regulation reduces several measures of firm performance such 
as output, sales, capital stock and productivity. This decreased firm performance of 
the firms located in countries with more strictly enforced labour regulation could be 
channelled to the banking sector via higher levels of loan defaults.  
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4.3.2.5  Does the Impact of Labour Regulation on Bank Performance Differs in 
the Crisis Period? 
 
In this section we explore whether the impact of labour on bank performance 
subdues or becomes magnified during the crisis. For this reason we create a crisis 
dummy (CRISIS-DUM) for the last three years of our sample, that is from 2008 to 
2010. Then we estimate dynamic panel models that include the crisis dummy 
variable (CRISIS-DUM) and its interaction with the labour regulation variables of 
the Fraser Index and the OECD Strictness of Employment Protection index. These 
estimations are available in tables 10 and 11.  
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Table 10: The Impact of Labour Regulation on Bank Performance using the  
Fraser Index -  Interaction with the Crisis Dummy 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES INEF INEF INEF INEF INEF INEF INEF 
        
L.INEF 0.537*** 0.525*** 0.516*** 0.527*** 0.535*** 0.563*** 0.545*** 
 (0.117) (0.113) (0.114) (0.116) (0.117) (0.109) (0.102) 
lnTA -0.0257* -0.0287** -0.0247* -0.0150 -0.0246* -0.0231* -0.0230* 
 (0.0136) (0.0123) (0.0132) (0.0148) (0.0137) (0.0140) (0.0139) 
LA 0.0305 0.0133 0.0262 0.0826* 0.0459 -0.00126 0.0376 
 (0.0539) (0.0546) (0.0542) (0.0429) (0.0562) (0.0586) (0.0399) 
EA -0.320* -0.338** -0.348** -0.248* -0.364** -0.327* -0.193 
 (0.167) (0.152) (0.165) (0.148) (0.148) (0.177) (0.125) 
LLPL 0.0323* 0.0341** 0.0333** -0.131 0.0308* 0.0270 -0.101 
 (0.0172) (0.0159) (0.0157) (0.167) (0.0159) (0.0199) (0.170) 
NIM 0.0110*** 0.0104*** 0.0114*** 0.0105** 0.0101*** 0.0131*** 0.0123** 
 (0.00328) (0.00354) (0.00327) (0.00446) (0.00332) (0.00459) (0.00519) 
ROA 0.000191 0.000252 0.000326 -0.00265 0.000397 -0.000705 -0.00425 
 (0.00336) (0.00267) (0.00313) (0.00464) (0.00292) (0.00412) (0.00418) 
LIQAS -0.0780 -0.101* -0.0788 -0.0283 -0.0617 -0.0858 -0.0650* 
 (0.0520) (0.0535) (0.0529) (0.0369) (0.0512) (0.0586) (0.0390) 
lnGDPcap 0.0711 0.0608 0.103 0.256** 0.0479 0.216** 0.159 
 (0.0984) (0.104) (0.0937) (0.120) (0.109) (0.100) (0.130) 
DCP 0.000295 0.000536*** 0.000327* 0.000106 0.000397* 0.000226 0.000347 
 (0.000187) (0.000202) (0.000180) (0.000207) (0.000209) (0.000204) (0.000228) 
lnDENS -0.00645** -0.00620* -0.00424 0.00265 -0.00272 -0.00623** -0.0109** 
 (0.00292) (0.00335) (0.00281) (0.00350) (0.00272) (0.00289) (0.00434) 
CRISIS-DUM 0.0333*** 0.0427*** 0.0560* 0.0151 0.0207  0.133***  0.155*** 
 (0.0104) (0.0112) (0.0294) (0.0218) (0.0231) (0.0223) (0.0204) 
MW-FR -0.000574       
 (0.00137)       
MW-FR*CRISIS-DUM -0.00494***       
 (0.00168)       
HF-FR  -0.00212**      
  (0.00104)      
HF-FR*CRISIS-DUM  -0.00405***      
  (0.00125)      
CCB-FR   -0.00102     
   (0.00254)     
CCB-FR*CRISIS-DUM   -0.0149*     
   (0.00792)     
DISS-FR    -0.00994**    
    (0.00405)    
DISS-FR*CRISIS-DUM    -0.00171    
    (0.00236)    
HR-FR     -0.00254   
     (0.00321)   
HR-FR*CRISIS-DUM     -0.00300   
     (0.00396)   
CON-FR      -0.000602  
      (0.00293)  
CON-FR*CRISIS-DUM      -0.0534***  
      (0.00867)  
LR-FR       -0.0180*** 
       (0.00418) 
LR-FR*CRISIS-DUM       -0.0632*** 
       (0.00786) 
Constant -0.280 -0.119 -0.625 -2.315* -0.0802 -1.785* -1.128 
 (1.070) (1.126) (1.031) (1.357) (1.181) (1.075) (1.478) 
        
Observations 2,456 2,456 2,456 2,159 2,456 2,456 2,159 
Number of banks 
N of instruments 
Wald 
AR2 p-value 
Hansen-J p-value 
381 
68 
     111.96*** 
0.2845 
0.471 
381 
68 
   126.24*** 
0.2806 
0.112 
381 
68 
  119.67*** 
0.2621 
0.357 
355 
67 
  110.40*** 
0.2216 
0.456 
381 
68 
90.10*** 
0.2627 
0.234 
381 
68 
     102.21*** 
0.2593 
0.152 
355 
67 
 97.27*** 
0.2316 
0.398 
Note: The table reports the dynamic panel results for the 2000-2010 periods for the labour regulation components of  the Fraser Index of 
Economic Freedom and their interaction with the crisis dummy (CRISIS DUM). The CRISIS DUM variable takes a value of 1 for the years 
2008 to 2010 and zero otherwise. The two step system GMM estimator (Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998) is used with 
Windmeijer-corrected robust standard errors. The dependent variable is the cost inefficiency scores (INEF)  calculated using SFA and 
assuming a common frontier across countries. TA stands for total assets, LA stands for the loan to total assets ratio, EA is the equity to 
assets ratio, LLPL is the ratio of loan loss provision to total loans, NIM stands for net interest margin, ROA stands for return on assets, 
LIQAS stands for the liquid assets to total assets ratio, GDPcap is GDP per capita in purchasing power parity (PPP) constant 2005 
international $, DCP stands for the ratio of domestic credit to the private sector over GDP, DENS stands for population density, MW-FR is 
hiring and minimum wage regulation, HF-FR stands for  hiring-firing regulation, CCB stands for centralised collective bargaining, HR-FR is 
hours regulation, DISS-FR stands for dismissal cost regulation, and LR-FR stands for  the overall labour regulation. To avoid collinearity 
problems with the selected variables, we first analyse correlations of all the selected variables. We observe that there is not a high level of 
correlation between the variables used in the models. ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. Robust 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Table 11: The Impact of Labour Regulation on Bank Performance using the 
OECD Strictness of Employment Protection index - Interaction with the Crisis 
Dummy 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES INEF INEF INEF INEF 
     
L.INEF 0.617*** 0.610*** 0.693*** 0.597*** 
 (0.0996) (0.121) (0.106) (0.120) 
lnTA -0.0243* -0.0168 0.00471 -0.0214* 
 (0.0125) (0.0117) (0.0108) (0.0127) 
LA -0.0390 -0.0163 0.0311 -0.00893 
 (0.0543) (0.0614) (0.0658) (0.0653) 
EA -0.241 -0.240 -0.182 -0.283* 
 (0.175) (0.169) (0.213) (0.163) 
LLPL 0.0208 0.0238 0.0196 0.0291 
 (0.0381) (0.0345) (0.0396) (0.0302) 
NIM 0.0104* 0.0124** 0.0148* 0.0109** 
 (0.00617) (0.00579) (0.00761) (0.00537) 
ROA -0.00566 -0.00369 -0.00428 -0.00264 
 (0.00912) (0.00820) (0.00976) (0.00709) 
LIQAS -0.157*** -0.122* -0.0601 -0.123* 
 (0.0579) (0.0623) (0.0608) (0.0633) 
lnGDPcap -0.00208 -0.153 -0.191 -0.0597 
 (0.141) (0.188) (0.135) (0.211) 
DCP 0.000683*** 0.000662*** 0.000510*** 0.000622** 
 (0.000189) (0.000254) (0.000184) (0.000281) 
lnDENS -0.00442* -0.00190 -0.00103 -0.00236 
 (0.00263) (0.00280) (0.00309) (0.00301) 
CRISIS-DUM           0.00298 0.0170 0.0258 0.0298* 
 (0.0179) (0.0137) (0.0211) (0.0162) 
EMPREG-OECD 0.0927***    
 (0.0222)    
EMPREG-OECD*CRISIS-DUM 0.00121    
 (0.00872)    
EMPTEMP-OECD  0.00735   
  (0.00883)   
EMPTEMP-OECD*CRISIS-DUM  0.00554   
  (0.00472)   
EMPCOLL-OECD   0.0469***  
   (0.0161)  
EMPCOLL-OECD*CRISIS-DUM   0.00737*  
   (0.00435)  
EMP-OECD    0.0409** 
    (0.0179) 
EMP-OECD*CRISIS-DUM    0.0115* 
    (0.00670) 
Constant 0.214 1.809 1.652 0.854 
 (1.404) (1.956) (1.308) (2.209) 
     
Observations 2,031 2,031 2,049 2,031 
Number of banks 
N of instruments 
Wald 
AR2 p-value 
Hansen-J p-value 
366 
58 
  158.77*** 
0.3439 
0.107 
366 
58 
    214.48*** 
0.3483 
0.198 
366 
68 
    556.34*** 
0.3177 
0.158 
366 
58 
   215.42*** 
0.3492 
0.124 
Note: The table reports the dynamic panel results for the 2000-2009 periods for the labour regulation components of  the OECD Strictness of 
Employment Protection and their interaction with the crisis dummy (CRISIS DUM). The CRISIS DUM variable takes a value of 1 for the 
years 2008 to 2009 and zero otherwise. The two step system GMM estimator (Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998) is used 
with Windmeijer-corrected robust standard errors. The dependent variable is the cost inefficiency scores (INEF)  calculated using SFA and 
assuming a common frontier across countries. TA stands for total assets, LA stands for the loan to total assets ratio, EA is the equity to 
assets ratio, LLPL is the ratio of loan loss provision to total loans, NIM stands for net interest margin, ROA stands for return on assets, 
LIQAS stands for the liquid assets to total assets ratio, GDPcap is GDP per capita in purchasing power parity (PPP) constant 2005 
international $, DCP stands for the ratio of domestic credit to the private sector over GDP, DENS stands for population density, EMP-
OECD stands for the overall index of employment protection strictness, EMPREG-OECD stands for the strictness of regulation related to 
employees on regular contracts, EMPTEMP-OECD stands for the strictness of regulation related to employees in fixed-term/temporary 
contracts and EMPCOLL-OECD accounts for additional costs for collective dismissals. To avoid collinearity problems with the selected 
variables, we first analyse correlations of all the selected variables. We observe that there is not a high level of correlation between the 
variables used in the models. ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. Robust Standard errors are in 
parentheses. 
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In model 7 of Table 10 the overall Fraser Index of labour regulation (LR-FR) 
variable exerts a negative and significant at the 1% level impact on bank inefficiency 
while the coefficient of its interaction with the crisis dummy (CRISIS-DUM) is also 
negative and significant at the 1% level. The models 1 to 6 of Table 10 include the 
interactions of the crisis dummy (CRISIS-DUM) with the subcomponents of the 
Fraser Index of labour regulation.  In model 2 of Table 10 the interaction of the 
hiring and firing regulation (HF-FR) with the crisis dummy (CRISIS-DUM) is 
negative and statistically significant at the 1% level while the individual effect of the 
hiring and firing regulation (HF-FR) is also negative and significant at the 5% level. 
These result provide evidence that the negative effect of stringent labour regulation 
in general, and in particular of regulation rigidities in the hiring and firing process, 
on bank  performance becomes more magnified during the crisis years. This 
outcome is further validated in the dynamic panel models that include the OECD 
index.  In model 4 of table 11 the individual effect of the overall employment 
protection (EMP-OECD) on bank inefficiency is positive at the 5% level while the 
coefficient of its interaction term with the crisis dummy (CRISIS-DUM) is also 
positive and significant at the 10% level. In terms of the subcomponents of the 
OECD index, the interaction term between the costs of collective dismissals 
(EMPCOLL-OECD)  and the crisis dummy (CRISIS-DUM) as well as the 
individual effect of the cost of collective dismissals (EMPCOLL-OECD)  assert a 
positive impact on bank inefficiency at the 10% and 1% levels of significance 
respectively. A possible explanation of these results could be that countries with 
higher labour market rigidities experience deeper recessions (Forteza and Rama, 
2006; Artha and de Haan, 2011). This is because stringent labour regulation can 
impede the creative-destruction process (Caballero et al. 2013) that facilitates the 
reallocation of resources from declining firms and sectors to expanding ones and so 
increase productivity (Foster et al., 2001; Bartelsman et al., 2009). This deterioration 
of the performance of firms located in countries with stringent labour regulation 
during the crisis could be channelled in the banking sector through increased levels 
of  loan defaults. 
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4.4 Conclusion 
 
In this study we explore if labour regulation is a statistically significant determinant 
of bank performance for the banks located in the Eurozone periphery. To this end, 
we use SFA to estimate bank-specific inefficiencies for the 2000-2010 period. Then 
we regress these inefficiency scores over several labour regulation variables along 
with several bank-specific and country-specific control variables. We use two 
different data sources for the labour regulation variables in order to increase the 
validity of our results. These are the Fraser Index of Economic Freedom (Gwartney 
et. al, 2012) and the OECD Strictness of Employment Protection index. Our 
empirical findings reveal that stringent labour regulation has a statistically negative 
impact on bank performance, that is it increases bank cost inefficiency. By 
decomposing the labour regulation components of the Fraser Index of Economic 
Freedom (Gwartney et. al, 2012) we identify that the type of regulation that is most 
harmful for bank performance are dismissal costs. The results of the models that 
employ the OECD index confirm the negative effect of dismissal cost regulation on 
bank performance and further identify that it is the dismissal cost regulation of 
employees in regular contracts that matters the most for bank performance. The use 
of interaction terms between a dummy for the crisis years (2008-2010) and the 
labour regulation variables exposes that the negative impact of rigid regulation of 
labour becomes magnified during economic shocks.  Thus a decrease in the 
stringency of labour regulation in the countries of the Eurozone periphery may prove 
to be beneficial for the performance of their bank sectors and make it more resilient 
at periods of economic downturn. In further analysis by using interaction terms 
between labour regulation and the rule of law we find that the negative individual 
effect of labour regulation on bank performance subdues at higher levels of law 
observance. This could be attributed to some positive effects of enforcing  labour 
regulation on firm performance because of increased firm-specific knowledge of the 
employees. Another explanation could be that higher levels of rule of law could act 
as a deterrent for firms to enter the unofficial economy in order to avoid stringent 
labour regulation. This could increase bank costs because it would be harder for 
them to evaluate the creditworthiness of borrowers.  
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Appendices to Chapter 4 
Appendix A 
 
Table A1: Summary of the literature on measuring cost efficiency using parametric and non-parametric approaches in the EU-15 
 
 
 
Authors Approach Countries Considered Period Main Results 
Allen and Rai (1996) DFA, SFA 
12 EU countries, 
Australia, Canada, 
Japan and USA 1988-1992 
Italian, French, UK and US  less efficient than Japanese, Austrian, German, 
Danish, Swedish and Canadians ones. Prevalence of input X-inefficiencies far 
outweighs that of output inefficiencies (as measures by economies of scale and 
scope). 
Pastor, Perez and 
Quesada (1997)  
DEA, 
Malmquist TFP 
index 6 EU countries and USA 1992 
France highest efficiency level followed by Spain. UK the lowest level of 
efficiency. 
Hasan et al. (2000) DEA 10 EU countries 1993 
Takes into account environmental variables related to the main economic 
conditions in each country and the country-level accessibility to banking 
services. Overall, the results based on cross-country efficiency scores suggest 
that the banks from Spain, Denmark, Portugal and Belgium are relatively more 
technically efficient in their own respective countries and successful in 
maintaining high levels of scores if they decide to move to any other sample 
European country. Harder for banks from other countries to establish profitable 
networks in Spain, Portugal or Denmark due to adverse environmental 
conditions. Banks from  France and Italy are found to be less efficient 
institutions across the board. 
Berger et al. (2000) DFA 
4 EU countries and the 
US 1992-1998 
On average, domestic banks have higher cost and profit efficiency than foreign 
banks. The disaggregated results suggest that domestic banks may be more 
efficient than foreign banks from most foreign countries; may be about equally 
efficient with foreign banks from some foreign countries; but may be less 
efficient than foreign banks from one (the U.S.) of the foreign countries. 
Support for a limited form of the global advantage hypothesis. 
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Dietsch and Lozano-Vivas 
(2000) DFA Spain and France 1998-1992 
Incorporation of country–specific environmental variables in the cost function 
(macroeconomic, financial structure and regulation and banking accessibility). 
Without environmental variables, the cost efficiency scores of Spanish banks 
are quite low compared to those of the French banks. However, when 
environmental variables are included in the model, the differences between 
both banking industries are reduced substantially.  Environmental variables 
contribute significantly to the difference in efficiency scores between the two 
countries. 
Bikker (2001) SFA 9 EU countries 1989-1997 
On average, Spanish, French and Italian banks appear to be less efficient than 
those in Germany, the Netherlands and the UK, while banks in Luxembourg, 
Belgium and Switzerland are the most efficient. Large differences in average X-
inefficiencies and cost-levels between countries exist, Spain being around 40% 
above and Luxembourg about 35% below the European average. 
Maudos et. al. (2002)  DEA 10 EU countries 1993-1996 
Cost and profit efficiency estimation. Wide range of variation in efficiency levels 
in the banking systems of the European Union, the variation in terms of proﬁt 
efficiency being greater than in terms of cost efficiency. high levels of efficiency 
in costs and lower levels in pros. Medium-sized banks reach the highest levels 
of efficiency in both costs and profits. The growth of the market, measured by 
the real growth rate of GDP, allows higher levels of efficiency to be achieved. 
Banks that operate in markets with a higher network density are less cost 
efficient. 
Lozano-Vivas, Pastor and 
Pastor (2002)  DEA 10 EU countries 1993 
Focus on country level environmental variables. Significant influence of 
environmental variables on efficiency scores as comparing the basic DEA and 
the environmental DEA average efficiency scores is observed that the worse the 
country-specific environmental conditions the greater the changes in the 
scores.  Environmental variables, which play an important role in explaining 
differences in efficiency, are related to the accessibility of banking services and 
to the particular economic conditions. Most efficient banks from almost any of 
the 10 European countries, with the exception of Italy and the Netherlands, 
have enough competitive viability to be able to operate in a more unified 
European banking market. 
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Bikker (2002) SFA 
14 EU countries and 
Switzerland 1990-1997 
Inefficiencies in 1997 are nearly 45% lower than in 1990 implying that 
deregulation, liberalisation and ongoing financial and monetary integration in 
the EU have increased competitive pressures and enforced European banks to 
operate more economically.  Banks in Luxembourg and Switzerland are the 
most efficient ones.  Banks from Germany, in Denmark, the Netherlands, 
Portugal and the UK take a n intermediate position, whereas those from 
Belgium, France, Greece, Italy and Spain are the least efficient ones. Large 
banks are twice as inefficient as small banks. The estimated inefficiency is also 
dependent on the type of bank. Cooperative and savings banks have, on 
average, relatively small inefficiencies of over, respectively, 15% and 20%, 
whereas commercial banks have inefficiencies, which are two or three times 
higher. 
Cavallo and Rossi (2002) SFA 6 EU countries  1992-1997 
Significant efficiency gaps among the performances of banks in different 
countries and of different institutional types. In particular, it is found that the 
Central-European  model is the one that operates closest to the efficient 
frontier. The analysis suggests that, at the beginning of European Monetary 
Union, national barriers and regulatory frameworks are still responsible for 
deviation from the efficient frontiers. 
Guevara and Maudos 
(2002) DFA 14 EU countries 1993-1997 
For cost efficiency the greatest differences within groups occur when the total 
sample is divided into institutional groups (commercial banks, saving banks, co-
operative banks and other banks), the country effect and the type of productive 
specialization being more important in explaining the differences between 
groups. Profit efficiency inequalities are explained to a certain extent by 
country-specific  factors (degree of competition, barriers to entry etc)/ 
Molyneaux and Williams 
(2005) SFA 10 EU countries 1996-2003 
Co-operative banks benefited from substantial gains in both profit and cost 
productivity. Annual profit improvements range between 4% and 8% for the 
majority of co-operative banks, with even larger cost productivity gains.  Best 
practice co-operative banks have moved further away from other banks in 
terms of increasing profits and reducing costs. 
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Hollo and Nagy (2006) SFA 
25 EU countries 
(englarged EU) 1999-2003 
Focus on country level environmental (exogenous to the banks) differences. 
Evidence about the  existence of an X-efficiency gap, as well as suggesting that 
the competitive edge of old EU members  in relation to cost-efficiency is 
decreasing over time. Controls for country level environmental factors, 
particularly for inflation, the level of development, the closely linked depth of 
financial intermediation and the regulatory architecture - reduce  the size of the 
actual gap between the old and new member states. Efficiency gap in terms of 
profit efficiency is also detected but only but only if the impact of home market 
conditions on profitability is controlled. If factors originating from the 
operational environment are controlled, significant differences in profit-
efficiency between the two regions no longer exist.  
Weil (2009) FF 10 EU countries 1994-2005 
Improvement in cost efficiency in all EU banking sectors as well as convergence 
in efficiency across EU countries. Evidence supports the view that financial 
integration has taken place on the EU banking markets in the years under 
study. 
Girardone, Nankervis, and 
Velentza, (2009)  SFA 15 EU countries 1998-2003 
On the whole the results reject the agency theory hypothesis that managers of 
privately-owned banks are more cost efficient than those of mutual banking 
institutions because of capital market devices as it is found that mutual banks 
operating in EU-15 countries are significantly more cost efficient than 
commercial banks. Results are mixed concerning the financial structure 
hypothesis that in developed financial systems bank efficiency should not be 
statistically different across bank-vs market-based economies. 
Koutsomanoli-Filippaki 
and Mamatzakis (2010) SFA 15 EU countries 1998-2005 
Considerable variation in the speed of adjustment across banking systems, 
while over time it appears that continuing efforts to advance financial 
integration have led to some improvement in the speed of adjustment to the 
long-run equilibrium 
Casu and Girardone 
(2010) DEA 15 EU countries 1997-2003 
Results seem to provide supporting evidence of convergence of  efficiency 
levels towards an EU average. However, the potential gains brought about by  
increased integration have been offset by a decrease in the overall efficiency 
levels.   
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Brissimis, Delis and 
Tsionas (2010) SFA 13 EU countries 1996-2003 
Technical and allocative efficiency are  close to 80% and 75% respectively. 
Overall economic efficiency shows an improving trend. The most technically 
efficient banking sectors were found to be those of Austria, Germany and the 
UK, the same sectors also recording the lower allocative inefficiency scores. In 
contrast, the  banking sectors of Ireland, Portugal and Italy have much more to 
gain from improving their efficiency level.  
 
Note: SFA stands for stochastic frontier analysis, DEA stands for Data Envelopment Analysis, FF stands for Fourier-Flexible, DFA stands for Data Frontier Analysis 
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Table A2: The Labour Regulation Components of the Fraser Index of Economic Freedom  
 
Variable Category Nature Score Description Source 
LR-FR 
Labour 
Regulations 
Component of the 
Regulation of Credit, 
Labour and Business 
0-10 
(higher 
more 
liberal) 
This variable takes values between 0 and 10 with higher values indicating greater 
economic freedom. A measure of the extent to which labour market rigidities are 
present. In order to earn high marks in the LR component, a  country must allow market 
forces to determine wages and establish the conditions of hiring and firing, and refrain 
from the use of conscription. This component is the average of six subcomponents: Bi: 
Hiring regulations and minimum wage, Bii:  Hiring and firing regulations, Biii: 
Centralised collective bargaining, Biv: Hours regulations, Bv: Mandated cost of worker 
dismissal, Bvi: Conscription. 
Fraser Index 
of Economic 
Freedom 
MW-FR 
Hiring 
regulations and 
minimum wage 
Subcomponent of the 
Regulation of  Labour 
0-10 
(higher 
more 
liberal) 
This sub-component is based on the World Bank’s Doing Business Difficulty of Hiring 
Index, which is described  as follows: “The difficulty of hiring index measures (i) 
whether fixed-term contracts are prohibited for permanent  tasks; (ii) the maximum 
cumulative duration of fixed-term contracts; and (iii) the ratio of the minimum wage for 
a trainee or first-time employee to the average value added per worker. An economy is 
assigned a score of 1 if fixed-term contracts are prohibited for permanent tasks and a 
score of 0 if they can be used for any task. A score of 1 is assigned if the maximum 
cumulative duration of fixed-term contracts is less than 3 years; 0.5 if it is 3 years or 
more but less than 5 years; and 0 if fixed-term contracts can last 5 years or more. 
Finally, a score of 1 is assigned if the ratio of the minimum wage to the average value 
added per worker is 0.75 or more; 0.67 for a ratio of 0.50 or more but less than 0.75; 
0.33 for a ratio of 0.25 or more but less than 0.50; and 0 for a ratio of less than 0.25.” 
Countries with higher difficulty of hiring are given lower ratings. • Source World Bank, 
Doing Business (various issues), <http://www.doingbusiness.org/>. 
Fraser Index 
of Economic 
Freedom 
HF-FR 
 Hiring and 
firing 
regulations 
Subcomponent of the 
Regulation of  Labour 
0-10 
(higher 
more 
liberal) 
This sub-component is based on the Global Competitiveness Report question: “The 
hiring and firing of workers is impeded by regulations (= 1) or flexibly determined by 
employers (= 7).” The question’s wording has varied slightly over the years. • Source 
World Economic Forum, Global Competitiveness Report (various issues), 
<http://www.weforum.org/en/initiatives/gcp/index.htm>. 
Fraser Index 
of Economic 
Freedom 
150 
 
 
CCB-FR 
Centralized 
collective 
bargaining 
Subcomponent of the 
Regulation of  Labour 
0-10 
(higher 
more 
liberal) 
This sub-component is based on the Global Competitiveness Report question: “Wages 
in your country are set by a centralized bargaining process (= 1) or up to each individual 
company (= 7).” The question’s wording has varied slightly over the years. • Source 
World Economic Forum, Global Competitiveness Report (various issues), 
<http://www.weforum.org/en/initiatives/gcp/index.htm>. 
Fraser Index 
of Economic 
Freedom 
HR-FR 
 Hours 
regulations 
Subcomponent of the 
Regulation of  Labour 
0-10 
(higher 
more 
liberal) 
This sub-component is based on the World Bank’s Doing Business Rigidity of Hours 
Index, which is described  as follows: “The rigidity of hours index has 5 components: (i) 
whether there are restrictions on night work;  (ii) whether there are restrictions on 
weekly holiday work; (iii) whether the work week can consist of 5.5 days;  (iv) whether 
the work week can extend to 50 hours or more (including overtime) for 2 months a year 
to respond to a seasonal increase in production; and (v) whether paid annual vacation is 
21 working days or fewer.  
For questions (i) and (ii), when restrictions other than premiums apply, a score of 1 is 
given. If the only restriction is a premium for night work and weekly holiday work, a 
score of 0, 0.33, 0.66 or 1 is given according to  the quartile in which the economy’s 
premium falls. If there are no restrictions, the economy receives a score  of 0. For 
questions (iii), (iv) and (v), when the answer is no, a score of 1 is assigned; otherwise a 
score of 0 is assigned.” • Note This component was previously called “Mandated cost of 
hiring a worker” and was based on the World Bank’s Doing Business data on the cost of 
all social security and payroll taxes and the cost of other mandated benefits including 
those for retirement, sickness, health care, maternity leave, family allowance, and  paid 
vacations and holidays associated with hiring an employee. Because of pressure from 
the International  Labour Organization, this measure was dropped from the Doing 
Business project. In order to maintain as much  consistency over time as possible, we 
have revised the dataset back to 2002 with these data replacing the previous values. • 
Source World Bank, Doing Business (various issues), <http://www.doingbusiness.org/>. 
Fraser Index 
of Economic 
Freedom 
DISS-FR 
 Mandated cost 
of worker 
dismissal 
Subcomponent of the 
Regulation of  Labour 
0-10 
(higher 
more 
liberal) 
This sub-component is based on the World Bank’s Doing Business data on the cost of 
the advance notice requirements, severance payments, and penalties due when 
dismissing a redundant worker. The formula used to calculate the zero-to-10 ratings 
was: (Vmax − Vi) / (Vmax − Vmin) multiplied by 10. Vi represents the dismissal cost 
(measured in weeks of wages). The values for Vmax and Vmin were set at 108 weeks 
(1.5 standard deviations above average) and 0 weeks, respectively. Countries with 
values outside the range marked off by Vmax and Vmin received ratings of either zero 
or ten, accordingly. • Source World Bank, Doing Business (various issues), 
<http://www.doingbusiness.org/>. 
Fraser Index 
of Economic 
Freedom 
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CON-FR Conscription 
Subcomponent of the 
Regulation of  Labour 
0-10 
(higher 
more 
liberal) 
Data on the use and duration of military conscription were used to construct rating 
intervals. Countries with longer conscription periods received lower ratings. A rating of 
10 was assigned to countries without military conscription. When length of conscription 
was six months or less, countries were given a rating of 5. When length of conscription 
was more than six months but not more than 12 months, countries were rated at 3. When 
length of conscription was more than 12 months but not more than 18 months, countries 
were assigned a rating  of 1. When conscription periods exceeded 18 months, countries 
were rated zero. If conscription was present, but apparently not strictly enforced or the 
length of service could not be determined, the country was given a rating of 3. In cases 
where it is clear conscription is never used, even though it may be possible, a rating of 
10 is given.If a country’s mandated national service includes clear non-military options, 
the country was given a rating of 5. • Source International Institute for Strategic Studies, 
The Military Balance (various issues); War Resisters International, World Survey of 
Conscription and Conscientious Objection to Military Service, <http://www.wri-
irg.org/programmes/world_survey/>. 
Fraser Index 
of Economic 
Freedom 
 
Note: The table reports only the components of the Fraser Index of Economic Freedom  used  in this study. The index consists of five areas:  (1) size of government; (2) legal 
structure and security of property rights; (3) access to sound money; (4) freedom to exchange with foreigners; and (5) regulation of credit, labour, and business. 
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Table A3: OECD Strictness of Employment of Protection Index  
Variable Score Headline Description Source 
EMPREG-
OECD 
0-6 (higher 
means more 
strict) 
Strictness of Employment 
Protection: Indicator for 
Dismissal of Employees on 
Regular Contracts 
This index incorporates three aspects of dismissal protection: (i) procedural 
inconveniences that employers face when starting the dismissal process, such 
as notification and consultation requirements; (ii) notice periods and severance 
pay, which typically vary by tenure of the employee; and (iii) difficulty of 
dismissal, as determined by the circumstances in which it is possible to dismiss 
workers, as well as the repercussions for the employer if a dismissal is found to 
be unfair (such as compensation and reinstatement). 
OECD Strictness 
of Employment 
Protection index 
EMPTEMP-
OECD 
0-6 (higher 
means more 
strict) 
Strictness of Employment 
Protection: Indicator for 
Strictness of Regulation on 
Temporary Contracts 
This index quantifies regulation of fixed-term and temporary work agency 
contracts with respect to the types of work for which these contracts are 
allowed and their duration. This measure also includes regulation governing the 
establishment and operation of temporary work agencies and requirements for 
agency workers to receive the same pay and/or conditions as equivalent 
workers in the user firm, which can increase the cost of using temporary 
agency workers relative to hiring workers on permanent contracts. 
OECD Strictness 
of Employment 
Protection index 
EMPCOLL-
OECD 
0-6 (higher 
means more 
strict) 
Strictness of Employment 
Protection: Additional costs for 
collective dismissals 
Most countries impose additional delays, costs or notification procedures when 
an employer dismisses a large number of workers at one time. This measure 
includes only additional costs which go beyond those applicable for individual 
dismissal. It does not reflect the overall strictness of regulation of collective 
dismissals, which is the sum of costs for individual dismissals and any 
additional cost of collective dismissals. 
OECD Strictness 
of Employment 
Protection index 
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Appendix B 
 
 
          Table B1: Cost Function with Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) 
 
 
  Coefficient Standard    Errors p-value 
constant         1.25837***    0.4060 0.0019 
lnP1        0.51400***  0.0832 0.0000 
lnP2 0.07553 0.0771 0.3274 
lnY1      0.38092***    0.0507 0.0000 
lnY2 
                
0.49455***       
0.0509 0.0000 
lnN1       0.25340***  0.0398 0.0000 
lnN2    -0.17064*     0.0882 0.0529 
(lnP1)
2      0.11215***  0.0089 0.0000 
(lnP2)
2      0.05877***  0.0116 0.0000 
(lnP1)(lnP2)    -0.20894***  0.0208 0.0000 
(lnY1)
2     0.13349***  0.0038 0.0000 
(lnY2)
2     0.15226***  0.0040 0.0000 
(lnY1)(lnY2)    -0.29902***  0.0086 0.0000 
(lnP1)(lnY1)    -0.04819***  0.0054 0.0000 
(lnP2)(lnY1)    0.03945***  0.0069 0.0000 
(lnP1)(lnY2) 0.00338 0.0059 0.5693 
(lnP2)(lnY2)      -0.01417**   0.0064 0.0265 
(lnN1)
2 0.00451 0.0043 0.2984 
(lnN2)
2 -0.01049 0.0147 0.4752 
(lnN1)(lnN2) 0.01613 0.0107 0.1301 
(lnN1)(lnY1)  -0.00675*   0.0036 0.0626 
(lnN1)(lnY2)    -0.01683*** 0.0033 0.0000 
(lnN1)(lnP1)       -0.01349***     0.0049 0.0055 
(lnN1)(lnP2)      0.04169***  0.0061 0.0000 
(lnN2)(lnY1)       0.01970***   0.0068 0.0037 
(lnN2)(lnY2) 0.00777 0.0072 0.2803 
(lnN2)(lnP1)        0.06172***  0.0099 0.0000 
(lnN2)(lnP2)     -0.06023***  0.0123 0.0000 
t 0.00444 0.0165 0.7873 
(t)2     0.00200**      0.0010 0.0476 
t(lnP1)       0.01249***     0.0023 0.0000 
t(lnP2)   -0.00570**   0.0027 0.0321 
t(lnY1)       0.01005***   0.0016 0.0000 
t(lnY2) 0.00218 0.0014 0.1257 
t(lnN1) 0.00014 0.0013 0.9163 
t(lnN2)       -0.01347*** 0.0024 0.0000 
C3 -0.00032 0.0003 0.2371 
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GDPgr   -0.00456**   0.0021 0.0334 
INFL    0.02508***   0.0050 0.0000 
Country Dummies                                                             yes 
Sigma-squared(v) 0.0258 
Sigma-squared(u)     0.0486 
Sigma(v)       0.1606 
Sigma(u)      0.2205 
Number of observations 3130 
Log likelihood 546.5325 
 
 
Notes: The table depicts the estimations of the cost efficiency frontier using stochastic frontier analysis (SFA). 
P1 and  P2  stand for the input prices of labour and physical capital  Y1 and Y2 stand for the outputs of loans and 
other earning assets respectively, N1 and N2 are the fixed netputs of fixed assets and equity.  As environmental 
(Z) variables we employ the three banks concentration ratio (C3), GDP growth (GDPgr), and the inflation rate 
(INFL). We also impose country dummies.  
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Table B2: Labour Regulations as Cost Inefficiency Determinants. Estimations that 
employ the Battese and Coelli (1995) Methodology. 
 
Variables Fraser Index    OECD Index   
constant -2.231 *** -2.678 ** 
lnTA -0.012   -0.034   
LA 0.147 *** 0.232 *** 
EA -0.201 *** -0.173 *** 
LLPL -0.004 * -0.020   
NIM 0.065 *** 0.004 * 
ROA -0.038 ** -0.230 * 
LIQAS -0.010   -0.035   
lnGDPcap 0.026 *** 0.019 *** 
DCP 0.001   0.002 * 
lnDENS -0.054 ** -0.003 * 
MW-FR -0.003 *     
HF-FR -0.001       
CCB-FR 0.002       
DISS-FR -0.074 ***     
HR-FR 0.002       
CON-FR 0.001       
EMPREG-OECD     0.131 *** 
EMPTEMP-OECD     -0.030   
EMPCOLL-OECD     -0.010   
Log-lik -952.483   -737.694   
LR test of the one 
sided error (x2) 1262.810   512.813   
Banks 373   412   
Observations 2269   2461   
Notes: The parameter estimates in this Table were obtained simultaneously with the parameters of the 
stochastic frontier using the Battese and Coelli (1995) model and present the effect of the covariates on the 
inefficiency term. TA stands for total assets, LA stands for the loan to total assets ratio, EA is the equity to 
assets ratio, LLPL is the ratio of loan loss provision to total loans, NIM stands for net interest margin, ROA 
stands for return on assets, LIQAS stands for the liquid assets to total assets ratio, GDPcap is GDP per capita in 
purchasing power parity (PPP) constant 2005 international $, DCP stands for the ratio of domestic credit to the 
private sector over GDP, DENS stands for population density, MW-FR is hiring and minimum wage 
regulation, HF-FR stands for  hiring-firing regulation, CCB stands for centralised collective bargaining, HR-
FR is hours regulation, DISS-FR stands for dismissal cost regulation, EMPREG-OECD stands for the 
strictness of regulation related to employees on regular contracts, EMPTEMP-OECD stands for the strictness 
of regulation related to employees in fixed-term/temporary contracts and EMPCOLL-OECD accounts for 
additional costs for collective dismissals. To avoid collinearity problems with the selected variables, we first 
analyse correlations of all the selected variables. We observe that there is not a high level of correlation 
between the variables used in the models. ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels 
respectively. We also impose country and year dummies.  
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Chapter 5: Conclusions 
 
 This thesis explores in a comprehensive way the impact that country-level business 
regulation had on the performance of the banking sector in the European Union over 
the 2000-2010 period. This topic is a novel contribution on the literature that 
examines the determinants of bank performance and has important public policy 
implications. The contribution begun by examining the impact of labour, business 
and credit related regulation on the performance, as measured by cost efficiency, of 
banks in the EU-10 (transition) economies over the 2000-2010 periods (Chapter 2). 
During the last decade the EU-10 countries have almost completed their transition 
from centrally planned to free market economies making the assessment of the 
impact of non-transition related regulations on bank performance a timely issue. In 
particular, we have estimated cost efficiency scores for banks located in the EU-10 
over the 2000-2010 periods using a non-parametric approach (DEA). Then we have 
regressed these scores in fixed effects, dynamic panel and panel vector 
autoregression (VAR) models over the regulation variables available in the Fraser 
Index of Economic Freedom. An important finding is that more liberal labour 
regulation is positively related with bank efficiency. This could be attributed to the 
direct reduction of personnel costs for the banks in the EU-10 but also increased 
performance of the firms in the non-financial sector due to less stringent labour 
regulation that could be channelled in the banking sector via a reduction in loan 
defaults. In terms of credit regulation, we have found a robust positive impact of the 
internationalisation of the banking systems of the EU-10 economies on bank 
efficiency. The index we have used captures both foreign bank presence and barriers 
to entry for foreign banks so the positive relationship between bank system 
internationalisation and bank performance could have a double interpretation. 
Foreign banks may bring the benefit of superior screening and risk management 
techniques in the EU-10 economies improving in that way performance. 
Furthermore, a reduction in the barriers to entry in the domestic market for foreign 
banks may reduce moral hazard by domestic banks and induce them to improve their 
performance. Finally, we find that business regulation does not exert a significant 
impact on bank performance in the EU-10 economies over the 2000-2010 period. 
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The public policy implications are clear from this chapter and suggest that the 
increased internationalisation of the EU-10 banking systems as well as a less 
stringent regulation of labour could prove beneficial for bank performance. 
 In Chapter 3 we have examined the impact of several types of business regulation 
on bank performance, as measured by cost efficiency, in the whole of the EU (EU-
27) over the 2004-2010 period by using  regulatory data from the “Doing Business” 
project of the World Bank. In particular we examine the impact on bank 
performance of regulations related to: getting credit, paying taxes, starting a 
business, enforcing contracts, protecting investors, resolving insolvency and 
employing workers. We put special emphasis on the “getting credit” type of 
regulations as they are directly relevant to the banking sector.  We also give a strong 
emphasis to the “paying taxes” and “ starting a business” type of regulations. This 
is because “paying taxes” related regulation is central to the efforts of EU 
policymakers to increase government revenue and improve public finances  as a 
measure to wither the sovereign debt crisis while the “ starting a business” type of 
regulations is of importance for EU governments to improve competitiveness in the 
aftermath crisis but also to close the competitiveness gap between the US and the 
EU and wither competition from emerging markets such as China and India. It is a 
useful endeavour then to examine the effect that reforms in business regulation could 
have on the banking systems of the EU economies. To this end, we have estimated 
cost efficiency scores for banks  in the EU-27 over the 2004-2010 periods using 
stochastic frontier analysis. Then we have regressed these scores in fixed effects  and 
dynamic panel  models over the regulation variables of the Doing Business” project 
of the World Bank. The results of this research are important as for the first time in 
the literature is examined the impact of business regulations on bank performance 
and significant results emerge. As far as concerns the “getting credit” type of 
regulations, we find that the strength of creditor rights has a negative impact on bank 
performance but on the other hand the depth of creditor rights as well as the  
population coverage of credit bureaus have a positive effect of bank efficiency. 
Strong creditor rights might increase moral hazard and complacency in the loan 
origination process and this might lead to an increase in loan defaults decreasing in 
that way performance. On the other hand increased quality  and coverage of credit 
information induces banks to make better informed choices to who they loan to and 
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this could lead to improvements of bank performance. In the light of these results 
important policy implications emerge. Regulators in the EU-27 should focus more 
on credit information infrastructure rather than the mere strengthening of creditor 
rights in order to improve the performance of the banking system. In some way 
credit information infrastructure could also act as a creditor rights enhancement 
mechanism as bank customers would avoid to get blacklisted and be excluded from 
future financing.  Furthermore we find that stringent regulation related to “starting a 
business” has a negative impact on bank performance as measured by cost 
efficiency.  This could be attributed to the decreased performance of the non-
banking sectors due to decreased competition that could be channelled to the 
banking sector due to increased loan defaults. Similar results are obtained for the 
“paying taxes” category of business regulations. Increased taxation burden both in 
terms of bureaucracy related regulation (number of tax payments per year and time 
dedicated by a firm for tax compliance) and profit taxation has a negative on bank 
performance in the EU-27.  These results lead to important policy implications.  A 
decrease in the burden of “starting a business” type of regulations could lead not 
only to an increase in the competitiveness of the EU-27 economies but also have a 
positive effect in their banking systems.  This result is timely as several EU 
economies, especially the ones of the EU periphery, try to simplify their “starting a 
business” regulation in order to improve competitiveness and in this way wither the 
sovereign debt crisis. On the other hand, the results for the “paying taxes” 
regulation can serve as a warning that when governments want to use taxation as a 
measure of increased government revenue in order to improve public finances they 
could harm the banking sector of the economy. Governments, should at least try to 
improve the bureaucracy related components of the “paying taxes” type of 
regulations.  
In many cases we also find that the individual effect of several business regulation 
variables is influenced by  institutional quality as measured by the rule of law and 
control of corruption variables. This is a second important contribution of Chapter 3.  
The rationale of interacting the business regulation variables with the rule of law is 
to capture the extent to which regulations are in place but are not actually enforced.  
The interaction of the business regulation variables with the control of corruption 
variable serves to explore the “grease the wheels” (Lui, 1985) and the “sand the 
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wheels’’(Murphy et al., 1993) hypotheses of corruption28. An important finding is 
that the positive impact of the quality of credit information variable (depth of credit 
information) and of the coverage of private sector credit registries subdues at higher 
levels of rule of law. This could mean that the informational advantages that the 
depth of credit information and of the private sector credit registries coverage gives 
to banks are more important for countries with lower level of rule of law where 
contracts, as for example loans, are less respected. This finding is important in terms 
of public policy as it warrants the improvement of the credit information depth for 
the countries of the EU that are characterised by lower levels of rule of law. This is 
especially true for the countries of the EU periphery such as Greece, Italy, Spain and 
Portugal but also for some of  the new EU member states. Another important finding 
is with regards the “paying taxes”  type of regulations and their interaction with the 
control of corruption variable. More particularly,  the main effect of the number of  
yearly tax payments and of the time dedicated by firms to comply with tax 
regulation on bank performance is negative but this effect subdues in the presence of 
higher control of corruption providing evidence of the “sand the wheels” 
hypothesis. A public policy implication  from this is that the reduction of the 
bureaucracy related taxation regulatory burden becomes of increased importance for 
the EU economies with higher levels of corruption.  In many other cases we also 
find that the impact of business regulations on bank performance in the EU-27  is 
influenced by institutional quality. This implies regulators should take a note of 
institutional quality  when prioritising and implementing reforms. 
In Chapter 4 we investigate in detail the impact of different types of labour 
regulation on the performance, as measured by cost efficiency, of banks located in 
the countries of the Eurozone Periphery (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain) 
over the 2000-2010 period. These countries are still in the process of recovering 
from the sovereign debt crisis and regulatory reforms are at the top of their economic 
                                                        
28As it is explained in Chapter 3, the “grease the wheel” hypothesis denotes that higher levels of 
corruption may speed up bureaucratic processes (see, for example Lui, 1985) and could thus increase 
firm operational efficiency while the “sand the wheels’’ hypothesis contends that higher levels of 
corruption represent an additional cost when dealing with public sector bureaucracy (Murphy et al., 
1993) and so further impede operational efficiency. 
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policy agenda in order to restore national competitiveness. Furthermore, these 
countries (with the exception of Ireland) until recently were characterised by 
stringent regulation of labour. To estimate cost efficiency scores we use SFA. We 
then regress these scores in fixed effect and dynamic panel models over several 
labour regulation variables and other bank-specific and country-specific control 
variables. To increase the credibility of our results we use  labour regulation 
variables from two sources: the Fraser Index of Economic Freedom and the 
Strictness of Employment Protection Index from the OECD. We identify that 
stringent labour regulation overall has a negative impact on bank performance. By 
decomposing the labour regulation index of the Fraser Index of Economic Freedom 
we find that the specific type of  labour regulation that harms bank performance is 
dismissal cost regulation and hiring and minimum wage regulation. The results from 
the alternative labour regulation index, the OECD Strictness of Employment 
Protection Index, confirms the result for the dismissal cost regulation and further 
identifies that the main channel through which stringent regulation of dismissals 
harms bank performance is through the protection of employees in regular contracts. 
This result supports, at least in terms of bank performance, the recent regulatory 
efforts of the government in the Eurozone periphery to make labour regulation less 
stringent at least with regards to dismissal costs and hiring and minimum wage 
regulation. Furthermore we find, in accordance with the labour economics literature, 
that the negative effect of labour regulation on bank performance is more 
pronounced in countries where such regulation is actually enforced (i.e. in countries 
with higher levels of rule of law). Finally we find that the negative impact of labour 
regulation on bank performance is magnified during the crisis years (2008-2010). As 
these countries are still in a recession phase, a fast implementation of liberal reforms 
in their labour markets is warranted for improvement in the performance of their 
banking sectors. 
This study is not short of limitations. We use  cost efficiency as a measure of bank 
performance. However, the examination of profit efficiency is also of great interest. 
Firms, such as banks, are profit maximising units and the target of profit 
maximisation does not necessarily  imply a cost minimisation of the production of 
bank services. Berger and Mester (1997) for example do not find a positive 
correlation between bank profit and bank cost efficiency and argue that profit 
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efficiency, in comparison with cost efficiency, represents a more complete measure 
of performance of the banking sector as it incorporates the revenue side of a bank’s 
balance sheet. A future investigation of the impact of business regulations on bank 
performance as measured by profit efficiency would be a useful and interesting 
endeavour. Future research could also examine the impact of business regulation on 
bank performance using standard financial ratios such as the cost to income ratio or 
the return on assets (ROA). Such financial ratios represent, in comparison with 
efficiency estimation,  crude measures of bank performance. However it would be 
interesting to investigate if the impact of different types of business regulation on 
bank performance is verified using these type of variables as measures of bank 
performance. 
A second important limitation of this study is that it does not examine the 
heterogeneity of the impact of the bank-specific type of regulations, as for example 
the depth of information in the credit registries and the strength of creditor rights, on 
the performance of foreign vis-à-vis domestic banks. The theoretical premise behind 
this  are the “home advantage” and the “global advantage” hypotheses posed by 
Berger et al. (2000).  If the  “global advantage” hypothesis holds then we would 
expect for example the positive impact of credit information depth on bank 
performance to be less pronounced for foreign banks as their strong firm-specific 
advantages (such as superior loan monitoring technologies) might enable them to 
operate more efficiently  vis-à-vis domestic competitors even in countries 
characterised  by low levels of credit information depth. On the other hand, if the 
“home advantage” hypothesis holds then domestic banks would be able to operate 
more efficiently than foreign banks at a given level of bank-specific type of 
regulation as they have the extra advantage to operate with better knowledge of the 
domestic environment. It is important to note that this avenue of future research also 
allows the investigation of the impact of regulatory distance (see for example 
Lensink et al., 2008) on foreign bank performance. The concept of regulatory 
distance could serve as measure of the liability of being foreign.  For example a 
subsidiary of a bank located in an economy with low levels of credit information 
depth while its parent originates from a country with high levels credit information 
depth faces increased liability of foreignness and this could have an impact on its 
performance.  
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Another important limitation of the research carried out in this thesis is that several 
regulation variables that are examined in terms of their impact on bank performance 
are country wide regulations (for example the labour regulation variables used in this 
study) and not specific to the banking sector.  This makes it hard to disentangle if the 
impact of such regulatory variables on bank performance is occurring because of the 
direct effect these regulation can have on banks or indirectly by influencing the 
performance of the non-banking sectors, which could consequently be channelled to 
the banking sector. In this thesis for the types of regulation that are country wide and 
not bank-specific we have given arguments for both of these potential channels. 
Future research could focus on creating measures of regulations directly relevant to 
the banking sector, as for example bank-specific labour regulation measures, in 
order to overcome this issue.  
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